dissenting.—I concur in this judgment, because I think the certificate was sufficiently explicit, and that the deed, having been recorded in the lifetime both of the husband and wife, was a valid renunciation according to the terms of the statute. But I am not prepared to say that recording was unnecessary to its validity, even between the parties.

This is not the deed of a party sui juris, who requires no protection from the law, and who, of course, requires no record to inform him of his own deed. Nor is it even the act of a minor, which may, or may not, be affirmed when he arrives at maturity. The deed of a jeme covert is a mere nullity—she has no legal existence. In Reid v. Lamar, (Columbia M. S., December, 1846,) which was a case of marriage settlement, *578we held that she had no authority, but as derived from the deed, that she was the creature of the deed. Her act had no validity or legality, but as declared legal and valid by the instrument authorizing her to contract. A married woman having then no legal existence, this enabling statute was passed, which imparted validity to her act, renouncing her inheritance on certain conditions. “Such renunciation,” declares the act, “shall not be considered as being complete, or legal, until the same shall be recorded in the office of Mesne Conveyance, or office of the Clerk of the Court,” &c. By the principles of the common law, her deed was a nullity. By the provisions of the act, it shall not be considered legal, until the same shall be recorded. Until that done, it has the same consideration, and no other or higher considerations, than it would have received before the act was passed.

It seems difficult to advert, to the then existing state of the law, and yet adopt the conclusion that this proviso was merely a part of the registry act. By the Act of 1785, passed ten years previously to this law, it was declared that no conveyance of lands should be valid to pass any estate of inheritance, &c.s which was not recorded within six months of the execution thereof, “ exceptas to the parties themselves, and, their heirs.” It cannot he doubted that the deed of the husband and wife, as well as the renunciation of inheritance of the latter, fell strictly within the provisions of the Act of 1785, and, in order to bar the rights of creditors and subsequent purchasers, should be recorded within six months, although it would be valid, by the terms of the act, as between the parties themselves and their heirs. According to the construction now given, the formal proviso in the Act of 1795, which declares that “such renunciation shall not be considered as being complete or legal until the same shall be recorded in the office of Mesne Conveyance,” was simply superfluous, or nugatory. I am unwilling to suppose it either the one, or the other. In the language of Chancellor Harper, 1 Hill, C. R., 106—“the words are too plain to admit of question. Whatever reasons may have governed the Legislature in making the enactment, I cannot imagine that the words have any other meaning, than that the renunciation shall *579have no operation, or effect whatever, even between the parties. The security and protection of the woman must have been, in some way, the object of the provision.” Concurring fully in these observations, I would only illustrate them, by supposing that a marriage settlement, which authorized a wife to act, had nevertheless declared that her deed should “not be complete or legal, until the same was shewn, or notice thereof given, to her father, if alive, or to her trustee; could it be maintained that a deed of the feme covert, divesting herself of her estate, would be complete and legal, though it had never been exhibited, or made known, to her father, or trustee? Nothing more, it is true, was to be done by the wife. It was in the exclusive power of the alienee to make known to the lather or trustee, that he had procured a renunciation of the estate, and, thereby, render his title complete and legal, is it, therefore, complete and legal, although he had always kept his deed in his escritoire, and never communicated it to the friends of the wife? The inquiry need not be made, what they could have done, even if they had known of the wife’s alienation; although it might not be difficult to conceive a very satisfactory reply to the inquiry. But the party must stand, not alone on the deed of alienation, for that, of itself, is a nullity, but on the authority to execute the deed, and is bound by its terms.

