Boatright v. Wingate
Opinion of the Court
On the first ground, I am clearly of opinion that the marriage was a release at law, of all contracts existing between the husband and wife before marriage; but the court of equity would perhaps, under circumstances, enforce the contract, and consider the husband as a trustee for the wife.
The second ground involves a question of great importance to the community. It is contended that by the act of the 8th March, 1785, all marriage settlements are to be recorded in the secretary’s office, or be void, and that this settlement, not being so recorded, is consequently void. Since the passing of that act, there have been several acts on the subject, of which I shall hereafter take notice, but which I do not think can effect the question. The point will be determined by the construction given to this act, and the act of the 17th of March, passed at the same sitting of the Legislature. I cannot conceive that there is any thing in the act of the 8th March, which warrants me in determining that marriage settlements, made' subsequent to that time
By the act of the Legislature, passed on the 8th March, 1785, it is expressly required, that marriage settlements shall be recorded in the secretary of state’s office : and by a clause in the act passed the 17th of March, of the same year, and during the same session, and of course by the same members, it is said, that a memorial of marriage settlement, &c. &c. shall be registered in the secretary’s office, &c. and in the latter part of the clause, as if by chance, it is expressed in the words, following : “ And the clerks of all, and every of the county
The act of 1792, on the same subject, if it bears op the case at all, would go to support the act as far as legislative construction could weigh of the 8th of March. As to the consequences which would result from this construction, it is not for the judge to say. Let those who have incautiously recorded their marriage settlements in the county courts, make the best of it. I am, therefore, of opinion, thatthe rule ought to be discharged.
_TT 2d, Whether the deed of settlement, or marriage contract, not being recorded in the office of the secretary of state, was therefore void as to creditors?
As to the first point, it seems to me ¡that the contract was released % the subsequent marriage of the parties to it.
Let us now enquire what are the rules of law which apply to and govern this question.
By marriage, the husband and wife become one person in law. Her legal existence is suspended; and all compacts made between them while single, generally speaking, are avoided by the intermarriage. Co. Litt. 112. Cro. Car. 551. 1 Bl. Com. 442.
Articles entered into before marriage with the woman herself, and not with a trustee on her behalf, will be decreed to be executed by a court of equity : But at law, the subsequent intermarriage amounts to a release of the contract. 2 Ventr. 343. 3 Wooddes. 444. 2 Vern. 481.
In the case of Milbourn vs. Euart & others, 5 Term Rep. 381. the wife, after the death of her
There seems to be a distinction between a trust, and a legal estate. The particular tenant of a trust estate cannot bar a contingent remainder. ■ Of a trust estate the husband may be considered as standing seized. And where the trust is not to be executed by him, but by another after his death, upon a contingency which ■ may never happen, I can see no necessity for resorting to a court of equity after his death, in order to compel the performance of the contract. The contract may be considered as existing during the coverture, but so as not to impose any duty or obligation on the husband, or any thing to de done by him in his life time, by way of performing the contract. The contract is not void by the subsequent marriage, but remains valid as a trust, which may be protected by, a court of equity. After the death of the husband, the equitable claim of the obligee is converted into a legal right, which a court of law may enforce. This is the only way
If a man marries his debtor, the debt is gone, Co. Litt. 264. 6. The personal estate of the wife rests instantly on the marriage, in the husband. It is considered as a gift to him, or a purchase by him, in consideration of marriage : or rather it is because the wife can have no separate property of a personal nature, resting in herself, during the coverture ; for husband and wife are but one person in law. So, dioses in action belonging to the wife may be reduced into possession by the husband during the coverture, and become his property. Co. Litt. 351. b.
