The opinion of the Court was delivered by

This action was begun- in the probate -court of Spartanburg county for the settlement and distribution of the estate of Mossie M. Ekart, deceased. Defendant, Frank Ekart, as surviving husband of the said Mossie M. Ekart, claimed the entire estate under the laws of North Carolina.

Defendant, Addie Pearl Gault, and her guardian- defendant, B. E. Wingo, claimed that the estate was devisable under the laws of South Carolina and that she as heir at law of her sister, Mossie M. Ekart, was entitled to -one-half of the -estate.

This appeal is from the judgment of Hon. Walter H. Hunt, special Judge, affirming the judgment of the probate court, holding that the -estate was personal property and should be distributed according to the law -of North Carolina, and that defendant, Frank Ekart, the husband-, was entitled to the whole estate, after paying costs -of administration and certain debts.

The Statute of North Carolina introduced in evidence is as follows :

“Husband, on wife's estate; i-iis interest therein: If any married woman shall die wholly or partly intestate, the surviving husband shall be entitled to administer on- her personal estate, and- shall hold the same, subject to the claims of her creditors and others having rightful demands against her, to his own use, except as hereinafter provided. If the husband shall die after his wife, but before administering, his executor or administrator or assignee shall receive the personal property of the said1 wife, as a part of the estate of the husband, subject as aforesaid, and except as provided by law.”

M-o-ssie M. Ekart was a minor, residing in North Carolina, at the time of her death, on September 6, 1907, or 1908, intestate, leaving no children, leaving surviving husband, Frank Ekart, and her sister, Addie Pearl Gault, a minor, residing in Spartanburg county, S. C. Plaintiff became *343 administrator de bonis non of estate of Mossie M. Ekart in April, 1909. B. K. Wingo became guardian of Mossie M. Ekart and Addie Pearl Gault, and1 on November 17, 1902, as such received the proceeds of certain real estate belonging to the estate of their mother, Sarah Ann Gault, in Spartan-burg county, which had been sold for partition and division, .under an order of Judge Buchanan, dated' September 22, 1902, requiring the master to pay the balance ,of the proceeds of the sale of the said land, after charges, commissions and costs, to the guardian of said Mossie and Addie or .to the parties themselves upon their reaching, their majority.

The appeal depends upon the question whether the proceeds of real estate became personalty when paid over to the guardian, Wingo, under the order of the Court. We think the proceeds of lands sold for partition became personalty upon distribution under the order of the Court. The purpose of such a proceeding is to change land into money and when distribution is made in money the distributees hold money, not land. This is undoubtedly true as to adults and in the absence of any statute directing otherwise, there is no good reason to have a different rule when distribution is made to the guardian of an infant. This result was recognized in Major v. Hunt, 64 S. C., 102, 41 S. E., 816, where the Court said:

“If the order of sale had contained a provision that the proceeds of sale when paid into Court should be delivered to the infant or her guardian, it might be contended1 with effect that this would manifest an intention to convert the realty in all events into personalty, and that equity which considers that as done which should have been done, would stamp the proceeds with the impress of personalty.”

A different rule may prevail where the Court retains control of the fund. Ex parte John W. Mobley, 2 Rich. Eq.; 56; Major v. Hunt, 64 S. C., 97, 41 S. E., 816.

This fund in the hands of the guardian, being, personal estate of Mossie M. Ekart, domiciled in North Carolina, *344 upon her death intestate became the property of her surviving husband, subject to the conditions of the statute.

We do not construe the statute as making the right of the husband to succeed to the wife’s personal estate depend upon the husband becoming administrator thereof. He is given the right to administer, but it is not compelled to do so.

It is sufficient if there be administration by another as in this case. No decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina giving a contrary construction was introduced in evidence or even cited in argument.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.