Thinking that the purchaser, in this case, had complied with the provisions of the Act of 1795, and that the feme covert was thereby effectually divested of her estate, I agree in the conclusion that the defendant below was entitled to a non-suit, or that a new trial shouldbe granted, asmovcdintlieLawCourtof Appeals.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Plaintiff Mrs. Kottman, was once the undisputed owner of the land, and is entitled to recover, unless the defendant has acquired a good title under the conveyance from Higgen-bottom & Wife, to Mary Carr. This makes it necessary that we should decide on all the objections made by the plaintiff to *570the defendant’s title. It is sufficient, however,in relation to all of these, (except those which were decided in the Plaintiff’s favor on the circuit, and which are embraced in the defendant’s grounds of appeal) to say, that this Court concur with the Circuit Judge. As to the alienage of the husband, the general rule is that an alien may purchase, but he cannot hold real estate; yet his title is good until office found, and no one but the Lord of the escheat can oust him of his possession. He certainly had some estate in the land, and being the husband of the owner, he comes within the description of the person, with whom the wife may join in conveying away her real estate. Nor do we think there is any thing in the objections that this estate was not the inheritance of the wife, and therefore not embraced in the Act of 1795. The word inheritance does not necessarily mean an estate which has descended, but may as well mean any estate which may descend or be inherited; and in this sense it seems to me, the word is used in the Act of 1795, and includes every estate of the wife, which, on her death, by operation of law, would be cast on her heir at law. This disposes of all the points of the case, except the two which were decided on the circuit in favor of the plaintiffs, and are made the grounds of appeal by the defendant,.—which I proceed to consider.

When the case was presented on the circuit, it appeared to me that the act contemplated that the wife should not only bear testimony before the Judge or Justice, that the deed was voluntary, and executed seven days before her examination, but she was required also to say, that the transaction was bona fide, and not pretensive; that it was a real sale, and not a mere color to transfer her inheritance. Í have known more than one case, where the forms of the land have been obscured merely to invest the husband with the lee of his wife’s laud by a reconveyance from the pretended purchaser. But a more attentive examination has satisfied me that this is not the true meaning of the Legislature. The great object of the act, both in relation to dower and inheritance, was to protect the wife against any influence which might be exercised over her, and to leave her to the guidance of her own free will in the matter. *571The act, therefore, provides that seven days shall intervene between the execution oí the deed and her examination before the Judge or Justice. She shall “declare to him that she did at least seven days before such examination actually join her husband in executing such release,” &c. After this declaration has been made, the act provides that a “certificate, signed by the woman, and under the hand and seal of the Judge or Justice as aforesaid, shall then be immediately endorsed upon the said release, or a separate instrument of writing to the same effect, in the form and to the purport of the certificate prescribed in the second clause of this act; to which certificate an addition to the following effect shall invariably be made, to-wit: that the woman did declare that the release was positively and bona fide executed, at least seven days before such her examination.”

From the reading of this clause, it appears that two things are required to the perfection of the renunciation; first, the private examination by the Justice; and secondly, an endorsement of the result of the examination on the release or a separate piece of paper. The certificate is the written evidence of the facts as to which the woman has made a declaration, and, it would seem, need not contain any thing more than that the act of joining her husband was free and voluntary, and that seven days had elapsed since the execution. These seven days, I presume, are allowed, that she may have time to reflect on what she has done, to consult her friends, and if she repent, to withhold her assent to the filial consummation of the deed. When, therefore, the act directs that the Justice shall endorse a certificate in the form and to the effect of that, prescribed in the second clause, for the renunciation of dower, with the addition that it was positively and bona, fide executed at least seven days before such her examination, these latter words were necessary to be inserted, or some equivalent words, in order to make the certificate correspond with the facts, about which the Judge or Justice is required to examine the woman. It will be perceived, that the 3 edge or Justice is not required to examine her, as to the bona fieles of the release, and there is nothing in the act, which authorizes any conclusion, that the certificate *572should contain more than a clear statement of what she did declare on those points, on which the act requires her to be examined. I conclude, therefore, that the words positively and bona fide can'nave no ot her application, than as to the fact that the deed was executed at least seven days before her examination. Taken in this connexion, I think the case is free from difficulty. The act docs not require that the words positively and bona fide should be used, but that the certificate should be to the effect that the woman did declare, &c. The words used in this renunciation are that she did actually join her husband, &c. Is this word, actually, of the same or of equivalent meaning with the words,positively and, bona fide. These latter words are of such familiar use, that they are to be found in several of our English Dictionaries, and are defined to mean, really, Indy; actually, is defined by the words, in fact, in reality,—and, positively, by the words, certainly, without doubt. In Lcvoref’s Latin and English Dictionary, actually, is explained by the words, rere, re-ipsa, revera, and these arc translated into English by the words, true, real, certain, not false, or counterfeit, in truth, in reality, in fact, indeed. Positively, is defined by the Latin words, eerie,prefecto,—which are translated into English, by the words, certainly, assuredly, truly, indeed, doubtless, really. From this comparison, I think it clear, that these words, although they may not be synonimes, when applied to different subjects, yet when applied to the same subject, they are so nearly of the same meaning, that we may fairly infer that they were used in the same sense by the Legislature in the Act of 1795. Thus in common parlance, we may say in reference to the time, when a thing was done, that it was, bona fide, done, at such a time, or actually, or positively, done, meaning thereby that it was, really, certainly, in truth, in reality, and, without doubt, done at the time mentioned. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the word, actually, used in the certificate in this case, is of the same import, and to the same effect as the words, positively, and, bona fide, used in the act: and in this construction the whole Court concur.

