Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1924

Hardin v. Southern Rwy. Co.

Hardin v. Southern Rwy. Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · Decided April 22, 1924 · Cothran, Messrs, Watts, Fraser, Marion, Chiee, Gary
122 S.E. 582; 128 S.C. 216; 1924 S.C. LEXIS 204 (South Eastern Reporter)

Counsel

Mr. J. Harry Foster , for the appellant, cites: Statute of Limitation: 80 S.C. 223 . Responsibility of a carrier for acts of its physician, an employee: 100 S.C. 98 ; 139 S.W., Rep., 771; 50 Am. St. Rep., 314; 28 Am. St. Rep., 556; Thompson on Negligence, Sec. 3843; 60 Fed. Rep., 365; 45 Am. St. Rep., 767; 1 Am. St. Rep., 815. Messrs. McDonald McDonald and Frank G. Tompkins , for respondent, cite: Precedence of the Federal Employers' Liability Act over State Laws: 223 U.S. 1 ; 18 R.C.L., 841-42; 223 Fed., 448; 260 Fed., 874; 232 U.S. 248 ; 231 Fed., 591; 228 U.S. 702 ; 234 U.S. 86 ; 98 S.C. 197 . Time limitation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act a part of the right of action rather than the remedy: 160 N.W., 424; 167 N.Y. Supp., 177; 96 S.E., 640 ; 241 Fed., 395; 40 App. Cas. (D.C.), 391. Necessity of pleading limitation of two years: 239 U.S. 199 . Non-liability of corporation to supply medical aid to injured employee: 18 R.C.L., 506-508; Case note; 21 R. C.L., 873; Case note 8 Am. L.R., 515; 95 Tenn., 713 ; 1 Nott. McC., 452; 108 S.C. 266; 100 S.C. 96 . Competency of physician: 36 L.R.A. (N.S.), 50, Damage for malpractice: 50 Am. R., 601; 104 Am. St. Rep., 218; 107 S.C. 200 ; 69 Am. St. Rep., 906; Note 36 Am. St. Rep., 807-861. Demurrer: 28 S.C. 388 ; 33 S.C. 216 ; 34 S.C. 62 ; 104 S.C. 323; 111 S.C. 394 ; 110 S.E., 837 .

Hardin v. Southern Rwy. Co.

Opinion of the Court

Mr. Justice Cothran,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Circuit Judge was in error in holding that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred under the Federal Employers’ Riability Act, because it was not brought within two years after the alleged cause of action accrued. It does not appear, upon the face of the complaint, that both the employee and the railroad company were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the alleged injury, facts essential to the application of that Act. If it had so appeared, the conclusion would have been correct.

*223 The other grounds of the demurrer were properly sustained, for the reasons stated by the Circuit Judge in his order, which is accordingly affirmed.

Messrs. Justices Watts, Fraser and Marion concur. Mr. ChiEE Justice Gary did not participate.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.