In the case of a bond given to the wife before marriage by the husband, payable after his death, the debt is a chose in action, which the husband cannot reduce into possession, and, therefore, it belongs to the wife as her sole property. In such case no rule or principle of law is infringed, by allowing the debt, or obligation to subsist, notwithstanding the subsequent marriage of the parties, and to be recoverable by the wife, or her representatives, after his death. But not so in a case like the present. The property in the slaves in question (the legal estate) must reside in some person during the coverture. In whom did it rest in this case? Certainly it could not abide in the wife. It would be repugnant to the law of marriage to
It has been said, that the contract created a trust 5 and that the husband must be regarded as a trustee for his wife. In equity, I am of opinion, it may be so considered ; and upon application to a court of equity, and all parties interested being before that court, the widow of the intestate may be completely relieved : provided there is no fraud or laches, which ought to exclude the equity of her claim. But in a court of law, the claim of the wife must be excluded ; or rather it cannot appear to have any legal foundation. If it has, any foundation at all, it is merely equitable. Upon legal principles, the contract was extinguished by the intermarriage, so far at least, as respected the settlement of the negroes on the wife. To have attained that object, it was necessary that a trustee should have been interposed in whom the legal right of the property meant to be settled, might have vested. Why is it usual to convey property in trdst, in this way, if it be not necessary? Precedents are said to teach and Ulus-. trate. Many precedents may be found teaching and illustrating this doctrine.
Suppose the bond in the case of Milbourn vs.
A husband may devise to his wife, for that does not take effect till after his death. Co. Litt. 112. So, a covenant, or contract, by a man with a woman, is not destroyed by their marriage, where the thing is future, to be done after the marriage, and after the death of the husband; as to leave the wife worth so much. Hob. 216. Cro. Jac. 511. 1 Com. Rep. 67. 1 Salk. 326. Carth. 512.
In the case of Cage vs. Acton, 1 Ld. Raym. 515. which ini Com. Rep. 66. is called Gage vs. Acton, the arguments of Turton & Gould, justices, by whom the case was determined, contrary to what Lord Kenyon was pleased to style, e( the flimsy and technical reasoning of Lord Holt,” go expressly upon the ground that nothing was to be performed during the coverture, and that the obligation could not be sued during the coverture.
The marriage was held to be only a suspension,
Lord Holt, on the contrary held, that the bond debt was extinguished by the intermarriage, because he considered it as a present debt; and the condition, in his opinion, made no alteration. The husband, (he said) was to receive the money, and in his own right; and therefore, he could not, at the same time, be the person bound to pay, (< and no intention of the parties can alter the law.” But, he admitted, that where the wife has a right, or duty, which by no possibility can accrue to her during co-verture, the husband cannot release it. The intermarriage, therefore, will not, ex consequenti, extinguish it. 1 Salk. 326.
The right of the wife in the. present case, to the benefit intended by the settlement, was to accrue during coverture as well as afterwards ; and to give it effect, the observance of it by the husband during the coverture, should have been enforced: or, it might have been necessary to enforce it. Therefore, it might have been released by the husband, and if so, it was extinguished by the intermarriage.
If this doctrine be sound, it is decisive of the mo
But, as it is desired that the other question submitted in this case may be decided, I shall proceed to consider it also, and declare my opinion upon it.
It has been insisted for the plaintiffs that the deed of marriage settlement, though it should be regarded as valid, notwithstanding the marriage, yet ought nevertheless, “to be deemed and declared to be fraudulent in respect to creditors, and liable to the payment and satisfaction' of the debts due by the party who made the deed, to a 11 intents and purposes, as if such deed had never 'been made because it was not recorded, nor lodged to be recorded in the office of the secretary of state, according to an act of assembly, entitled “ An Act to oblige persons interested in marriage deeds and contracts to record the same in the secretary’s office of this state,” passed the 8th day of March, 1785.
The defendant on the contrary, contends, that the deed being recorded in the office of the clerk of the district court of Richland, entitled all persons interested therein to every benefit which might have been claimed under it, if it had been recorded in the secretary’s office ; and to maintain this ground, reliance has been placed on the 47th section of an act, passed the 17th day of March, 1785, entitled “ An Act for establishing county courts, and for regula
And the act directs what such memorials shall contain. And it requires “ The clerks of all and every of the couuty courts within this state, twice in every year, to transmit memorials of all such deeds, settlements, mortgages or other conveyances, as have been proved or recorded in their respective courts, to the secretary’s office to be registered.” To this section of the act is added a proviso, “ that nothing therein contained shall extend, or be construed to have any retrospective operation, or to affect any deeds or other conveyances theretofore registered, or to be registered, as by law directed.”