But the most difficult part of the case remains to be considered, and on that there is not the same unanimity of opinion. *573This question relates to the sufficiency of the recording of the deed from Higginbottom and wife to Mary Carr. The deed is dated the 12th of February, 1835; the renunciation was on the 24th of the same month, but it was not recorded until 12th of October, 183G, more than one year and seven months after-wards, but within the life time of both husband and wife. I should not consider this a question of much difficulty, if we were not embarrassed by the case of Hillegas v. Hartley, 1 Hill C. R., 106. There would be no difficulty in distinguishing that case from this, so far as the facts are concerned; but the principle of that case, as would seem from the reasons given, would cover this as well as all other cases, where the renunciation was not recorded within six months from its date. This construction of the Act, a majority of t his Court are of opinion was error; and I will now proceed to assign the reasons for that opinion.

The words of the Act of 1795, are, “and such renunciation shall not be considered as being complete or legal, until the same shall be recorded in the office of mesne conveyances, or office of the clerk of the County Court.” There arc two constructions which have been put on these words. The venerable Chancellor DcSaussure, who decided the case, Hillegas v. Hartley, on the circuit, held, that as between the parties and those claiming under them, the deed might be recorded at any time. In the Court of Appeals (two Judges only being present) this decree was reversed; and if the reasoning of the Judge who pronounced the opinion was adopted by the other Judge, it was decided by the Court, chat without reference to the death of the wife, the renunciation was void, because it was not recorded within six months from its date. The principle on which this case proceeds, is, that recording, like delivery, and the other essentials of a deed, is necessary to its perfection, and without it, the deed is void as between the parties, as well as against all other persons. It is as much a nullity as if it had never been delivered. The general rule in relation to the registration of deeds, is, that they are good without recording, between the parties, and against all other persons having notice of them. Is there any thing in the words of the Act of 1795, which requires *574a different construction? All other deeds arc perfected when signed, sealed and delivered. When the grantor has done all, that by law he is required to do, it, would seem to me, the deed» as to him, is perfected. Recording is not an appropriate part of execution. It is to be done by the grantee, and not by the grantor. Such a construction is at variance with that, which is given to all other Acts of the Legislature on the subject of recording. By the 45th section of the Act of 1785, (P. L., 381) it is enacted, “that no conveyance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments within this State, shall pass, alter or change from one person to another, any estate of inheritance, fee simple, or any estate for life or lives; nor shall any greater or higher estate be made or take effect in any person or persons, or any use thereof be made by bargain and sale, lease and release, or other instrument, unless the same be made in writing, signed, sealed, and recorded in the clerk’s office of the county,” &c. The Act goes on to provide, that without recording, “such deed or other conveyance shall be legal and valid between the parties themselves and their heirs, but shall be void and incapable of barring the rights of persons, claiming as creditors or subsequent purchasers. Here the words of the Act would seem to imply, that (except as between the parties themselves and their heirs) no estate shall pass from one person to another, unless the conveyance was signed, sealed and recorded. Here recording is put in juxta position with signing and sealing, and might be supposed to have been intended as equally essentia] to the validity of the deed, and without which, it would be incapable of barring the rights of creditors or subsequent purchasers; and yet it has been held, in Tart v. Crawford, and numerous other cases, that without recording, the deed was good, and did alter and pass the estate, as to subsequent purchasers having explicit notice. This was on the clear principle, that the object of recording is notice, and as to one having notice, the end of recording is attained. By the Act of 1823, (6 Stat, 213,) it is declared, that no marriage settlement shall be valid, until recorded in the office of the Secretary of State, and in the office of the Register of mesnes conveyances, where the parties reside, provided, that the par*575ties shall have throe months to record the same, and if not recorded within three months, shall be null and void. The words, “shall not be valid until recorded,” is as strong an evidence of legislative will, that without recording, a marriage settlement is null and void as to all persons, as the words used in the Act of 1795—“the renunciation shall not he considered, as complete and- legal until the same shall he recorded.” “Shall not be valid,” and “shall not be complete and legal,” seem to be of the same import, and to convey the same idea. If there be a difference, I should say the former words, connected with the subsequent words of the Act, mill and void, show more strongly a legislative intention, that without recording, a marriage settlement should be utterly null and void as to all persons.

