Gyles v. Southern Ry.
Gyles v. Southern Ry.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have 'been sustained by him' on November 35, 1905, at Edisto, S. C., while attempting tO board defendant’s regular passenger train from Branchville to Augusta as a passenger for Blaekville, and was awarded judgment for ^ljSOO.OO.
Plaintiff -testified that it was difficult to state how fast the train was moving but he supposed four or five miles an hour. The accident happened within a few seconds after the train began to move and it was not probable the train had acquired any great speed. ’ The rule of law declared in this State is that it is not negligence per se to board or alight from a moving train, unless the train is moving so- fast as to make the danger of alighting or boarding obvious toi a person of ordinary prudence, and that ordinarily it should be left to the jury to determine whether the passenger's act is negligent under the circumstances. Cooper v. Ry. Co., 56 S. C., 94, 34 S. E., 16; Creech v. Ry. Co., 6-6 S. C., 533-4, 45 S. E., 86. Such is the rule as established by the weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
3
The plaintiff testified that when the train rolled up, he grabbed the two bundles and carried them to -the baggage-car; a railroad man in the door, in -answer to' a call from the engineer, said “Go airead,” upon which plaintiff remarked, “What the devil do you want to go ahead for and leave me standing out here?” That he rushed to the remlaining bundles -and taking one in each hand tried to get aboard, •with the result already stated. The defendant’s' servants *179 rendered no assistance whatever in the effort to get the baggage aboard.
In view of the foregoing, it can not be said that there was such absence of testimony as to make it error of law to refuse a new trial.
1
The first and second exceptions allege error in refusing certain requests to charge, but an examination'of the record fails to disclose that the Court refused to charge any such requests, as are specified in the exceptions. It does appear that Judge Gage refused to charge appellant’s sixth request, as follows: “When a passenger voluntarily leaves a train of cars while in motion simply to avoid being carried beyond the station where he desires to 'stop, and- in doing so receives an injury, his own negligence is the proximate cause of the injury and he can not recover against the company though the conductor was in fault in not stopping the train.”
This request was not strictly applicable to the case in hand, but conceding that the same general rule should 'apply whether the injury is sustained while alighting froml or boarding a moving train, 'the foregoing request Was properly refused, as it assumes that alighting from or hoarding a slowly-moving train is negligence per se, whereas, as heretofore shown, that is not the law of this State.
The exceptions are overruled and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
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