Gillman Roddy Long, also known as Dave Gillman Long v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA WESTERN DIVISION GILLMAN RODDY LONG, 5:14-CV-05022-KES also known as Dave Gillman Long, Petitioner, ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF vs. APPEALABILITY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

On February 23, 2026, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded petitioner Gillman Roddy Long’s appeal and ordered this court to determine whether to grant a certificate of appealability. See Docket 71. A federal prisoner filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his [motion].” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from— . . . the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.”). “Before an appeal may be entertained, a prisoner who was denied habeas relief in the district court must first seek and obtain a [certificate of appealability] from a circuit justice or judge.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36. A certificate may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A “substantial showing” is one that demonstrates “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

The court finds that Long has failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were denied. Reasonable jurists would not debate the court’s ruling that Long’s Rule 60(b) motion asserted a substantive claim— namely, that his trial counsel’s alleged abandonment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 2009), a Rule 60(b) motion that presents a “claim” must be treated as a second or successive habeas petition under AEDPA. Because Long’s motion sought to assert or reassert a substantive ineffective-assistance claim, the court correctly characterized it as a successive petition.

The governing precedent makes clear that Rule 60(b) motions asserting substantive ineffective-assistance claims are treated as successive petitions, and absent appellate authorization, the district court has no authority to consider them. Because the court’s ruling, see Docket 69, is not debatable among reasonable jurists, Long cannot satisfy the standard set forth in Slack.

As such, a certificate of appealability is denied.

Thus, it is ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is denied.

Dated February 24, 2026.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Karen E. Schreier KAREN E. SCHREIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE