State v. Yeager

Counsel

MARTY J. JACKLEY, Attorney General, QUINCY R. KJERSTAD, Assistant Attorney General, JOHNATHAN STIEN, Legal Intern, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee., JEFFREY J. FRANSEN of Pennington County Public Defender's Office, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant., KERN, Justice *108[¶1.] Shaylan Yeager pled guilty to second-degree rape pursuant to a plea agreement. The circuit court sentenced him to forty years in the state penitentiary, with five years suspended, to run consecutive to the prison term Yeager is currently serving in Iowa for offenses involving the same victim. Yeager appeals, alleging the sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment and an abuse of discretion. We affirm., [¶2.] In 2008, Yeager pled guilty to five counts of third-degree sexual abuse in Iowa district court for conduct involving his fourteen-year-old daughter M.Y. The court sentenced Yeager to thirty years in prison in early 2009. In 2016, Yeager's ex-wife contacted the Pennington County Sheriff's Office and reported that Yeager had also abused M.Y. in August 2008 while their family vacationed in the Black Hills. An investigation ensued and, while Yeager was still serving his Iowa sentence, the Pennington County grand jury indicted him for ten counts of rape, sexual contact, and incest.1 On July 14, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Yeager pled guilty to one count of second-degree rape as defined in SDCL 22-22-1(2)2 in exchange for dismissal of the remaining nine charges and an agreement that the State would forego future prosecutions in Custer County., [¶3.] At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the court considered numerous factors when fashioning Yeager's sentence, including: (1) statements from the victim and her mother; (2) Dr. Donald Janz's evaluation of Yeager concluding he posed a low risk of reoffending; (3) protection of the public; (4) Yeager's pre-sentence investigation, including his lack of criminal history; (5) retribution; and (6) the significant lapse of time between the offense and its prosecution. The court sentenced Yeager to forty years in prison with five years suspended and ordered that his South Dakota sentence run consecutive to his prison term in Iowa. Yeager appeals, raising two issues for our review:, [¶4.] Yeager asserts that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV. "The question whether a noncapital sentence violates the Eighth Amendment requires us to determine de novo whether the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to its corresponding offense." State v. Rice , 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 13, 877 N.W.2d 75, 80. To make this determination, we "compare the gravity of the offense-i.e., the penalty's relative position on the spectrum *109of all criminality-to the harshness of the penalty-i.e., the penalty's relative position on the spectrum of all permitted punishments." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, when comparing Yeager's sentence to other penalties, we are not limited to the range of penalties available for second-degree rape, but rather contemplate its harshness across the sphere of all punishments permitted by the laws of our state. See id. , 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 13, 877 N.W.2d at 81., [¶5.] If, after considering those factors, the penalty appears "grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, then we will compare the sentence to those 'imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction' as well as those 'imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.' " State v. Chipps , 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 38, 874 N.W.2d 475, 489 (quoting Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 291, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ). "The challenged sentence is cruel and unusual only if these comparisons 'validate the initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime.' " Rice , 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 13, 877 N.W.2d 75, 80 (quoting Helm , 463 U.S. at 291, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 )., [¶7.] As to the harshness of Yeager's sentence, the circuit court imposed a forty-year sentence, with five years suspended, to run consecutively with his sentence in Iowa. Second-degree rape is a felony punishable by up to fifty-years imprisonment, a maximum $50,000 fine, or both. See SDCL 22-6-1(4). The circuit court's sentence is ten years below the statutory maximum available for the crime, with five additional years of Yeager's sentence suspended. When viewed on the spectrum of all permitted punishments, which includes the possibility of death for Class A felonies and mandatory life imprisonment for Class A and Class B felonies, Yeager's penalty for raping M.Y. in South Dakota is well below the harshest possible punishment permitted. Therefore, Yeager's "sentence does not appear to be grossly disproportionate." Rice , 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 15, 877 N.W.2d at 81., [¶8.] Notwithstanding the foregoing, Yeager argues the circuit court's imposition of a forty-year sentence for one offense was cruel and unusual because it was grossly disproportionate to the sentence he received in Iowa for virtually the same criminal conduct. The Iowa district court imposed a thirty-year sentence upon Yeager for five counts relating to the sexual abuse of M.Y. Yeager also argues that he was prejudiced by his ex-wife's delay in reporting the offense because if he had been charged in South Dakota at the same time as his prosecution in Iowa, he could *110have explored a global plea agreement involving concurrent sentences., [¶11.] Circuit courts exercise broad discretion in imposing sentences and when challenged on appeal they are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rice , 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83. "An abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices...." Id . (citations omitted)., [¶14.] Red Kettle expressed that a "state and federal court may each sentence a defendant for the commission of a single act constituting an offense under both state and federal law," but the sentences may only run consecutively when the elements of the state and federal offenses are different. See id. at 775 (emphasis added). Yeager's convictions in South Dakota and Iowa did not arise from a single act. Rather, every instance of rape involved different facts and constituted a separate crime, albeit against the same victim. Because the South Dakota rape conviction involved a separate act from any of the Iowa convictions *111our decision in Red Kettle is inapposite here., [¶15.] Yeager also argues the circuit court failed to consider mitigating evidence including: his acceptance of responsibility and remorse, the delay in reporting the crimes, and testimony from Dr. Janz that he fell "in the low risk range for sexual recidivism." Based on our review of the sentencing transcript, however, it is apparent that the court considered these and other factors, including the nature of the offense which the court described as "a heinous and disgusting crime."