In giving a construction to this act of assembly, it was supposed by the defendant’s counsel, that the legislature intended to establish different modes for
At the same time when this act passed, county courts were not practicably established in any part of the state ; but by an act which.passed the 12th day of March, 1785, the ivhole state was divided into counties. The district of Charleston was divided into six counties, and Georgetown was divided into four. Court houses were directed to be built in each county, in order that courts might be therein held. A few days after the passing of this act, another act was passed for establishing county courts ^ in every county of this state.” In this last mentioned act it contained the provision requiring the registry in the secretary’s office of a memorial of sales, &e.
At the same session of the legisture, on the 8th of March, 1785, the act passed to oblige persons interested in marriage contracts, to record them in the secretary’s office. I agree with the defendant’s counsel, that all these acts are to be regarded as co-temporaneous, and that neither should have prece-
Among other deeds, of which memorials are required, maiTiage settlements are mentioned. It cannot well be supposed that the legislature could have intended any thing so unnecessary and absurd, as to require the registry of marriage settlement deeds in the secretary’s office for the security of creditors,
The act of 1792, amending the act concerning the registry of marriage contracts, contains nothing contrary to the foregoing expositions : on the contrary, it corroborates and confirms them. Those contracts which are not provided for by the act of
The act of 1792 declares what shall be the constituent requisite of marriage contracts, deeds and settlements, made or entered into after the first of June, 1793. It requires that schedules of personal property shall accompany such deeds, and be recorded therewith; and that in default thereof, such deeds and marriage agreements shall be void, “ with respect to and against creditors, and bona fide purchasers or mortgagees.”
Not a word is said in this act to draw in question the former provisions of the act of 1785, touching the registry of deeds at full length, in the secretary’s office: but it clearly requires all subsequent deeds to. be so registered in that office, and that, in default thereof such deeds and contracts shall not only be void as to creditors, (as formerly,) but also in respect to, and against, bona fide purchasers and mortgagees.”
On both points my opinion is for the plaintiffs.
1st, Upon the first point in this case I am very clearly of opinion that the marriage settlement *s S°°d an^ valid, although no trustees are named in the deed. A case was mentioned in the course of the argument, between Bullard and Wife, in which it was said the court of equity decreed such a deed a good one. There could be no doubt but, in equity, such a deed would be held as binding on the parties. And that court, if necessary, would compel a special performance of the terms of the deed. I hold it, however, equally good and efficacious in a court of law, where a party defends herself under such a deed.
It appears to me, therefore, that this deed may well be construed into a covenant to stand seised fox’ the use of the wife after the husband’s death. Marriage is the highest consideration known in Iaw\ Any agreement, therefore, between a man and a feme sole, in consideration of an intended marriage between them that she shall hold property to her sole use, after his death, may, and ought to be construed into such a covenant.
It is laid down in 6 Bae. 99. with respect to consideration of marriage, that a man may stand seised to the use of his wife, and the consideration that she is his wife will raise a good estate to her in law. Bid. 83. And no precise set of words is necessary to constitute such a covenant, where the intent can be collected. And words shall be so construed that such deed may stand, if possible. 6 Bac. 100,
The case referred to in the argument, by Mr. Starke, the counsel for defendant, in Ld. Raym. 515. is a very strong one: hut not, in my opinion, so strong as the one under consideration. That was a case where a feme sole took a bond from the man she intended to marry, conditioned for the payment of ¿01,000 sterling, in case she survived him, which was held good after his death. Here is a specific agreement, that in consideration of marriage the ne-groes in question, should be the wife’s absolutely, in case she survived him.
In the case referred to, as in this case, it was contended that the marriage was an extinguishment of the contract. But the court determined otherwise. It was there admitted that by the intermarriage, all contracts for debts due in presentí, or in futurio, or upon a contingency which may become due duriug coverture, are extinct; because the husband and wife are but one person in law : so that there is no debtor and debtee. The debt would in such case become extinct." But where material rights are created, as well as an obligation to pay money, the court was of opinion that they might subsist together by the rules of law / for that the law does not love that rights should be destroyed, but that they should be supported and maintained, Lord Raym. 516, 517.