On the construction of the Act of 1823, it would seem, from what is said in Fowke v. Woodward, (1 Spear E. R., 233,) that in the Court of Equity, where cases of that description usually arise, the opinion prevailed for some time, that the words of the Act would require the same construction, as had been given to the Act of 1795, in Hillegas v. Hartley; that is, that the recording within the prescribed time was essential to the perfection of the deed. But when the question arose directly, in the case of Fawke v. Woodward, the Appeal Court of Equity, by the unanimous opinion of the Chancellors, decided, that an unrecordcdjmarriage settlement operated, as to third persons, from the time of recording, and if not recorded within time was void; but as to the parties themselves, it operated ah ini-tio, because they had notice from the beginning. Thus, construing the Act of 1823, as a registry Act, and carrying out the principle upon which Tart v. Crawford, and Givens v. Branford, had been decided, it is of great importance, that all Acts, on the same subject, should receive a similar construction; and I do not sco how this can be, without giving to the Act of 1795 the same effect, as is given to all the other Acts, which require registration of deeds.

It was said in the argument, that if nothing had been said about recording, in the Act of 1795, still the deed and renunciation would have to. be recorded, under the general provision of the Act of 1785, and that, therefore, something more than mere *576notice was intended. The second clause of the same Act requires, that renunciations of dower should be recorded also, and I have never heard it even supposed that such a renunciation would be void as to the wife without recording. The case of Gough a. Walker, arose on the construction of a different Act, and under a very different rule, from that which has prevailed since 1795. The decision in the case of Gough v. Walker, 1 N. & M’C., 469, was on the Act of 1731, which was said to be analogous to the levying of a fine. That was a judicial proceeding, and although the note of the fine and the foot of the fine might be made at any time, within a year and a day, and afterwards on notice, yet these are said, in Hillegas v. Hartley, to be like a final judgment, without which the record would be incomplete; and if the recording in the Court of Common Pleas be a substitute for the note and foot of the fine, the renunciation of dower under the Act of 1731 was incomplete without recording; and in this view the case of Gough v. Walker, was correctly decided. In that case, the release of dower was not recorded for fifty years, and not until the action was brought; and so far as appears from the reported case, the recording was in the Register’s office, and not in the Common Pleas. The proceeding, under the Act of 1795, bears no resemblance to a judicial proceeding. The renunciation may be before a Judge, but it may as well be before a Justice. No acknowledgement in Court, or record of it in the Court, is required, or any thing which bears the least affinity to a judicial proceeding. I agree fully with what is said in Hillegas v. Hartley, that the renunciation of the wife under the Act of 1795 is a mode of conveyance, and so regarded, I do not perceive the slightest reason for supposing it was intended, the recording should bo for any other purpose, than that fer which other deeds are required to be recorded.

