THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Detrick Williams, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002100

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal from York County J. Ernest Kinard, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-017 Submitted April 15, 2016 – Filed April 27, 2016

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General James Rutledge Johnson, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: This Court granted petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari from an order of the post-conviction relief court finding petitioner was not entitled to a belated review of his direct appeal issue pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). Upon reviewing petitioner's direct appeal issue, we affirm his conviction and sentence pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Clark v. South Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 382–83, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2005) (holding this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling on a directed verdict motion only where there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by error of law (citing Hinkle v. National Cas. Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 92, 96, 579 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2003))); State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003) (noting a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged); see also State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2011) ("Although it is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the defendant, State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991), courts must nevertheless interpret a penal statute that is clear and unambiguous according to its literal meaning" (citing State v. Mills, 360 S.C. 621, 624, 602 S.E.2d 750, 752 (2004))); In re Vincent J., 333 S.C. 233, 235, 509 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1998) (finding under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute (citations omitted)); Paschal v. State Election Comm'n, 317 S.C. 434, 436, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995) (stating where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning (citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.