It was also further laid down in the case in Lord Raym. 518. that a release (or pretended extinguishment by the operation of law,) will never destroy the provision that was intended for the wife, by the agreement of the parties..
The same doctrine is laid down in 12 Mod. 290. 1 Salk. 255. and in Carth. 511. for it would be hard, indeed, if marriage should destroy that, whereof it was the cause ; for the rule is modus et conventio vinCent legem, and law, by its own operation, will do no wrong; and since it would be a great wrong to defeat the wife of her provision made before marriage, it would, indeed, be unnatural as well as unjust, that marriage should be a release of that provision by reason of which, and in consideration of which, the marriage took effect. I am, therefore, of opinion that the deed in this case was a good one in its creation, notwithstanding there are no trustees named in it, and that the wife, for whose benefit it was made, ought to enjoy the property the husband intended for her after his death.
2ndly, The second point is, that admitting it to be good between the parties, and all claiming under them; yet that it is void as to creditors, not having
Nothing is said about marriage settlements, as ex-tradistinguished from other deeds for lands or ne-groes, <£c. in any of our public acts, from the year 1712 till the year 1785, a period of seventy-three years. Then, for the first time in the history of our legislation, we hear of marriage settlements.
The act of the 8th of March, 1785, (Pub. Laws. 357.) after reciting the inconveniences to creditors and others, of keeping marriage contracts in the hands of the parties without recording, declares that all marriage contracts then existing shall be recorded, or lodged in the secretary’s office, to be recorded within twelve months thereafter. And that all marriage settlements thereafter to be entered into,
Afterwards, again, in the same month and year, (17th of March, 1785,) the county court act passed, dividing the state into counties, and establishing courts of jurisdiction in each county, and an office for recording deeds for lands within them respectively; and the forty-fifth clause of the act declares that all deeds shall be recorded in the said offices for lands lying within the said counties, within six months after the execution. And if the person ma-kind such deed resides in any other state, then within twelve months. And if out of the United States, then within two years after the execution of the same. If not, then such deeds shall be only good between the parties themselves; but not against creditors or subsequent purchasers. In this clause no mention is made of marriage settlements, or negroes, or other goods and chattels. It appears to be confined to lands only, yet the forty-seventh clause of the act seems to enlarge the operation of the act on this subject, and to include the whole. The words of the latter clause are these, “ And to the end that persons who are inclined to lend money upon the security of lands or negroes, or to become pur-
These, I believe, are all the acts and clauses Of acts, relating to the recording of deeds or marriage settlements, which have been passed in this state since the year 1712 ; or, at least, all that are in force. From all which I infer, that if no other act had passed upon the subject, but the act of the 8th of March, 1785, it would have been conclusive, however inconvenient it might have been to the
But the 45th clause of the county court act of the 17th of March, 1785, kid a broad foundation for improvement on that subject, by establishing an office for registering deeds and conveyances for lands in every county in the state ; and although nothing is said about marriage settlements, eo nomine, in that clause; yet if lands had been conveyed in trust for the Use of a woman after her husband’s death, I see no legal objection to the validity of such a deed, upon its being duly proved and recorded as the clause directs, any more than there would be against mortgages for securing the payment of money ; for a deed of conveyance for lands, is the Women generalissimum for every species of transfer of land from one man to another, and will include not only absolute fee simple estates, but also all estates upon condition, for lives, or upon trust, or for years, &c. and the words of the clause refer to such estates.
As, however, the 45th clause of that act might not seem broad enough to include marriage settlements, not only for lands but also for negroes, &c. the 47th clause goes all lengths, and appears to me to be fully explanatory of the intent and design of the law makers, and that they were all meant and intended to be recorded in the different offices in the counties. For why should that clause, in ordeT
I confess that these clauses might have been penned with more accuracy and precision; or they might have been thrown into one clause as relating to the same subject. But one part of the statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may (if possible) stand, tit res magis valiat quam percat. It is a duty incumbent on the court to give
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.