Buist v. Williams
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was- delivered by
Reference (rnay be had to the decree of the Circuit Court and the exceptions- -thereto, herewith reported, for a full statement of the facts- and issues.
It is contended in behalf of plaintiff that the proper construction of this deed requires the conclusion that upon the death of Eliza E. Buist, childless, the corpus of the funds now in the trustee’s hand, will become intestate property of John H. Williams, the original grantor, or a resulting trust in him or his heirs.
The three grandchildren were Eliza E. Williams, plaintiff, now wife of H. B. Buist, Martha E. Williams who died unmarried and childless, and William A. Williams who died in 1888 leaving as his issue defendants J. Hudson Williams and William A. Williams. It is contended that as Eliza F. Buist is the last survivor of the three grandchildren, upon her death childless, there will be no one answering the description “Survivor of my said grandchildren,” and that the estate cannot go over to the four children named because all three of the grandchildren did not die without leaving issue surviving them, hence the estate reverts to the grantor and his heirs.
The Circuit Court declined -to accept this view and sustained the conclusion of the master,' who reported in part as follows: “After careful perusal of deed and close consideration of it, as a whole, and in reference to the words, *278 phrases and clauses therein contained, 'it is manifest to the master that the intention and desire of the grantor was,
“(1) To part with his whole estate in the land, and to convey it for the benefit of his three grandchildren as payment for the release on their part of certain- claims, which they held against him. In other words: There was a valuable consideration paid to him by these- grandchildren alone. No other relatives of the grantor contributed towards the payment of this consideration, for the claim was held by these three grandchildren, and by none of his other relatives. Clearly then, this conveyance was exclusively for the benefit of these three grandchildren and their issue, and not for the benefit -of the grantor’s other relatives-, so long as any of these three grandchildren or their issue should be in existence.
’ “(2) That these three grandchildren should not o-wn the land absolutely, but only for their lives.
“(3) That upon the death of -the grandchildren, the land was to go to the issue absolutely; free from all trusts.
“(4) That the land was not to revert to the grantor’s estate, nor to go to any of -his other relatives, unless all three of his said grandchildren should die without leaving issue surviving them-.
“Then, if these conclusions are the expressed intent of the grantor, the -existing circumstances admitted by the pleadings being that -the plaintiff is to die without issue, and the defendants, J. Hudson Williams and William A. Williams, will be living at the time of her -death, -then upon the death of Eliza E. Buist 'her share of the trust fund, freed from all trusts and limitations, will go to the surviving issue of the grandchildren, to wit: J. Hudson Williams and William A. Williams, or, if either of them be not living, then to the surviving one.”
• We affirm this construction. This is a trust deed. A. court of equity- in its jurisdiction over trusts is not bound by the technical rules of th-e common law, and will seek the *279 intention of the grantor from the whole instrument. McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S. C. 558, 29 S. E. 403. Viewing the deed as a whole we think the construction given effectuates the intention of the grantor, which was to convey the entire estate in trust for others, first for the benefit of the three grandchildren for life, then remainder in fee for their issue if any then living, and if no' such issue, then over to the children named.
With respect to the $540 payment it appears that while this sum was paid on the Marshall mortgage previous to the time when H. B. Buist became trustee from money furnished by Mrs. Williams, the mother of Mrs. Buist, the amount was afterwards repaid out of the trust fund. Of course, the trustee is accountable for this money and the Court so holds, and the trustee raises no objection thereto; but it does not follow that such use of the trust fund gives tht-cestui que trustent the right to claim a proportionate part of the land. The greatest reach of equity could not go beyond impressing a lien upon the land to the extent of the payment. This also has been already accomplished by the mortgage given by Mr. Buist on this land to secure the trust estate. The cases of Wallace v. McCullough, 1 Rich. Eq. 426, and Green v. Green, 56 S. C. 193, 34 S. E. 349, 46 L. R. A. 525, cited in the decree, sustain the ruling of the Circuit Court.
*281 It is very clear also that the trustee should not be charged with the present value of the Burgiss land. The sale was not wrongful, but was made under the authority and discretion conferred by the trust deed, acting in good faith. In such case the trustee can only be required to account for the proceeds of sale.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.