THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Shawn Bethea, Appellant, v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000270

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-314 Submitted May 1, 2018 – Filed July 11, 2018

AFFIRMED

Thurmond Brooker, of Brooker Law Firm, of Florence, for Appellant.

Adam L. Whitsett, of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this appeal from a contested case hearing, Shawn Bethea appeals the order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirming the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division's (SLED's) denial of his application for a concealed weapon permit. On appeal, Bethea argues the ALC erred by finding he failed to satisfy the requirements for a concealed weapon permit due to his prior conviction for criminal domestic violence because he is not prohibited from possessing a firearm under (1) federal law or (2) state law. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: 1. As to whether Bethea's 1993 conviction disqualifies him from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) when the conviction is excluded from the definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i): Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved."); Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005) (explaining an appellant has "the burden of providing a sufficient record" for review).

2. As to whether the denial of the concealed weapon permit was proper under state law: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2017) (providing that, on review of an ALC decision, this court is "confined to the record," and may affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the ALC's decision); Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 415 S.C. 351, 355, 782 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016) ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which this [c]ourt is free to decide without any deference to the [ALC]."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-215(A) (2007) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except subject to subsection (B), SLED must issue a [concealed weapon] permit . . . to a resident . . . who is at least twenty-one years of age and who is not prohibited by state law from possessing the weapon . . . . "); S.C. Code Ann. § 23­31-215(B) (2007) (requiring SLED to conduct a federal fingerprint review and a background check and providing that "[i]f the fingerprint review and background check are favorable," SLED must issue the permit) (emphasis added); State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) ("A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers." (quoting Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 125, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992))); id. at 351, 688 S.E.2d at 575 ("Courts will reject a statutory interpretation [that] would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention.").

AFFIRMED.

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.