THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Henry Kevin Grant, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002499

Appeal From Laurens County Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-341 Submitted September 1, 2019 – Filed October 9, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In all criminal cases, an appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2003) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial."); id. at 318, 557 S.E.2d at 464 ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 478, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("A jury charge that is substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583 ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); id. ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 584 ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's] decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error or law."); State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 125, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1977) ("[V]oluntary intoxication, where it has not produced permanent insanity, is never an excuse for or a defense to crime, regardless of whether the intent involved be general or specific.").1 AFFIRMED.2

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and HILL, JJ., concur.

This case is distinguishable from Elonis v. United States because Elonis is narrowly focused on the specific intent requirement of section 875(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code, not on any broader First Amendment implications. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012-13 (2015); see also United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) ("But, importantly, the Court's holding in Elonis was purely statutory; and, having resolved the question on statutory grounds, the Court declined to address whether a similar subjective intent to threaten is a necessary component of a 'true threat' for purposes of the First Amendment.").

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.