Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1920

Robison v. Barton

Supreme Court of South Carolina · Decided January 26, 1920 · Gary, Townsend, Richland, Summer

102 S.E. 16; 113 S.C. 212; 1920 S.C. LEXIS 48 (South Eastern Reporter)

Counsel

Mr. D.W. Robinson , for appellant, submits: The tenant must have held under an agreement indefinite as to time for more than year before he acquires the rights of a tenant from year to year: 66 S.C. 170; 44 S.C. 459 -60; 30 S.C. 213 ; 24 S.C. 514 ; 90 S.C. 58; 60 S.C. 400; 107 S.C. 282. The law as to tenancy from year to year rests in a presumption in cases where there is no express contract, or where the express contract is oral and void under the statute as being for more than one year; the presumption taking the place of the absence of evidence: 90 S.C. 58; 4 McCord (15 S.C.L.) 59; 2 Rich. 348-9 (31 S.C.L.). The only law requiring three months' notice prior to the end of the calendar year, is applicable to those cases where it is a tenancy from year to year, and the Court has established the end of the year as the time for termination of it, and the law has fixed, either with regard to agricultural purposes, or the local custom of the place, three months as a reasonable time to give notice: 4 Rich. (38 S.C.L.) 27; 2 Rich. (31 S.C. L.) 248-9. The tenancy in this case was either a tenancy at will, which could be terminated on reasonable notice: 90 S.C. 58; 60 S.C. 400; or it was a tenancy for one year from September 21, 1917, and terminated on September 21, 1918: 2 Rich. 348-9 (31 S.C.L.). Mr. James H. Hammond , for respondent.

Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chief Justice; Gary.

The facts herein are stated in the order of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, which will be reported, together with the plaintiff’s exceptions.

The following is a summary of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, out of which the controversy arose:

“This is a contract between G. M. Barton, seller, and Lena Robison, purchaser, dated August 21, 1916, for the purchase of the house and lot oh Woodrow street, Melrose Heights, at the price of $2,250, of which $25 was paid the date of the contract, balance to be paid 30 days from date on execution of good title.

“The contract further provides: It is understood and agreed that the Owner is to have one year lease on place at $20 per month, making $240; $200 to be deducted from selling price, which is $2,250, leaving $2,050 to be paid as above, two last months’ rent of year’s lease to be paid at the end of each month.”

The defendant executed a deed of the house and lot to the plaintiff on the 21st of September, 1916.

1 Unquestionably the lease was only for a year. The mere fact that a tenant may continue in possession after the termination of his lease is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute a tenancy from year to year.

There must be consent or acquiescence on the part of the landlord, or the circumstances must be such as to be susceptible of a reasonable inference, that the parties intended a tenancy from year to year. Matthews v. Hipp, 66 S. C. 162, 44 S. E. 577.

The testimony in the case does not make the same impression upon us as it did upon his Honor, the Circuit Judge. It appears to us that the only reasonable inference from the *217 testimony is that the plaintiff did not, by implication or otherwise, consent or acquiesce in a tenancy from year to year.

Unless there was a tenancy from year to year, the plaintiff was not bound to wait until the end of the calendar year before ejecting the defendant under proper proceedings. Floyd v. Floyd, 4 Rich. 23.

2 The ruling of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, that, in order to terminate.a tenancy from year to year, it was necessary to give three months’ notice, before the end of the calendar year, was reversible error The law only requires reasonable notice. Jones v. Garlington, 44 S. E. 533, 22 S. E. 741.

Reversed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.