Hall v. Woodward
Hall v. Woodward
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On December 21, 1860, the defendant, together with Daniel Hall, E. J. Hall, and E. G. Palmer, as sureties of W. E. Hall, executed their joint and several note, under seal, payable to Mrs. Mobley, one day after the date thereof, On the back of this note certain credits, signed by the attorney of the owner and holder of the note, are endorsed as follows: “Reed. January, 1867, on the above note, three hundred dollars in currency. Reed. February, 1867, of H. A. Gail-lard, administrator, $100 on the above note. Bal. due 1st Januai-y, 1880, $2,297.21, after payments by estate of W. E. Hall and estate of E. G. Palmer.” By whom the first payment was made is not stated in the credit endorsed, but it is admitted that the defendant, Woodward, never made any payment on the note at all, or otherwise acknowledged its continued validity — all the-payments having been made by H. A. Gaillard, as administrator of the principal debtor, W. E. Hall, and by- the executor of the surety, Palmer.
On January 21, 1868, judgment was recovered against Daniel Hall alone for the balance due on the note. The plaintiff alleges that as a part of the consideration for a tract of-land conveyed to him by his father, Daniel Hall, sr., in January, 1885, he undertook to pay said judgment, and- that at the time the convey-' anee was executed his father verbally assigned to him his right of contribution against his co-surety, Woodward. On April 23, 1885, the plaintiff paid up the judgment, and in August following the assignment above mentioned was reduced to writing, though it bears date December 8, 1885 — the day on which it was actually signed. These allegations on the part of the plaintiff were denied by the defendant, and the issue thus raised was not considered or decided by the Circuit Judge, as he rested his judgment upon another ground, which will be hereinafter stated.
This action was brought to recover from Woodward one-half of
We agree with the Circuit Judge that the recovery of the judgment against one of the parties was not sufficient to rebut the presumption, arising from lapse of time, in favor of the defendant. Langston v. Shands, 23 S. C., 149. But we cannot agree with him in holding that a payment made by one of two or more joint and several obligors within the period necessary to raise the presumption of payment from lapse of time, will not rebut such presumption as to the others. This question has been so fully and satisfactorily discussed in the case of Dickson v. Gourdin, ante, p. 391, heard at the present term, and in which the opinion has just been filed, that it is only necessary to refer to the reasoning employed and the authorities cited in that case as furnishing the grounds of our decision in this.
The Circuit Judge not having considered or passed upon any of the other defences set up in defendant’s answer, they are not before us, and as to them we are not to be regarded as intimating any opinion.
The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and that the case be remanded to that court for a new trial.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- HALL v. WOODWARD
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Judgment obtained against one of the obligors on a joint and several single bill, does not rebut the presumption of payment arising in favor of the other obligor from the lapse of time. 2. But a voluntary payment made by one of such obligors within the twenty years will rebut the presumption of a payment by the other. 3. A sealed note, executed by A as principal, and B, C, and D, as sureties, matured in I860. In 1867 A made a payment and also B. In 1868 the payee recovered judgment against C for the balance due on the note. In 1885 the plaintiff, in part payment of a tract of land, purchased from 0, agreed to pay this judgment and take an assignment of C’s right of contribution against D, accruing upon such payment, which was done, and in the same year plaintilf brought action against D for one-half of the amount so paid. Held, that D was not discharged from liability by the presumption of payment arising from lapse o’f time.