Doris Tibke (Tibke), Tana Koch (Tana), and Misty Koch (Misty) (collectively plaintiffs) take an intermediate appeal from a trial court order dismissing their cause of action for slander and Tibke's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. They further appeal the order dismissing their lawsuits and granting partial summary judgment in favor of all defendants on plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference with business relations and expectancy except Tibke’s claim against defendant Tom Bennington. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

Tibke ran a family horse training business near Rapid City, South Dakota, from 1972 through the summer of 1985. This was conducted on her own ten acres of land complete with indoor and outdoor facilities for riding lessons, and training and boarding horses. Tana and Misty, Tibke’s daughters, also participated in the family horse business. In the summer of 1985 Tibke sold her ten acre training facility and planned to move to Arizona. She changed her mind, however, and in the fall of 1985 purchased a mobile home in Piedmont, South Dakota. Subsequently, Tibke made an oral arrangement with Joe and Maxine Murdza where Tibke was allowed to board her horses at the Murdza ranch and continue training and giving lessons at the ranch. In return, the Murdzas were paid a portion of the profits. In approximately March of 1986 the arrangement between Tibke and Murdza was terminated. After losing the Murdza Ranch facilities, Tibke tried to get her horses into indoor training facilities at Hart Ranch and at the Gerald Tanner ranch, but no stalls were available.

Defendants are members of the West River Appaloosa Horse Club, Inc., (WRAC), which is a non-profit South Dakota corporation organized in 1969. Plaintiffs are suing all but one defendant individually and in their official capacity as officers or directors of the WRAC. WRAC is a local horse club which is affiliated with the national organization, Appaloosa Horse Club, Inc., (ApHC) located in Moscow, Idaho. WRAC is a voluntary organization and membership is a privilege. Article II, Section G of the WRAC Constitution states: “Those members abusing their privileges of membership shall have their membership revoked by the Board of Directors.”

Tibke had been a member in good standing of WRAC for about fifteen years prior to December 1985. Her children were also members of the WRAC. In December 1985, following a November 22, 1985, gen*901eral meeting of the WRAC,1 the WRAC Board of Directors terminated Tibke’s membership on the grounds of her unsportsmanlike conduct and her continued disruptive behavior at meetings and horse shows. Defendants contend they were acting under the rights conferred upon them by the WRAC Constitution in revoking Tibke’s membership. The Tibke-Murdza relationship was not terminated because of Tibke’s loss of membership in the WRAC.

The Board of Directors determined that Tibke had abused her privileges of membership and that her conduct was detrimental to and not in the best interests of WRAC and the harmonious relationship of its members. Further, defendants contend that Tibke’s unceasing disruptive behavior and her outstanding unpaid debt owed WRAC2 were considered by the WRAC Board of Directors in deciding that Tibke would be denied the privilege of exhibiting horses in WRAC-sponsored shows, as an owner, trainer, or rider of any horse sought to be entered in any event. Tibke was informed in December 1985 that she could not renew her WRAC membership for 1986; however, Tibke was allowed to exhibit at WRAC shows despite her loss of membership. She was formally advised by a letter dated June 9, 1987, of the loss of exhibiting privileges until she paid her debt. Despite that letter and a subsequent phone call by Tom Bennington to Elaine Thomas informing her that Tibke could not show Elaine’s horse at an upcoming show in Newcastle, Wyoming, Tibke still attempted to show Elaine’s horse in Newcastle in June 1987 and was refused entry into the show. Tibke filed a protest with ApHC over the denial of her entry. ApHC, upon a hearing, denied the protest.

In July 1986, Tibke was notified that she had been approved as a judge by ApHC. She lost her judging card as a result of her unprofessional behavior at an August 1986 horse show sponsored by WRAC.3 Tibke’s membership in ApHC was revoked in July 1988 and she was barred by the national club for life. ApHC proceedings are separate and distinct from the proceedings before us now. Neither WRAC nor ApHC is a named defendant in this lawsuit.

