Nathaniel Yisrael-Laquer v. Joe Kernell, Greenville County
District Court, D. South Carolina
Nathaniel Yisrael-Laquer v. Joe Kernell, Greenville County
Trial Court Opinion
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
)
Nathaniel Yisrael-Laquer, ) Case No. 6:25-cv-06094-JDA
)
Plaintiff, ) OPINION AND ORDER
)
v. )
)
Joe Kernell, Greenville County )
)
Defendants. )
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint, a Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) of the Magistrate Judge, and Plaintiff’s motions “for Title 42
USC Sec 14141” and for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. [Docs. 1; 9; 13; 14.]
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this
matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge William S. Brown for pre-trial
proceedings.
On June 23, 2025, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] On June 25, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued
a Report recommending that the action be dismissed without issuance and service of
process and without leave to amend. [Doc. 9.] The Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff of
the procedures and requirements for filing objections to the Report and the serious
consequences if he failed to do so. [Id. at 15.] The Clerk docketed objections from
Plaintiff on July 9, 2025. [Doc. 11.] On July 30 and August 6, 2025, the Clerk also
docketed motions from Plaintiff “for Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 14141” and “for declaratory
judgement and injunctive relief.” [Docs. 13; 14 (capitalization omitted).]
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71
(1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the
Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate
Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). The Court will review the Report only for clear error in the absence of an
objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (stating that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not
conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The Report explains several reasons why Plaintiff fails to adequately plead a claim
and why, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are brought to challenge the charges pending
against him or his present incarceration at the Greenville County Detention Center, his
claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. [Doc. 9 at 5–14.] In his objections,
Plaintiff does not engage the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. [Doc. 11.]
Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution for the pro se Plaintiff, the Court has
conducted a de novo review of the Report, the record, and the applicable law. Upon such
review, the Court accepts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and
incorporates it by reference. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED without issuance and
service of process, without leave to amend, and without prejudice, and Plaintiff’s motion
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief [Doc. 14] is FOUND AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s
“motion for Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 14141” [Doc. 13] is DENIED.*
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States District Judge
November 25, 2025
Greenville, South Carolina
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Plaintiff is hereby notified of the right to appeal this order pursuant to Rules 3 and
4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
* This motion invokes the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(“VCCLEA”), which originally appeared as 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and has been recodified as
34 U.S.C. § 12601 et seq. The VCCLEA prohibits government employees responsible
“for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles” from depriving
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected under the Constitution.
34 U.S.C. § 12601. Actions that this statute authorizes must be brought by the United
States Attorney General; individuals are not permitted to sue for a violation of this statute.
See Robinson v. City of Conway, No. 4:24-5448-JD-KDW, 2025 WL 1852267, at *3
(D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2025), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2025 WL 1788659
(D.S.C. June 30, 2025).
Reference
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