THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals William McFarland and Jennifer McFarland, Appellants, v. Mansour Rashtchian and Amy Rashtchian, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000058

Appeal From Dorchester County Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-067 Submitted December 1, 2016 – Filed February 1, 2017

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown and Russell Grainger Hines, both of Young Clement Rivers, of Charleston, for Appellants.

David Cooper Cleveland and Michael Lawrence Leech, both of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence."); Keaton ex rel. Foster v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 497, 514 S.E.2d 570, 575 (1999) (providing an appellate court reviewing a jury charge "must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial. If, as a whole, the charges are reasonably free from error, isolated portions which might be misleading do not constitute reversible error." (quoting Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 547, 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (Ct. App. 1995))); id. at 495-96, 514 S.E.2d at 574 ("A jury charge is correct if '[w]hen the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law.'" (alteration by Keaton) (quoting State v. Johnson, 315 S.C. 485, 487 n.1, 445 S.E.2d 637, 638 n.1 (1994))); id. at 496, 514 S.E.2d at 574 ("The substance of the law is what must be instructed to the jury, not any particular verbiage." (quoting State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 554, 446 S.E.2d 411, 415 (1994)); Cartwright v. Herald Publ'g Co., 220 S.C. 492, 498, 68 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1951) ("Statements made in an honest endeavor to vindicate one's character or to protect one's interests are usually regarded as qualifiedly privileged, even though they are false, if they are made in good faith and without malice. Thus, it seems to be definitely settled that when one person assails another in the public press, the latter is entitled to make reply therein, and so long as the reply does not exceed the occasion, he cannot be held responsible for any resultant injury. . . . On the other hand, however, it is clear that a defensive communication will lose its privileged character if the person making it goes beyond the scope of the original attack or indulges in language that is unnecessarily defamatory." (quoting 33 Am. Jur. Libel and Slander § 134)).

AFFIRMED.1 HUFF and SHORT, JJ., and MOORE, A.J., concur.

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.