This is an intermediate appeal of the second of two lawsuits brought by Tibke against defendants. The first complaint dated December 19, 1986, alleged damages for Tibke’s loss of reputation and business because of the loss of WRAC membership privileges and because of comments and observations made by various members of WRAC about Tibke’s changing clothes in public at a July 1985 horse show, attempts to change club rules, unpopularity with members of WRAC, and her uncouth conduct and vulgar language. Plaintiffs claimed five causes of action: (1) tortious interference with business relations; (2) slander resulting in injury to profession, trade, or business; (3) slander; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress to Tibke; and (5) infliction of emotional distress upon the Tibke children. This first complaint was dismissed for failure to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.

Plaintiffs served a second complaint4 against the same defendants. This second *902complaint, the subject of this action, essentially repeated three of the same causes of action: (1) tortious interference with business relations or expectancy; (2) slander resulting in injury to profession, trade, or business; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The trial court dismissed with prejudice the allegations of slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state a cause of action against all defendants. But, the trial court found that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for tortious interference with business relations.

Subsequent to the court’s order, defendants moved for summary judgment based on Murdzas’ affidavits that defendants had not interfered with any contract between Murdzas and Tibke. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants with regard to any tortious interference with Tibke’s oral agreements with Murdzas and any relationships or damages resulting therefrom, but allowed plaintiffs additional time to identify with specificity any other contracts that may have been tortiously interfered with by defendants.

All of the defendants have testified by affidavit or stated in their answers to plaintiffs’ interrogatories that they have never said or done anything intended to interfere with any business relations of the plaintiffs, nor have they ever discouraged or tried to dissuade anyone from using Tibke as a horse trainer.

After taking Tibke’s deposition defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on the claim of tortious interference with business relations. In support of Tibke’s claim that defendants tortiously interfered with her business from approximately 1985 through 1989, Tibke named herself and eleven potential witnesses. All twelve filed affidavits, ostensibly in support of plaintiffs’ claim.5 After reviewing this new evidence, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

After deposing the twelve affiants,6 defendants individually moved for summary *903judgment. On July 31,1990, the trial court granted partial summary judgment on the claim of tortious interference with business relations in favor of all defendants except Tom Bennington because a phone call he made may have affected an alleged agreement between Tibke and John and Elaine Thomas. Furthermore, the court dismissed, with prejudice, all claims by Misty and Tana against all defendants. Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal.

STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS?

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF TIBKE’S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS?

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS EXCEPT TOM BEN-NINGTON AS TO TIBKE’S CLAIM OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS?

IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING THE LAWSUITS BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS TANA AND MISTY?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The South Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure state that if, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in SDCL 15-6-56.7

The settled record before us plainly indicates that matters outside the pleadings were presented to and considered by the trial court before the orders to dismiss *904were entered against plaintiffs.8 Accordingly, on review we treat defendants’ motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment and the disposition a grant of those motions. Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indann School, 438 N.W.2d 204, 206 (S.D. 1989).

This court reviews summary judgments under the premise that affirmance of such a judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and there exists any basis which would support the trial court’s ruling. Production Credit Assn. of the Midlands v. Mary Wynne, et al., 474 N.W.2d 735 (S.D. 1991); Trammell v. Prairie States Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 460 (S.D. 1991); Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988).

In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56(c),9 the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the non-moving party; the movant has the burden of proof to clearly show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; summary judgment is not a substitute for trial; a belief that the non-moving party will not prevail at trial is not an appropriate basis for granting the motion on issues not shown to be sham, frivolous, or unsubstantiated; summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be awarded only when the truth is clear and reasonable doubts touching upon the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved against the movant. Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989); Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1969). Where, however, no genuine issue of fact exists it is looked upon with favor and is particularly adaptable to expose sham claims and defenses. Ruane v. Murray, 380 N.W.2d 362 (S.D. 1986).

In addition to the foregoing tenets pertaining to summary judgments, the formal issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling and a party may not rest upon the mere allegations contained therein; the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must be diligent in resisting the motion, and mere general allegations and denials which do not set forth specific facts will not prevent issuance of a judgment; Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc., supra; and the non-moving party must present specific facts which demonstrate there is a genuine, material issue for trial. Ruane v. Murray, supra; SDCL 15-6-56(e). With these considerations in mind, we address the merits of Tibke’s appeal in chronological order.

