Panama Real Estate Co. v. Dime Savings Bank

Supreme Court of South Carolina December 20, 1920

Panama Real Estate Co. v. Dime Savings Bank, 105 S.E. 444 (S.C. 1920)

115 S.C. 290; 1920 S.C. LEXIS 229

Fraser, Messrs, Hydrick, Watts, Chiee, Gary, Gage

Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the. Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Fraser.

This is an appeal from an order of Judge Prince, refusing to change the place of trial from Lexington county to Charleston county. The motion was based upon two grounds:

(1) Because Lexington county was not the proper county.

(2) Because the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.

1, 2 The motion was refused, but the grounds upon which the refusal was based were not stated. If the refusal can be sustained on either ground, it must be sustained. The refusal on the second ground was clearly within his Honor’s discretion, and we do not see that he has abused his discretion.

The first ground need not be considered. See Moore v. Arthur, 113 S. C. 112, 101 S. E. 640.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Messrs. Justices Hydrick and Watts concur. Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Gage absent on account of sickness.

Reference

Full Case Name: Panama Real Estate Co. v. Dime Savings Bank Et Al.
Cited By: 2 cases
Status: Published
Syllabus: 1. Appeal and Eeeoe — Bepusal to Change Place op Tblal Not Distuhbed Ip Sustained on Any Gboúnd. — On motion to change the place of trial on the two grounds that county in which the action was brought was not the proper county, and that the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change, the Court’s refusal of motion will be sustained on appeal, if it can be sustained on either ground. 2. Venue — Bepusal op Change poe Convenience op Witnesses Discbetionaey With Couet. — Where change of venue would not promote tlie convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice, a denial of motion to change the place of trial on the grounds that the county in which the action was commenced was not the proper county, and that the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change, was within the Court’s discretion.