IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Bomasada Investment Group II, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-1784-BHH v. ) ) ORDER Nationwide Insurance Co., ) ) Defendant. ) oS)

On September 30, 2019, this Court entered an order granting Defendant

Nationwide Insurance Co.’s (“Defendant” or “Nationwide”) motion for summary

judgment and denying Plaintiff Bomasada Investment Group II, LLC’s (“Plaintiff” or “BIG

Il”) motion for partial summary judgment. On October 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion

to alter or amend the Court’s order and judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Reconsideration of a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy

that should be used sparingly. See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’ Fire Ins. Co.,

(4th Cir. 1998); ,

, 485 n. 5 (2008). Ordinarily,

a court may grant a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59(e) for only three

reasons: (1) to comply with an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available previously; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent

manifest injustice. ,

.

In its motion, Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in ignoring the issue of whether Nationwides additional insured endorsement applied to BIG II as an additional insured

and instead ruling that a 2013 policy cannot cover work completed in 2007. (ECF No.

83-1 at 1.) Plaintiff states: [t]he application of the 2013 policy to work performed in 2007 has never been disputed and was never an issue in this case. It was never raised

by Nationwide in its brief and never raised by Nationwide in its reservation of rights.

( ) After review, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiffs arguments. Nationwide

asserted in its motion for summary judgment that the certificate of insurance that Jones

Glass provided BIG II identified applicable carriers as National Trust Insurance Company and FCCI Insurance company, but no where in the documents is there any reference to the insurance sold to Jones Glass by Nationwide which is approximately 6 years after the

date of the work performed by Jones Glass.” (ECF No. 66 at 2.) Nationwide further

asserted:

The Nationwide insurance policy, in pertinent part, mandates that the Additional Insured status is provided to an entity “for whom you are performing operations only as specified under a written contract that requires such person or entity to be added as an additional insured on your policy.” The work performed by Jones Glass for Hightower was six (6) years prior to the Nationwide policy term so it could not possibly be “for whom you are performing operations.” The subcontract cannot under any interpretation be construed as requiring any insurance above and beyond that set forth on the Certificate of Insurance. Nationwide could not have been identified because it did not insure Jones Glass, Inc., the Nationwide Insured at the time it was “performing operations” for Hightower Construction Co., Inc, being the general contractor on the project.

This is precisely the reasoning the Court adopted in its ruling; thus, Plaintiff's

contention that Nationwide never raised the issue is without merit. Ultimately, as the

Court previously explained, there was no opportunity for the Nationwide policy to be

triggered here because there was no point at which Jones Glass was both (1) insured by

Nationwide and (2) performing operations /n the present tense, whether for Hightower

or BIG II. Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that relief is warranted pursuant

to Rule 59(e), the Court denies Plaintiff s motion (ECF No. 83).

IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/Bruce H. Hendricks The Honorable Bruce H. Hendricks United States District Judge June 11, 2020 Charleston, South Carolina

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