DECISION

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER AGAINST ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges slander resulting in injury to profession, trade, or business. Defendants’ answer denies the claim and asserts a conditional privilege.

To state a claim for slander, a plaintiff must establish that the publication was both false and unprivileged. SDCL 20-11-4 states in pertinent part:

Slander is a false and unprivileged publication other than libel, which:

(3) Tends directly to injure [plaintiff] in respect to his office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business *905that has a natural tendency to lessen its profit;

SDCL 20-11-5 reads, in pertinent part:

A privileged communication is one made: (1) In the proper discharge of an official duty;

(3) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or who is requested by the person interested to give the information;

In the cases provided for in subdivision (3) ... of this section, malice is not inferred from the communication or publication.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 discusses the privilege of common interest to be:

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances lead any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that there is information that another sharing the common interest is entitled to know.

This defense extends to non-profit organizations like WRAC.

The common interest of members of religious, fraternal, charitable or other nonprofit associations, whether incorporated or unincorporated, is recognized as sufficient to support a privilege for communications among themselves concerning the qualifications of the officers and members and their participation in. the activities of the society. This is true whether the defamatory matter relates to alleged misconduct of some other member which makes him undesirable for continued membership, or the conduct of a prospective member.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596, comment (e).

In order to be conditionally privileged, a communication must be without malice. If malice exists, the actions exceed the privilege or constitute an abuse thereof. Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1987).

The record shows that all of the alleged slanderous communications made by the various defendants were made to other members of WRAC or to other interested people in the horse business. We find that the communications were among interested parties and therefore conditionally privileged.

Next, we determine whether the communications were made with malice which would negate the conditional privilege. A “qualified or conditional privilege may be lost when the speaker, on an otherwise privileged occasion, publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another which either (a) he in fact does not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.” Bego v. Gordon, supra, 407 N.W.2d at 811. It appears from the record that defendants’ comments concerning Tibke were true. Certainly, defendants believed them to be true or had reasonable grounds for believing them to be true. Therefore, the conditional privilege was not negated. Plaintiffs’ complaint does set out general allegations of malice in an attempt to defeat defendants’ conditional privilege. However, a specific showing of malice is required for purposes of raising a genuine issue of a material fact, and this burden was not met by the complaint, depositions, or affidavits. Uken v. Sloat, 296 N.W.2d 540 (S.D. 1980) (citing Hughes-Johnson Co. v. Dakota Midland Hospital, 86 S.D. 361, 195 N.W.2d 519 (1972)); see also SDCL 15-6-56(e).10 Be*906cause malice cannot be presumed, the party bearing the burden of proof must establish that there was a reckless disregard for the truth on the part of the accused. Uken v. Sloat, supra, (citing Wollman v. Graff, 287 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1979)). “The real test of whether a defendant’s conduct is reckless so as to constitute actual malice is whether he ‘in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publications.’ ” Id. at 543. Plaintiffs have failed to allege both falsity and lack of privilege in their complaint, and they have not set forth specific facts through competent evidence by affidavit, deposition or otherwise pursuant to SDCL 15-6-56(e) to support their general allegations of malice and falsity in defense of defendants’ motion to dismiss. We therefore hold that defendants’ communications were between interested parties and therefore privileged, and made without malice. We affirm the trial court’s order to dismiss all counts of slander against all defendants.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF TIBKE’S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS.

Tibke argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In First National Bank of Jacksonville v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89, 167 N.W.2d 381 (1969), this court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Bragdon court held the important elements of that tort to be, “that the act is intentional, that it is unreasonable, and that the actor should recognize it as likely to result in illness [emotional distress].” Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1979); Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984); Ruane v. Murray, supra; and Groseth Intern., Inc. v. Tenneco Inc., 440 N.W.2d 276 (S.D. 1989) (Groseth II).11

In essence, the Ruple, Ruane, and Gro-seth II rule is broader than the rule set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts § 46(1), which provides: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”

