Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1930

Buffkin v. Pridgen

Buffkin v. Pridgen
Supreme Court of South Carolina · Decided January 3, 1930 · Stabler, Watts, Messrs, Cothran, Blease, Carter
151 S.E. 105; 154 S.C. 53; 1930 S.C. LEXIS 1 (South Eastern Reporter)

Counsel

Messrs. L.M. Gasque, E.S.C. Baker , and Ford Suggs , for appellant, cite: As to slanderous words: 14 N.Y. Cr., 148; 85 Mo. App., 462 ; 66 Mo. App., 537. Special damages must be alleged in action for slander per quod: 17 R.C.L., 391; 91 U.S. 225 ; 5 A.L.R. Ann., 1349. Messrs. M.A. Wright and Sherwood McMillan , for respondent, cite: Slanderous words: 1 N. McC., 216; 2 Bail., 592; 106 S.E., 855; 10 Rich., 417; 96 S.C. 294 ; 93 S.C. 467 ; 2 Rich., 573; 95 S.C. 90 ; 25 Cyc. Law Proc., 319. Words imputing want of chastity to a woman are slanderous and actionable per se: 8 N.Y. Supp., 5; 42 N.W., 956; 50 N.Y.S. Ct., 12; 52 S.E., 864; 22 S.C. 372 ; 21 S.C. 342 ; 2 Bail., 15; 63 S.C. 525 . Court will take cognizance of male and female names: 37 S.E., 125; 19 R.C.L., 1330; 15 R.C.L., 1096. Sufficient to set out substantially the slanderous words spoken: 2 McC., 305; 22 S.C. 372 ; 6 Rich., 419; 1 N. McC., 216; 2 Rich., 580.

Buffkin v. Pridgen

Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Stabler.

This is an action for damages on account of certain slanderous words alleged to have been spoken by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff, Inez Buff-kin. The defendant demurred to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient, in several particulars named, to constitute a cause of action, and, from an adverse holding by his Honor, Judge Shipp, he appeals and brings error.

This Court is satisfied, from a careful reading of the complaint, that a cause of action is stated. The words alleged to have been tittered and published by the defendant concerning the plaintiff impute to her a want of chastity and such words are deemed actionable, without proof of special damage. Freeman v. Price, 2 Bailey, 115. Also it is sufficiently shown from the allegations of the complaint that the plaintiff is a female, and that Seymour Tittle, the other party alleged to- have been named by the defendant, is a male person.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Watts and Messrs. Justices Cothran, BlEase and Carter, concur.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.