The Appellants, John L. Welch and Lester Bradshaw, while represented by two Court-appointed attorneys, pleaded guilty to safecracking at the January, 1963, Term of General Sessions Court for Lexington County. Mr. Bradshaw was sentenced to serve ten years. Mr. Welch was sentenced to serve ten years, provided that upon the service of five years, the balance be suspended and defendant placed on probation for four years.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed by Appellants and denied without hearing by the Honorable John Grimball in his Order of August 8, 1963, *260 óñ Wé grounds that, the; petition 'contained no: meritorious ¡matter warranting the, issuance of the writ. This .appeal followed. It. is proper, to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing thereon if it contains ño "allegations which warrant the issuance of the writ. Such a petition must contain an adequate statement of facts to make possible preliminarily an intelligent judgment on the merits of the petition. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the applicant to make at least a prima facie showing entitling him. to relief. Babb v. State, 240 S. C. 235, 125 S. E. (2d). 467; Crosby v. State, 241 S. C. 40, 126 S. E. (2d) 843; Tillman v. Manning, 241 S. C. 221, 127 S. E. (2d) 721; Blandshaw v. State, S. C. 140 S. E. (2d) 784.

The petition is based principally upon the contention that Appellants were the victims of an entrapment- instigated by an agent of the South • Carolina Law. Enforcement Division.

In Babb v. State, supra, 240 S. C. 235, 125 S. E. (2d) 467, "it was contended in a habeas corpus petition that petitioner was the victim of an entrapment instigated by a law enforcement officer. This. Court held that a defendant who did not interpose the affirmative defense of entrapment before sentencing, could not claim such defense by way of habeas corpus.

There is no allegation in the petition presented to Judge Grimball relative to an alleged failure of Court-appointed counsel .to inform Appellants of the defense of entrapment:;, but in their brief before this Court, it is contended that- they were denied a fair and' impartial trial as they were not .informed of the defense of entrapmant by their Court-appointed attorneys. This might" conceivably be construed as contending -that Appellants were iriadequately represented by "the Court-appointed attorneys. Such allegations are easily made; however, effective representation by counsel in .compliance with due process of law does not mean perfection on:the: part of attorneys.-A lack of effective assistance'of.-counsel'"must" be of such nature" aá"-"tó shock *261 the conscience of, the Court and make'the trial proceedings a farce and mockery of justice in order- to, suffice as grounds for the .issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Crosby v.State, 241 S. C. 40, 126 S. E. (2d) 843, Tillman v. State, 244 S. C. 259, 136 S. E. (2d) 300.

An examination of the.record reveals that the following.transpired during the taking,of)tifie pleas; “The Court: Now, Mr. Duncan and'Mr.. Bryan, you h.aye.talked to both Mr, Bradshaw and .Mr.: Welch and-'they understand'it?

“Mr. Duncan: Yes, sir. We conclude'that there is" no defense. Even a sympathetic trial would be of no avail to these men,.' and they.'décided tó plead guilty.'

“The Court: Now,,•.•Mr. Bradshaw-:and. Mr. Welch,:.you Ixpth agree to the statement . just , made -by - your attorney, is that right? : -v ’ . .- :-. -

“Mr-. Bradshaw.: Yes,-

“Mr.-Welch: Yes, sir:”

For the foregoing ..reasons.,. the..-Qrder- appealed from should be;affirmed, and it is.so...ordered. Affirmed. . .-¡. ,-