Powell v. Insurance Company
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Peters v. Great American Ins. Co. (4th Cir. 1949)
- Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance v. Thomas (District Court, D. South Carolina 1966)
- Brown v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. LIA. INS. CO. (S.C. 1958)
- Whaley v. Guardian Fire Insurance Co. (S.C. 1923)
- Bost v. Bankers Fire & Marine Insurance (S.C. 1963)
- Plummer v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co. of Jacksonville (S.C. 1961)
- Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Liability Insurance (S.C. 1958)
- State Farm Fire Insurance v. Rakes (Va. 1948)
- Cauthen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (S.C. 1939)
- Williams v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. (S.C. 1936)
- Harvey v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. (S.C. 1932)
- Fuller v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. (S.C. 1926)
- Wells-Dickey Co. v. American Alliance Insurance (Mont. 1924)
- Knights & Ladies of Security v. Bell (Okla. 1923)
- Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehead (Okla. 1918)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This was an action brought to recover a money judgment on a fire insurance policy. The action was commenced on May 20, 1913. After answer was filed and issue joined, the defendant gave notice of motion that it would move to- have the plaintiff reply to its answer. The cause was called for trial before Judge Rice on July 29, 1913, at Saluda, S. C.; this motion was then made and refused; and the case was tried and resulted in a verdict 'for the plaintiff for $550. The defendant moved -for a new trial on the minutes of the Court and upon the ground of after-discovered evidence, and the same was refused. After entry of judgment, defendant appeals.
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We will consider exceptions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 together. The evidence in the case showed conclusively that Dr. Asbill was the agent of the defendant; that he issued the policy sued on. The plaintiff testified that- he took out the policy with him, and received it from him. He himself verified the defendant’s answer, and as a witness in the case' testified he'was the- agent of -the- defendant at Riclge- Spring. The statement of his Honor in the charge was not a charge on the- facts and a violation of the Constitution. His charge was simply telling- the jury that the question of waiver was for them, and tells them what evidence, if established to- their satisfaction, might warrant them in inferring that the company had waived their right to cancel the policy.
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“An agent authorized to solicit insurance, to collect premiums, ho countersign policies, and to accept service of papers for the company has the authority to waive the iron-safe clause in a fire insurance policy issued by a mutual insurance company to' one of its members, although the charter and constitution provide such waiver can only be made by the president in writing.” Hankinson v. Insurance Co., 80 S. C. 392, 61 S. E. 905.
“When an insurance company has the right to cancel the policy, and fails to cancel it and return the unearned premium either before or after the fire, the jury may consider that as evidence of intention to waive the forfeiture.” Norris v. Insurance Co., 57 S. C. 358, 35 S. E. 572.
“Failure to cancel the policy and return the premium * * * after such knowledge (of the breach) was a circumstance tending to show waiver of the right to insist upon the provision of the policy prohibiting other insurance.” Madden & Co. v. Insurance Co., 70 S. C. 295, 49 S. E. 855.
“Good faith would seem to require the insurer to■ cancel the policy and return the unearned premium, if before the fire, while the policy was current, it had notice that the insured had so violated the policy that under its terms he would recover nothing in case of loss.” Pearlstine v. Insurance Co., 70 S. C. 82, 49 S. E. 6.
“Forfeitures are not favored in the law; and Courts aré always prompt to seize hold of any circumstances that indicate an election to1 waive a forfeiture, or any agreement to do so1 on which the party has relied and acted.” Hartford *380 Ins. Co. v. Unsell, 144 U. S. 439, 12 Sup. Ct. 671, 36 L. Ed. 496.
“The agent and applicant are not upon equal terms of knowledge. The applicant is generally ignorant of the powers of the agent and the special1 rules by which the solicited contract is to' be controlled. The agent is generally expert in these matters, and common honesty and fairness demand that the applicant be not misled, to his injury, by *381 the agents in one kind of an association as well as the other, whether the subject matter of waiver and estoppel relate to the form or the substance of the contract.” McCarty v. Insurance Co., 81 S. C. 152, 62 S. E. 1, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729.
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.