Burns v. Mills
Burns v. Mills
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by_
It seems that in May, 1888, the plaintiff sold and delivered to the intestate, L. A. Mills, of Spartanburg, six Jersey heifers for $525. The plaintiff claimed that the contract (which was verbal) was cash on delivery; but some contention arose as to the blood, and especially as to the “registry” of the animals. In 1885 L. A. Mills died, and O. P. Mills
The plaintiff proved that he had the heifers “registered” in “The American Jersey Herd Register” kept at Worcester, Mass. S. Harris, the only person except the parties themselves, who was present when the contract was made, testified “that he was present when the contract was made between plaintiff and intestate : four of the heifers were about 14 months old, two about 3 months old. They were very poor at the time. The understanding was that they were to be ‘registered,’ or certificate forwarded to that effect. Don’t know if book was mentioned in which they were to be ‘registered.’ It was not to his knowledge. I am a Jersey cattle man to a small extent; not an expert in ‘registering,’ &c. ‘The American Jersey Cattle Club Herd Registry’ is the only registration ‘Book’ in this country for Jersey cattle. The cattle registered in the book spoken of by Mr. Burns (American Jersey Herd Registry) were worth no more than grades or any other cattle,” &c. It was satisfactorily proved that “The American Jersey Cattle Club Herd Registry” was the only recognized registration book in this country for Jersey cattle, and that the heifers sold to the intestate Mills were not registered therein.
Under the charge of the judge, the jury found for the plaintiff the full amount of the account and interest, $705.66. Thereupon the plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint, so as to include a count for interest, -which was refused. The defendant then moved for a new trial on the minutes, which was also refused, and the defendant appeals, alleging error as follows:
“1. In charging that if there was a contract between plaintiff*58 and intestate, and the contract is proved, they should find for the plaintiff with interest.
“2. In refusing the motion for a new trial.
“3. In not at least granting a new trial nisi, the plaintiff remitting all of the verdict over $525, demanded in the complaint.
“4. In giving $5 costs against the defendant in refusing a motion for a new trial.
“5. In charging the jury that if they concluded that the contract between plaintiff and intestate was, that there was to be a registration of the cattle, then the contract, being a verbal one, was for their interpretation.
“6. In charging that the law in regard to a verbal contract is not what Mr. Mills intended by the contract, but if Mr. Burns made an offer to,Mr. Mills and Mr. Mills accepted it, it is what Mr. Burns, intended Mr. Mills should understand by his promise that these should be ‘registered’ cattle.
“7. In charging that it was what plaintiff offered to do, and what he intended that intestate should understand that he offered ■to do. that should govern.
“8. In charging that the above definition should only help the jury, if they should conclude that registration had not been sufficiently ^defined to them by persons sufficiently competent to know.
“9. In charging that it might be that the jury sufficiently understood the technical word ‘registered,’ when applied to Jersey cattle, to give it a definite fixed meaning, and it was for them to say whether that definite fixed meaning was used by Mr. Burns when he guaranteed it.
“10. In charging the jury that it might be that registration in. one of the registration books would be as good as the other.
“11. In charging that if the jury should come to the conclusion that Mr. Mills with full knowledge of the facts, accepted these cattle, whether they were registered or unregistered, would make no difference.” ' .
Exceptions 5, 6, .7, 8, and 9 substantially allege error in the charge, “That the law in regard to a verbal contract is not what Mr: Mills intended by the contract, but if Mr. Burns made an offer to Mr. Mills, which he accepted, it is what Burns intended Mills should understand by his promise that these should be reg
It seems, however, that there were two books of registry : one (A. J. C. 0.) which afforded the best evidence of the purity of the stock registered, and generally regarded in this country as the only proper registry of Jersey cattle, and the other (A. J. 0. IT.) much less valuable in that respect. The contract did not specify which “registry” was meant; and the confusion has arisen from the fact that the term used, “registered,” admits of more than one sense ; and that being the case, it seems to us that it was error to say that the contract should be interpreted by what was the intention of Burns, the seller, without any regard to the concurring intention of the intestate, the purchaser. It strikes us that the term used, being capable of two meanings, it was not enough to consider alone the intention of Burns. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to make out the special contract upon which he sued. He proved that he had “registered” the cattle in the registry, which was not the approved and accepted registry of the country. There was no proof that the intestate meant that registry. “The most essential element of an agreement is the consent of the parties. If two or more parties express their consent to a common purpose, this is an. agreement.
This makes it unnecessary to consider the other exceptions.
The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- BURNS v. MILLS
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- A sold certain Jersey cattle to B, under an agreement that they should be “registered.” There are tAvo books of registry for Jersey cattle— “The American Jersey Herd Register,” in which these cattle were registered, and “The American Jersey Cattle Club Herd Registry,” testified to by witnesses as the only recognized registration book of Jersey cattle in the country. Held, that the term “registered” in this contract being susceptible of two meanings, it was not to bo interpreted as A intended B to understand it, unless B did so understand it, as he could not be held bound by a contract to which his mind had not assented.