Kennedy v. Executors of Denoon
Opinion of the Court
This was a scire facias to revive a judgment. The original writ was in the name cf James Kennedy, late sheriff of Charleston district, The judgment was entered up in the name of James T, 0 ° i.. ~ Kennedy only, without the addition. This judgment was signed on the 5th day of November, 1793, and the scire facias issued on the 28th April, 1810. The defendant pleaded payment, and relied on the length of time from entering up judgment till the issuing of the scire facias, about 16 years and a half, as sufficient to raise a presumption of payment, without offering any proof of actual payment ; and to strengthen that presumption, the defendant’s counsel insisted that he ought to have liberty to prove the constant sol-venev of defendant’s testator, and -the embarrass-J .. , , ment of the plaintiffs pecuniary circumstances during this interval. Defendant’s counsel also moved for a non-suit on the ground that the plaintiff in the writ of scire facias had used the name of James Kennedy only; therefore, it varied from the record which had the addition, (i late sheriff of Charleston district.” The presiding judge overruled both these motions, and the jury found a verdict for plaintiff. The motion by defendant is to set aside
This doctrine of presumption Was first taken up by Lord Hale, who only thought it a circumstance from which a jury might presume payment. In this he was followed by Lord Holt and Lord Raymond, and after them Lord Mansfield, who seems to speak positively, that after a lapse of twenty years a bond shall be presumed to be paid. He has said, that in some cases, a less time might be sufficient ; and eighteen years had been allowed, by Lord Raymond, to be long enough. But judge Buller, in the case of Oswald vs. Leigh, in 1st Durnf. & East, 271. is of opinion that no less than twenty years could of itself form a presumption: and says that even twenty years, when no demand' has been made is only a circumstance for the jury to found presumption upon, and is in itself no legal bar j and in this opinion he only concurs with Lord Hale, who was the- founder Of this rule. And judge Buller asserts, that in those cases, when satisfaction of a bond has been presumed within a less period, some other evidence has been given in favour of such a presumption ; such as having settled an account in the intermediate time, without any notice having been taken of such a demand $ and this opinion seems to fully satisfy the eighteen years allowed by Lord Raymond.
The argument of the defendant’s counsel, that twenty years was fixed on because a bond at five per cent, would, in that time double itself: and by our
I think also the second ground equally untenable, for it appeal’s to me there was no such variance as the defendant contended for. As the name of plaintiff was mentioned in the original, as “ James Kennedy,” and also, otherwise called James Kennedy, late sheriff of Charleston district,?? he could then enter up his judgment in his name, either with or without the addition of “ late sheriff of Charleston and no advantage could be taken of it on the scire facias. .
But even if I should be incorrect in this opinion, it would seem that he could not take advantage of it under the plea of payment; but that nul tiel record was the only plea under which this variance could come properly before the court. 1st Chi tty f 480. I am, therefore, of opinion that a new trial ought to be refused, as well as the motion for non-suit and arrest of judgment.
Dissenting Opinion
dissentient. This was a scire facias to " *« . renew a judgment. About seventeen years had elapsed between the judgment and the scire facias. The defendant pleaded solvit ad diem ; and, as evi-^eiloe from vvhieh presumption of payment might arise, in addition to the lapse of time, offered to prove the embarrassed circumstances of the plaintiff, the affluent circumstances of the defendant’s testator, his punctuality in paying his debts, &c.. But this evidence was rejected by the presiding judge, on. the ground that no presumption of payment ought to be left to the jury, within the period of twenty years. The plaintiff of course obtained a judgment; and a motion is now made to set aside that judgment, and grant a new trial, on the ground that the judge misconceived the law, in rejecting the testimony offered.
It appears to me two distinct principles have been confounded, both in the decision on the circuit, and in the argument in this court, to wit; presumption of payment arising from lapse of time, and presumption of payment arising from other circumstances which is only strengthened by lapse of time. It is an established rule of law in England, that a lapse of twenty years, without any other circumstance, affords sufficient presumption of payment to bar an action of debt on bond. 2nd Sts. 826, 27. Seale vs. Barrington, 1st Campbell, 29. Colset et al. vs. Bud et al. 1st Bay, 482. And the same rule applies to an action of debt on a judgment, on a scire facias. Peake, 24. Tidd’s Practice, 19. The reason why twenty years was the period fixed
A doubt has been suggested whether the rule, ought to apply to a judgment, because it is a debt qf record. But when a debt is once admitted to have existed, circumstances going to establish a presumption of payment would appear to be equally strong, without regard to the nature of the debt. Indeed, as far as the reasons abovementioned are to be regarded, they apply more strongly to judgments, than bonds, because they do not always carry interest. If twenty years have not elapsed, the payment of a bond may be proved precisely as the payment of any other debt. A receipt for the second year’s rent is presumptive evidence that the first was paid s
By a reference to a few cases, we shall find that testimony of this sort is always admitted. In the case of the Executors of Brenton vs. the Executors of Cannon, 1st Bay, 482. the court say, if no interest has. been paid on a bond for twenty years, it shall be presumed to be satisfied; “ but the war, and a variety of distresses occasioned by the revolution alters the situation of the country greatly, and therefore all these circumstances should have been permitted to have gone to the jury.” In the caser of Williams vs. George, 1 Campbell, 217. the embarrassed circumstances of the defendant were given in evidence to rebut the presumption of payment. Upon the same principle, I should presume the embarrassed circumstances of the plaintiff, or the affluent circumstances of the defendant, might be shown to raise a contrary presumption. In the case of
In many of the cases which I have enumerated, the testimony was unavailing, and so it might have been in this ease. I give no opinion on that point; it is the principle I look to. Believing that the evidence ought to have been admitted ; that the time which had elapsed, though not of itself a bar to the plaintiff’s demand, added weight to the other circumstances ; and that all ought to have been submitted to the jury, under the direction of the Court, I am for granting a new trial.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.