Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1919

Coggins v. Cannon

Coggins v. Cannon
Supreme Court of South Carolina · Decided July 14, 1919 · Watts
99 S.E. 823; 112 S.C. 225; 1919 S.C. LEXIS 130 (South Eastern Reporter)

Counsel

Mr. John Gary Evans , for appellant, submits: That the contract sued upon is void under the statute of frauds: Civil Code 1912, vol. I, sec. 3737; 10 Fed. 241; 7 Kan. 373 ; 2 N.H. 515 . Evidence of the seduction of the plaintiff by 4 Strob. 46. Messrs. DePass DePass and Sanders DePass , for respondent, submit: Mutual promises although resting in parol are regarded as valid: 20 Cyc. 157, and cases cited under note 12; 23 Cent. Dig., title "Frauds, Stat. of," sec. 3. A promise to marry is not within the clause of the statute of frauds, relating to contracts made in consideration of marriage: 90 Md. 294 ; 45 A. 459 ; 47 L.R.A. 385; 1 Bland (Md.) 284; 1 Lord Ragm (overruding Philpott v. Wallet , 3 Lev. 65); 1 Strob. 34. Where there is a possibility of the marriage being performed within a year, and there is no stipulation that it should not be, the statute does not apply: 56 Me. 187 ; 26 Am. Dec. 443; 90 Md. 294 ; 5 Cyc. 1014, and cases cited in notes 33 and 34. Where the promise is expressly denied evidence of sexual intercourse between plaintiff and defendant, and the resulting motherhood is competent, though not alleged in the complaint: 63 Hun. (N.Y.) 361; 18 N.Y. Supp. 266; 43 N.Y. 647 . As to Judge modifying defendant's second request to charge: 5 Cyc. 1002; 4 Strob. 42; 35 S.C.L. 42; 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) (cases annotated), p. 850. Under a general allegation of damages plaintiff may recover not only an indemnity for pecuniary loss and the disappointment of reasonable expectations of an advantageous settlement in life, but also compensation for injury to feelings and affections, and mortification undergone: 5 Cyc. 1009. See cases annotated; 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 842, and p. 846. This action forms an exception to the rule that exemplary or punitive damages should not be allowed in cases on contract, and has always been classed, as regards to measure of damages, with actions of tort: 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 840, and annotated cases; 24 N.Y. 252 ; 42 N.Y. 474 ; 1 Am. Rep. 561; 52 Hun. 631; Cent. Dig., vol. VIII, p. 955, and cases cited; 3 Cyc. 1019 and 102; 4 Strob. 42.

Coggins v. Cannon

Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Watts.

This was an action by plaintiff against defendant for damages for alleged breach of contract for marriage. The case was heard before Special Judge Greene, and a jury, at Spartanburg, S. C., and resulted in a verdict of $5,000 actual damages to the plaintiff; the action being both for actual *229 and punitive damages, but the verdict of jury was only for actual damages. After entry of judgment, defendant appeals. •

1 The first exception imputes error in refusing to strike out all of the testimony of plaintiff relating to a supposed contract of marriage entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, for the reason that under the testimony offered, plaintiff was absolutely uncertain as to the time of performance, and, therefore, within the statute of frauds. This exception is overruled. There is nothing to show that the contract was not to be performed within one year, so as to bring it within the statute of frauds. Had the evidence shown that the contract was one that was not to be performed within one year, then that would have brought it within the statute of frauds. A mutual promise to marry can be made in parole; need not be in writing. Such parole agreement is valid, and is excluded from the operation of the statute of frauds. It is not essential to the right of action that any definite time should have been fixed for the marriage.

2 The second exception complains that evidence of seduction of the plaintiff by defendant, in the absence of allegations in the complaint that the act- was done by virtue of the promise to marry, is incompetent and should have been received. This exception is overruled.

The plaintiff testified that under the promise of marriage she was seduced against her will by force, persuasion, and promise of marriage. This evidence was competent to go to the jury for their consideration, as the issues were: (1). Did the defendant make the promise to marry — was that promise mutual between plaintiff and defendant? (2) Did the defendant break that promise? (3) If so, was the plaintiff damaged,- and how much in dollars and cents? His Honor, in his general charge instructing the jury as to compensatory damages, stated the law lucidly and correctly, and also charged defendant’s request embodying the same *230 principles. The fact that plaintiff was seduced under promise of marriage was clearly admissible in evidence as an aggravation of damages for the jury to consider in arriving at tHeir verdict.

3 Exception 3 is overruled. His Honor correctly charged the law, and committed no error as complained of.

Exception 4 is overruled, as his Honor did not commit the error alleged in the exception to have been committed by him.

4 Exception 5 is overruled. The jury did not award any punitive damages, but only rendered a verdict for actual damages.

Judgment affirmed.

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