The Act of 1795, in requiring the renunciations to be rcorded, meant to put them on the same footing in every particular as other deeds, or it meant that the deed should be inchoate until recorded. It either intended to subject them to all the provisions of the Act of 1785, or to make recording like delivery essential to the completion of the deed. If we adopt this *577latter construction, then it would seem to me that the recording may be at any timé within the lifetime of the wife. Thus a deed may be signed and scaled at one time, it may be delivered at another, and it may be recorded at another; but the recording, like the delivery, may be at any time whilst the wife is living. This construction would decide this case for the defendant, in consistency with the case of Hillegas v. Hartley, but not in consistency with the reasons upon which that case is put: but a majority of this Court think that would be too narrow a construction, and would not effect what we think of great importance,—to restore to our registry laws a uniformity of construction, which will make them consistent with each other. The effect of this is a reversal of the case of Hillegas v. Hartley. I feel the full force of all that has been said on the rule of “stare decisis,” but the case of Hillegas v. Hartley has not settled any great rule of property under which rights have been acquired, which the reversal would defeat. Its only effect will be in a few instances to restore rights honestly, in most cases, acquired, but which would have been defeated by accident or by ignorance that the law required such deeds to be recorded within six months. It defeats no right; it only avoids a forfeiture.

The motion for anew trial is granted.

dissenting.—By the Act of’85, all releases of lands must be recorded in six months. But the want of recording does not injure the title, i. e., as between the donor and donee. The Act of ’95, makes no alteration in such recording, but expressly requires renunciations of dower, &c., to be recorded, of course in six months. But in the 3d clause, it is enacted, that renunciations of the wife’s inheritance shall “not be complete or legal until recorded.” Under this Ihird clause it was decided, by the late Court of Appeals, that the recording of such renunciations, by a feme covert, must be in *580virtue of the Act of ’85,—of course in six months. And unless so recorded in six months, then in virtue of the Act of ’95, it is incomplete and illegal, in its original execution, by the plain letter of that act.

Shall that decision be reversed, is now the question'?

I dissent from the decision of the Court, because it sets aside the judgment of the late Court of Appeals, in the case of Hillegas v. Hartley, Hill R. 106, upon argument inadequate to justify such a reversal. That judgment is direct and conclusive of the question of the present case, and of course, the opposite decision in this case directly and conclusively reverses the judgment in the former, and introduces an entire new exposition, not only in the meaning of the terms of the Act of ’95, but in its spirit and general object, reconverts an Act, for the condition precedent to the wife’s binding renunciation, into a mere registration, as if recording had not already belonged to all conveyances of land. My objections, therefore are, twofold. First, as to the letter of the Act. After the terms of an Act have been settled for fourteen years, it is inconvenient and inconsistent, if not dangerous, to give a nc tv version. On this head I would observe, that although the enactment—‘"that the renunciation shall not be complete or legal until recorded,” <&c., might perhaps admit of different interpretations, yet they will admit of this meaning,—that unless recorded as other Mesne Conveyances, i. e., within six months, the renunciation of a married woman is incomplete and illegal. This is what had been decided. The object is her protection, and it would be a further protection to her inheritance, that it should be so recorded, or be void—i. e., not binding even between the parties; whereas other conveyances bind the immediate parties, though not recorded in clue time—or never put on record. This difference would seem to be the further protection intended for the wife’s inheritance by the Act. Secondly. In expounding such an Act, it should be borne in mind, that all such Acts, by affording the means of a married woman renouncing her inheritance, alters the common law, and practically ministers to her deprivation, by giving her any such power, while yet under the influence of her husband. A wife *581is not sui juris. Such Acts, therefore, by removing her legal disabilities, which constitutes, says Blackstone, “her protection,’’ really infract her rights; and therefore the Act, when equivocal, should be made to enure to her best possible protection. The Act is far from being a mere remedial Act, to be expounded liberally, to advance and facilitate the sale of her inheritance. Is it an Act in derogation of the common law protection of the voile’s landed estate, which holds her incapable, for her own security, of releasing it during coverture? Thence it follows that the Act of 1795 is to be expounded strictly, when opposed to the wife’s interest, and liberally, if necessary, to preserve her lands—i. e., every condition must be fulfilled, or she retains her inheritance. This object, and such characteristic of the Act, I take to be the key to the construction made by the late Court of Appeals, now to be set aside. That decision secs, in the terms of the Act, its true spirit; and whatever might have been its construction, I perceive no sufficient reason for reversing that of the Court of Appeals, so made, upon a just and comprehensivo conception of the Act, in connexion with the principles of the common law. Her protection is the element of the past construction. Shall it now bo reversed? Here, let it be remarked, that this makes the third instance in which the decisions of the hate Court of Appeals have been reversed; State v. M’Bryde, Fash v. Ross, and the present case. I deem it, therefore, a fit occasion, and proper case, to express my opinion of the importance of the maxim, stare decisis. The reversal of a former decision introduces this striking inconsistency—that the party, or side, who gained the case before, loses it upon the reversal.

