THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr., Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment & Workforce, South Carolina Budget & Control Board, and Office of the Governor of South Carolina, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002356

Appeal From Richland County G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-217 Submitted April 1, 2017 – Filed May 24, 2017

AFFIRMED

Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr., of Neeses, pro se.

Eugene Hamilton Matthews, of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP (stating a circuit court may dismiss a complaint when the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action); Dawkins v. Union Hosp. Dist., 408 S.C. 171, 176, 758 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2014) (providing the same standard of review for circuit courts and appellate courts when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP: "whether the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in the pleadings filed with the court"); Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 202, 584 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting this court will affirm a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) "if the facts alleged in the complaint do not support relief under any theory of law"); Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 331 S.C. 192, 204, 500 S.E.2d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 [to -220 (2005 & Supp. 2016)], is a limited waiver of governmental immunity."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17) (2005) ("The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from . . . employee conduct outside the scope of his official duties, or which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude."); Pallares v. Seinar, 407 S.C. 359, 370, 756 S.E.2d 128, 133 (2014) ("The tort of abuse of process is intended to compensate a party for harm resulting from another party's misuse of the legal system."); id. ("The essential elements of abuse of process are (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process that is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.").

AFFIRMED.1 LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.