Kennedy v. Williams
Kennedy v. Williams
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The facts of this case are thus stated in the decree of his Honor, the Circuit Judge:
“This is an action brought -by the plaintiffs against the defendant, David R. Williams, jr., to recover the possession of the real estate, described in the complaint. Being an action at law, it was at issue as a case to be tried by a jury; but trial by jury was duly waived by all parties, and the question of title, involving questions of fact and law thereon, was submitted to the Court, all other questions raised in the pleadings being reserved. By agreement, the complaint was amended by making David R. Williams, as trustee as well as individually, a party defendant. The plaintiffs claim that the title to the real estate in controversy, is in them, and in the defendants, Sallie K. Winkler, E. D. Blakeney, A. K. Blakeney and L- M. Blakeney, as tenants in common. The plaintiffs and the defendant, Sallie K. Winkler, are the children of Mrs. E. C. Kennedy, and the other defendants, E. D. Blakeney, A. K. Blakeney and D. M. Blakeney, are the husband and children of Lillian Blakeney, a deceased daughter of the said Mrs. E. C. Kennedy. David R. Wil *380 liams, trustee, defendant, answered, denying the title set up in the complaint, and alleging title in himself by reason of conveyance of the premises, by order of this Court, in a •cause entitled John D. Kennedy and Elizabeth, his wife, against Ann C. Kennedy et al., made to Mary B. Chestnut and a devise of such premises by Mary B. Chestnut to said defendant. It appears from the evidence submitted to me, and I find that the lands described in the complaint were devised by Joseph ■Cunningham to his daughter, Elizabeth, for life, and after her death to the issue of her body living at the time of her death; that said Elizabeth intermarried with John D. Kennedy; that on the 31st day of August, 1872, said John D. Kennedy and Elizabeth, his wife, instituted an action in this Court, to which action Ann C. Kennedy (now known as Annie K. McDowall), Sallie D. Kennedy (now known as Sallie K. Winkler), Elizabeth McM. Kennedy (subsequently known as Lillian Blakeney and now deceased), and Alfred E. Kennedy, then the only children of said Elizabeth Kennedy, and remaindermen under the will of Joseph Cunningham, were made parties; that the summons and complaint in that action were personally served on said defendants; that a guardian ad litem was appointed by the Court for said minor defendants, and answered for them; that the object of this action was to secure the authority of this Court to sell to Mary B. Chestnut the premises described in the complaint; that after proper proceedings had in this Court, an order was made by this Court in the cause, by which C. Shiver, then clerk of the Court, was ordered, as special referee, to convey the lands to said Mary B. Chestnut, and said Mary B. Chestnut was directed to pay therefor to a trustee named in said order, $1,000 in cash, and to give a bond in the further sum of $1,000 to the trustee named; that A. D. Kennedy was appointed trustee by said order, but upon his refusal to accept the trust, A. M. Kennedy was by subsequent order appointed trustee in his stead; that on the 1st day of Januáry, A. D. 1873, the said C. Shiver, special referee, did, in pursuance of the order of the *381 Court, by proper deed, signed, sealed and delivered, convey the premises described in the complaint to Mary B. Chestnut; that said Mary B. Chestnut paid the cash portion of the purchase money and entered into security for the deferred payment, which was duly paid; that all- of these payments were made to A. M. Kennedy, trustee, as required by order of the Court; that said Mary B. Chestnut devised the premises to David R. Williams, the defendant, as trustee; that Josephine E. Cureton is a daughter of Elizabeth, and John D. Kennedy, and was born in 1876, after the proceedings above recited; that Elizabeth Kennedy died in 1876; that J. D. Kennedy died in 1897; that A. M. Kennedy, the trustee, died in 1892, insolvent, and that Mrs. Mary B. Chestnut is dead.”
The Circuit Judge, for the reasons hereinafter set forth, dismissed the complaint.
The plaintiffs appealed upon exceptions, assigning error on the part of the Circuit Judge as follows:
“1. In his conclusion that the summons and complaint in the proceedings in the case of Kennedy v. Kennedy, under which the land in question was authorized to be sold to Mary B. Chestnut, were properly served on the minor defendants herein; in holding that said minors were properly before the Court and precluded by the judgment herein. Whereas, the proof of service in the records of said case shows that no parent or guardian of said minors had been served, or fails to show such service.