In Hillegas v. Hartley, the wife regained her inheritance from the omission to record in six months; in the present case she loses it by the reversal oí'the former case. This inconsistency shocks the minds of men, and the Court is lessened in their respect and confidence, and loses the character of its high conservative usefulness. It is in its unlcgislativc uniformity that the judiciary has its force oí character, its strength and its usefulness. It is vested with great discretion and power, but is essentially unlcgislativc. And it is better to have ordi*582nary laws stable, when once understood, than better laws, subject to unlooked-for changes. “Misera est servitas, ubi jus est vagum aut incondilurn,” is an historical fact; and the shield against the introduction of this great evil is placed, by the constitution, in the hands of the judiciary. Upon such practical justice, sound sense, and judicial reliance, the rule of Judges adhering to established expositions of law, is bottomed. Firmness in such a course, is but little less essential, and very analogous to the rule, that a case at law being once fairly tried, the judgment rendered closes up every question, submitted in the issue made between the .same parties. For when such judgment has been sanctioned by the Appeal Court, it gives solemn assurance that all future litigants shall receive the same judgment on presenting the like case. I grant that such reversals come within judicial authority, but they should depend upon a comparison with former adjudications, in connexion with considerations of justice, prudence, and judicial consistency, and ought not to be sanctioned, but in cases of a manifest former error. In a word, I am not convinced of either the force of argument, or of the necessity of this reversal of the former decision. That decision, and the present reversal, stand in these respects, to say the least, too well balanced for the judicial introduction of such a change; which I consider not merely alterative of terms, but introductivo of a different end and principle for the Act of'95. But further, the fact that, the present decision lays down no intelligible rule of its own, while it destroys the former rule, that the wife’s renunciation must be recorded in six months. This leaves the Act of ’95 in a state of vacillation with every new case. In M’Bryde’s case, the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court was laid down; and in Fash v. Ross, there is at least a rule for other cases, substituted for the former; but in the present reversal, I can perceive no rule, unless it bo meant that the bare renunciation transfers the wife’s inheritance—i. e., it stands like other conveyances— valid as between the original parties, recorded or not. This would be intelligible, I grant, but then, away goes the provision in her favor. The renunciation “shall not be legal or complete until recorded,” which I consider important protection, and *583intended to give early notice to her iriends, in case the wife should have been secretly coerced, and require some interposition of a Court. The early recording, and consequent notoriety, is, in fact, a great safe-guard for the wife, against the grasping of her husband; and also keeps up something like the protection she before had, in the public judicial proceeding by fine and recovery—for which the Acts of 1731, and ’95, are the substitutes.

I am, therefore, for adhering to the former decision, because I can see nothing better in the present, and because the reversa^ in its effect, appears, to my understanding, to interpolate a new principle, that trenches manifestly upon the common law protection of femes coverts; and this would amount to a legislative enactment, rather than a judicial interpretation of the Act of 1795.