Bulow v. City Council of Charleston
Bulow v. City Council of Charleston
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
It has been conceded, in the argument of the case, that
I take it to be generally true, that whatever appertains to the persons of the citizens, over whom, or over whose property, the supreme authority has a control, is a legitimate subject of taxation, unless it be exempted by a superior authority. Thus we see houses, lands, slaves, cattle, stock in trade, money at interest, professional income, and all the long list of property and interest, are so considered ; and it cannot be doubted that United States Bank stock falls within the class of legitimate objects of taxation ; and it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to show that it was exempted* by an authority superior to that of the City Council. It has been attempted to be demonstrated by the following view of the subject.
1. It was contended, that Congress had authority under the Constitution of the United States, to establish a bank, and, necessarily all the powers requisite to carry it into effect; and that the exercise of the right of taxation, by any other power, is incompatible with that authority, as it might be carried to an extent which would defeat the object of its establishment.
2. That the United States Bank stock held by the plaintiffs, must be regarded as being located at the mother bank, although there be a branch here, and although the plaintiffs may receive their dividends here ; and therefore not within the power of the City Council.
1. It is not proposed, nor is it necessary, to enter into the question formerly much contested, whether under the Constitution of the United States, Congress had or had not the power to establish a National Bank ; nor will it be denied, that the exercise of the right of taxation over it, as a bank, would be incompatible with that power ; or that the stock held by the United States is for that reason exempted. But with all these admissions, it appears true, that the conclusion drawn from the first view of the subject does not necessarily follow; and to demonstrate that it does not, it will only be necessary to examine into the nature of the property which the stockholder has in the stock. Though bound together by a union of funds and a community of interests, the stock of each member, of whom the United States constitutes one only, the property which each possesses, in it, is wholly distinct, and independent of the others, and in no manner dependent on, or connected with, them, further than the losses or profits of the one is measured by those of the others, in consequence of the community of their interest. It does not therefore follow, that if the interest of the United States in the bank, or the bank itself, in respect thereof, is exempted from taxation, that the interest of an individual, in no wise connected* with, or under its control, shall be also exempted.
Connected with this subject, an argument was founded on the position that the bank constituted one of the component parts of the fiscal departments of the United States, and was therefore exempted from taxation. I think it has been before shown, that the interest of the United States and the individual stockholders are distinct and independent. Admitting therefore, that it might be so considered, in relation to the United States, the reasons before given demonstrate that the same protection is not intended to the individual.
2. Having before, as I think, clearly established the position, that all sources °f wealth and income are the legitimate subjects of taxation, when either the person of the possessor, or the thing itself, is within the power of the authority imposing it, it is sufficient to remark on this branch of the subject, that when the person, and not the thing, is within the reach of the authority imposing it, it must be considered as a tax imposed on the person in respect of the thing ; and I am not sure that every tax ought not be so considered, so that from whatever source the thing arises, it is a fit object of taxation.
The policy of this ordinance does not fall within the judicial sphere of a court of justice; it belongs to them only to expound the law. But if I were allowed an opinion on the subject, I think it very questionable whether the unlimited exercise of the power might not have the effect of driving from the city a great proportion of its mercantile capital, and necessarily all the advantages arising from the dividends. This, however, is a matter for the consideration of the Council, and they will no doubt act upon it as policy and convenience may dictate.
I am of opinion that the motion ought to be granted.
7 Stat. 98.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting, delivered his opinion as follows :
Having taken a different view of this question from a majority of the Court, perhaps it may have been thought my duty to have given the subject a more ample investigation than I am prepared to do on this
The great objects of the federal compact are declared to be “to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty.” Preamble to the Constitution, Grimke, P. L. App. 29.
It is also further declared, that Congress shall have power to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect all the powers so delegated by the Constitution. Art. 1, sec. 8. P. L. App. 82. For what purpose, let it be asked, does the Constitution contain such a provision, if the operation of any Act of Congress may be defeated by an Act emanating from the authority of a State ? If such is the situation of our government, it does appear to me the people of the United States have failed in the attempt to effect, at least, one of the great and avowed objects of the confederation : that of securing to themselves and their posterity, “ domestic tranquillity.” *1 cannot conceive a more effectual source of domestic discord, than a power in the States to resist or defeat the operation of a constitutional Act of the general government.
It is said, we have nothing to do with the policy of the measure. It is true, we are not authorized, with a view to answer any political object, to give a construction to the constitution inconsistent with the letter and spirit of that instrument. But it is a rule, universally admitted in the construction of statutes, to consider the old law, the mischief existing under it, and the remedy intended to be applied. In searching for the true meaning of the constitution, we must frequently look to iha preexisting state of things, and inquire, what purpose was intended to be
The strong ground on which the motion is attempted to be supported,
There is another view of the subject which, perhaps, deserves consideration. The sixth article of the federal constitution declares,’that this constitution, and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution, or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding. If the laws of the United States are to be supreme, any law of a State impeding their operation must be unconstitutional. Otherwise a State might indirectly defeat the most important ^measures of the general government.- If-the government does not deserve our confidence, let it be abolished, or so modified as to remove the danger. But let it not be so maimed and crippled as not to.be able to do either good or harm, except by accident.
That our liberties may be destroyed by an abuse of the powers vested in Congress, I admit. Too liberal a use of the single power to raise armies might prostrate the liberties of the American people. There is no good government which has not the power to destroy the. liberties of the people. No government can be good, which has not such power. Without the power to destroy, the government could not possess the means to protect, our liberties.
But I forbear to dwell op a subject on which I have already said more than I intended or expected to say. Even if I had entertained a different opinion from that which I have expressed, I should think this measure of the City Council very unpropitious to that amity and confidence which ought to pervade every fibre of our government. I hope I may be mistaken in the view which I have taken of the subject. And if I am, I shall rejoice that the better opinion of my brethren will prevent the evil to which such an opinion might tend. But on the contrary, if it goes to establish the principle, that any body emanating from the authority of a State, may undertake to judge of the policy of an Act of Congress, which is
1 Stat.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- J. Bulow and J. Potter v. The City Council of Charleston
- Status
- Published