Challenge Golf Group of South Carolina, LLC v. Brandimarte
Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Challenge Golf Group of South Carolina, LLC, Respondent, v. B.J. Brandimarte, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2018-000831
Appeal From Greenwood County Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-076 Submitted January 1, 2021 – Filed March 10, 2021
AFFIRMED
B.J. Brandimarte, of Greenwood, pro se.
David Sanford Wyatt, of Wyatt Law, P.A., of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: B.J. Brandimarte appeals an order of judgment from the trial court finding he owed $29,476.68 to Challenge Golf Group of South Carolina, LLC. We find the terms of the restrictive covenant encumbering Brandimarte's real property in the Grand Harbor Club were unambiguous. Brandimarte conceded he was a member of the Grand Harbor Club, and did not introduce any evidence indicating he was not bound by the covenant's terms. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: O'Shea v. Lesser, 308 S.C. 10, 14, 416 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1992) (explaining an action to enforce the terms of a restrictive covenant is at law); Butler Contracting, Inc. v. Ct. St., LLC, 369 S.C. 121, 127, 631 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2006) ("In an action at law, when a case is tried without a jury, the trial court's findings of fact will be upheld on appeal when they are reasonably supported by the evidence."); Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 287 S.C. 1, 6, 336 S.E.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 1985) ("'Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature,' so that the paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as determined from the whole document." (quoting Hoffman v. Cohen, 262 S.C. 71, 75, 202 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1974))); Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4, 498 S.E.2d 862, 863 (1998) ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their execution."); Shipyard Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Mangiaracina, 307 S.C. 299, 308, 414 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining when "the language imposing restrictions upon the use of property is unambiguous, the restrictions will be enforced according to their obvious meaning").1
AFFIRMED.2 LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.