The court in Groseth Intern., Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 169 (S.D. 1987) (Groseth I) (citing Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963)), determined the proper criteria for establishing a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress to be: (1) an act by defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent on the part of the defendant to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress; (3) the defendant’s conduct was the cause in-fact of plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to defendant’s conduct.12 Mackintosh v. Carter, 451 N.W.2d 285 (S.D. 1990). Even though this standard of liability is more restrictive than the rule set out in Ruple, Ruane, and Groseth II, we feel this standard is more reflective of societal discourse today.13

*907The requirement that -the conduct be extreme and outrageous reflects our concern with the difficulties surrounding proof of the existence of severe emotional harm, and proof of a causal relationship between the injury and the defendant’s conduct. If the conduct is gross and extreme it is more probable that the plaintiff did, in fact, suffer the emotional distress alleged. Moreover, the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct as a condition of recovery will avoid litigation “in the field of bad manners, where relatively minor annoyances had better be dealt with by instruments of social control other than law.”

Alsteen, supra, 124 N.W.2d at 318.

In addition to setting forth the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, this court has repeatedly held that “[t]his tort requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and which is of a nature especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.” Groseth I, supra, 410 N.W.2d at 169; Ruple v. Brooks, supra; Ruane v. Murray, supra; Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 12 (4th ed. 1971).

We have vacillated in our prior opinions setting forth the elements of this tort. The bench and bar of this state are entitled to a definitive delineation of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, it is established that we adhere to the tenets of Groseth I and Mackintosh v. Carter, supra, as to the elements necessary for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

For conduct to be “outrageous,” it must be so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment (d). The determination of outrageous conduct by the defendant is initially for the court.14

In this case, we are of the opinion that reasonable men would not differ in finding that defendants’ termination and nonrenewal of plaintiff’s membership in WRAC together with the various statements allegedly made by defendants do not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ supporting affidavits in defense to defendants’ motion to dismiss do not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss Tibke’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants.

III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO ALL THE DEFENDANTS EXCEPT TOM BENNINGTON ON THE ISSUE OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS AND EXPECTANCY.

Tibke alleges a series of tortious interferences with business relations by the defendants that resulted in her loss of facilities to raise, train, or board horses causing a breach of existing contracts or prospective business. Tibke further alleges the barring of her from WRAC sponsored shows resulted in her inability to show her horses or her client’s horses which diminished the horses value for sale and breeding. She also contends that her termination in 1985 and continuing nonrenewal *908of her membership in WRAC along with her loss of her ApHC judging card and permanent expulsion from ApHC were all caused by defendants’ tortious campaign against her to ruin her horse business.

First, any allegations by Tibke relating to her loss of membership/nonrenewal in WRAC, any barring from WRAC sponsored shows, loss of her ApHC judging card, or her permanent expulsion from ApHC per se are not a proper subject for review by this court. If there were any improprieties committed by defendants, any ApHC judges, or ApHC relating to the above charges, the proper procedure for redress would be for the plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies within the organization before appealing to the courts. Annotation, Suspension or expulsion from social club or similar society and the remedies thereof, 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 384 (1951). This would include appealing her grievances to the Disciplinary Committee, the Board of Directors or the Appeals Committee of ApHC.15

This court has recognized a cause of action for intentional and wrongful interference with contractual relations. However, the interference must have been intentional and without reasonable justification or excuse. Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 73 S.D. 84, 39 N.W.2d 483, 485 (1949). In Groseth I, supra, at 172, we held that “[t]he tort of intentional interference with a business relationship requires only that there is an intentional interference with the business relationship which results in damage, to the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.” Citing Prosser, Law of Torts, § 130 at 953 (1971); Mitchell Machinery, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 918 F.2d 1366, 1371 (8th Cir. 1990). We have further held that “the interference may consist of injury to either an existing contractual relation or a prospective contractual relation.” Groseth I, supra, (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979)).16 See also Nesler v. Fisher and Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1990).