“2. In holding that the minors in said case of Kennedy v. Kennedy, plaintiffs and defendants in this case, are precluded by presumptions arising from lapse of time, or by any other presumption, from impeaching the record in said case, or the title of Williams claimed to be derived thereunder, as the period of minority of said minors should count against them, and any presumption of regularity should not be held conclusive against them.
“3. In holding that no advantage had 'been taken of the minors in said case of Kennedy v. Kennedy, inasmuch as it *382 appears that no adequate security for the funds of the minors therein was provided. ■
“4. In his construction of the order appointing A. M. Kennedy trustee, as not requiring him to give any bonds as trustee; whereas, such order should be construed in connection with the preceding decree in the case of Kennedy v. Kennedy, and as requiring a bond.
“5. In holding that the evidence adduced ‘does not show conclusively that no bond was ever given,’ for by so holding he requires conclusive proof, a higher degree than the law requires in civil actions, and a more exacting amount of proof than was incumbent on the plaintiffs in this action.
“6. In holding that the payment of the purchase- money cf the land ‘to a person not authorized to receive it,’ would not effect the title to the land conveyed in the case of Kennedy v. Kennedy.
“7. In holding that all the payments of the purchase money were made to A. M. Kennedy, trustee, in face of the recital in the deed of Shiver to M. B. Chestnut, that the cash portion was paid to the clerk of the Court, a person other than A. M. Kennedy.”
“It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that A. D. Kennedy, who was duly appointed -trustee of the fund to accrue from the sale of the land mentioned and described in the complaint herein, by a former -order of this Court, has declined .the execution of the trust and -refuses to qualify as such trustee, and it further appearing from the written testimony that A. M. Kennedy is a fit and proper-person to be invested with the duties of said trust. -On- motion of Shannon & Dinning, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and with the consent of Messrs. Deitner & Dunlap, defendants’ attorneys, it is ordered, that the said A. M. Kennedy be and he is hereby appointed trustee aforesaid in the place and stead of the said A. Dalton Kennedy, with the same fights, duties, powers, responsibilities and obligations as .were conferred upon the trustee hereinbefore appointed. .Sam. W- -Melton, 31st October, 1872. We consent. Deitner & Dunlap, attorneys for defendants.” :
The language of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, in disposing of this question might also- be interpreted as a finding of fact, which this Court is powerless to review; but as there is some doubt upon the point, we will rest our conclusion on other grounds. The first portion of the order dated 3d October, 1872, relates to the appointment of the clerk of Court as special referee for the purpose of conveying the land in the manner therein mentioned, and to the limitation on his power, to wit: that he was not to convey the land until the purchase money was paid and secured as therein directed. The second portion of said order.-has reférence to the appointment of the trustee and to the limitation upon his power *387 to discharge the duties of the trust, to wit: that he was not to enter upon his duties until he. had executed the bond therein mentioned. The order dated 3d October, 1872, was partially construed in the order dated 31st October, 1872, and that construction was binding on all parties to the action. Cartin v. Ry. Co., 43 S. C., 221; Fraser v. Davie, 15 S. C., 496. The words which we have italicized show that the Court construed the order as appointing A. D. Kennedy trustee of the fund at the time the order was Hied. Similar words were used in the order appointing A. M. Kennedy trustee in the place and stead of A. D. Kennedy, “with the same rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and obligations as were conferred upon the trustee hereinbefore appointed.”' At the time Mrs. Chestnut paid the cash portion and secured the remainder of the purchase money in compliance with the requirements of the order -and received a conveyance of the land, A. M. Kennedy was then trustee of said fund under the order as construed by the Court, and the clerk had the power to- execute the conveyance. The exceptions raising this question are overruled.
As we have disposed of the only two grounds upon-which the title of Williams was assailed, it .is not necessary to' consider other questions presented by the exceptions, especially as some of them only, involve questions of fact.
The judgment of the- Circuit Court' is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.