Milton v. Richland County

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court John Christopher Milton, Petitioner, v. Richland County, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000580

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Memorandum Opinion No. 2015-MO-046 Heard May 20, 2015 – Filed August 5, 2015

DISMISSED ______________ Constantine George Pournaras, Kris Hines and Elizabeth Fielding Pringle, all of Richland County Public Defender's Office, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction1 to determine: (1) whether prolonged detention of persons incarcerated upon the issuance of a uniform traffic ticket violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution2 where the county has failed to provide a mechanism for prompt judicial determination of probable cause within a 48-hour period following arrest; and (2) whether, absent a prompt probable cause determination, detention centers may detain persons arrested without a warrant longer than reasonably necessary for booking and processing. Because there is nothing in the record to indicate that John Christopher Milton did not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours of his arrest, we find Milton has failed to demonstrate a justiciable controversy that is appropriate for our review.

Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction.

I. Factual / Procedural History On January 23, 2014, a deputy with the Richland County Sheriff's Department arrested Milton for trespassing at a business after notice and issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket ("UTT").3 Milton was committed to the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center because he could not post the $470 bond set by Richland County Magistrate Metts. On February 18, 2014, Magistrate Howard converted the bond from a cash or surety bond to a personal recognizance bond. As a result, Milton was released from custody and ordered to appear in magistrate's court on March 12, 2014.4 On March 19, 2014, the Chief Public Defender for Richland County ("Petitioner"), on behalf of Milton and other similarly situated detainees, petitioned this Court to accept a Complaint within its original jurisdiction. Petitioner maintained that Milton and other individuals, who were arrested in Richland County pursuant to a UTT and not a warrant, have been subjected to prolonged detention without a prompt judicial determination of probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner sought for the Court to issue an order declaring that: (1) a criminal defendant, who is detained as a result of a warrantless arrest, must receive a Gerstein5 probable cause determination within 48 hours of his or her arrest; and (2) a criminal defendant, who does not receive a judicial determination of probable cause, may not be held by a detention center "longer than reasonably necessary" for booking and processing. This Court, despite mootness,6 granted the petition.

amendment does not affect the disposition of the instant case as it was amended to include additional offenses for which a UTT may be issued.

II. Standard of Review Petitioner seeks a declaration from this Court in its original jurisdiction.

Thus, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("the Act") is implicated. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005). Section 15-53-20 of the South Carolina Code identifies the purpose of the Act and provides that courts "shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-20 (2005); see Rule 57, SCRCP ("The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Code §§ 15–53–10 through 15–53–140, shall be in accordance with these rules, and . . . [t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."). The Act is to be liberally construed and administered to achieve its intended purpose "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-130 (2005).

To state a cause of action under the Act, a party must demonstrate a justiciable controversy. Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 177 S.E.2d 551 (1970). "A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute or difference of a contingent, hypothetical or abstract character." Id. at 154, 177 S.E.2d at 553.

III. Discussion Milton acknowledges that the Richland County deputy was statutorily authorized to arrest him using a UTT rather than a warrant.7 However, because he was detained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, Milton asserts that he was entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. Although Milton admits that he received a bond hearing within 24 hours of arrest, as required by section 22-5-510 of the South Carolina Code,8 he claims that at no point during the "bail proceedings" was there a determination of probable cause. In the absence of this determination, Milton argues he was detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

We find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a justiciable controversy.

Other than Milton's own assertions, the record contains no evidence that he was denied a probable cause determination. Because Petitioner failed to submit a sufficient record, this case presents nothing more than a dispute of a hypothetical character. See Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005) (noting that appellant has the burden of establishing a sufficient record and declining to address the merits of a claim when facts underlying the claim are not included in the record); Rule 210(h), SCACR ("Except as provided by Rule 212 and Rule 208(b)(1)(C) and (2), the appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal.").

Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction as it is not appropriate for our review.

DISMISSED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.