Both parties to this lawsuit concede, and we now adopt the principle, that the essential elements of a claim of tortious interference with business relationships or expectancy, which the plaintiff must prove to recover, consist of: (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy; (3) an intentional and unjustified act of interference on the part of the interferer; (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted. Miller Chemical Co., Inc. v. Tams, 211 Neb. 837, 320 N.W.2d 759 (1982). See also, Nesler v. Fisher and Co., Inc., supra, 452 N.W.2d at 198-99; 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference § 50 (1969); Annotation, Liability for interference with at will business relationship, 5 A.L.R.4th 9 (1981). These elements help clarify the existing law stated previously in South Dakota and more closely follow Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 76617 and 766B.

*909There has been no showing of a contract or business relationship between Tibke and anyone other than with the Murdzas and the Thomases. The trial court gave Tibke an opportunity to identify with specificity any other contracts that may have been tortiously interfered with by defendants. Plaintiffs failed to do so. As clearly shown by the affidavits of the Murdzas and un-contradicted by plaintiffs, the termination of the arrangement for Tibke’s training facilities at the Murdza ranch was caused by insurance costs and plaintiff’s abuse of the arrangement, rather than by Tibke’s loss of membership in WRAC or ApHC or any tortious interference by any of the defendants. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing of any comments or conduct by defendants to other people which would raise to the level of tortious interference with a business relationship. (See footnote 6, relating to the depositions of Tibke’s witnesses.)

All other allegations, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Tibke, reveal that the only relationship in which there was any type of conduct that could present a genuine issue of a material fact for trial on the issue of tortious interference with a business relationship would have been plaintiff’s arrangement with John and Elaine Thomas, which concerned only defendant Tom Bennington. This arrangement had to do with the June 1987 show in Newcastle, Wyoming. Tibke and Thomases had an agreement whereby Tibke took one of Thomas’ horses some five or six weeks in advance to get the horse in show quality. Tom Bennington, one of the defendants, had called the Thomases before the show and told them they could not show if Tibke was going to show their horse. The facts are disputed as to whether Tom Bennington did in fact interfere with existing business relations and whether that interference extended to any prospective business relations between the plaintiff and the Thomases resulting in the claim against Tom Bennington being exeluded from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for all named defendants except Tom Bennington on the claim of tortious interference with business relationships or expectancy.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE LAWSUITS BY TANA AND MISTY.

There is only one remaining issue in this appeal and that relates to the possible involvement or participation of Tana and Misty regarding the June 1987 Newcastle, Wyoming show and the arrangement between Tibke and John and Elaine Thomas. Liability for tortious interference with a business relationship can be asserted only by those directly connected with the contract or relationship on which the alleged tortious interference was immediately operative. 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference § 53. After reviewing all the evidence, neither Tana nor Misty were ever involved with the arrangement between Tibke and Thomases regarding the June 1987 Newcastle, Wyoming horse show or any subsequent shows with Thomases. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuits brought by Misty and Tana.

(dissenting).

Summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendants’ conduct and comments precipitating Tibke’s loss of membership in both WRAC and ApHC. The burden is upon the Defendants, as moving party, to clearly show that when the evi*910dence is viewed most favorably to Tibke, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Weiszhaar Farms v. Live Stock State Bank, 467 N.W.2d 752, 754 (S.D. 1991); Klatt v. Continental Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 366, 368 (S.D. 1987). They failed to sustain their burden. State, Dept. of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 N.W.2d 1, 3 (S.D. 1989).

The majority opinion sets out the five-part test for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. It then ignores portions of this test. Even if Tibke made no showing of any contract or business relationship, the record is replete with expectancies. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Elaine Thomas, SR 794, wherein she stated: “[W]e have therefore not been able to continue our practice of hiring Doris Tibke to show our horse. As far as we are concerned, the WRAC board is solely responsible for the inability for us to continue what had been a wonderful and continuous working relationship.”). Additionally, Tibke provided evidence that the value of her own horses, also a business expectancy, dropped due to her inability to show them. (See Affidavit of Roy Yates, SR 786).

Viewing the evidence most favorably to Tibke, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants intentionally interfered with Tibke’s business expectancies by causing her loss of WRAC and ApHC membership. Therefore, summary judgment was improper. Groseth Intern., Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 172 (S.D. 1987). I would reverse and remand for a trial.