Stretch v. Gowdey
Stretch v. Gowdey
Opinion of the Court
The bill is filed for a. settlement of the estate of Thomas Gowdey, deceased, and the construction of his last will and. testament. The intention of the testator throughout the will seems to me clear, and clearly expressed, and, in the events which have happened, practically easy of execution. . The testator provides that a sufficiency of his estate be set apart to raise an annuity of $1000 for his sister during her life, the property thus set apart, at her death, to fall back into his estate, and to be disposed of as the main bulk of his
The intention of the testator, by the language used in this clause, can admit of no doubt. He wills that the shares of his daughters in the money into which his estate is directed to be converted, shall be invested in productive real estate or mortgages, to be held by his daughters to their sole and separate use, and, at then death, to go to their children, if they have any, and, if none, then the daughters may dispose thereof to whom they please by last will and testament.
It is ingeniously urged by one of the able counsel of the defendants, that the direction to sell is a conversion of the testator’s estate into personalty, and that this personalty is given to the children absolutely; that the subsequent direction to invest the daughters’ shares in realty or mortgages, is not a re-conversion, because it is in the alternative that the daughters are entitled to take their shares without being invested as directed, and the provision in favor of the children of the daughters, and the restriction upon the power of disposition, only apply to the realty or mortgages. I do not think so. The provision for re-investment is as much a part of the will, as the clause directing- an equal division among the testator’s children. The one can no more be defeated than the other. The testator means that his children shall share his estate equally, but he also means that his daughters’ shares shall be invested in a certain mode, and held in a certain manner. The daughters, it is true, take an absolute estate under the fourth clause, but subject to the contingency, of being divested, under the seventh clause, by leaving children surviving. If they have no children, the estate is absolute in them. This is the construction put upon a similar will by our supreme court in Alston v. Davis, 2 Head, 266, in which case I was of counsel 'and contended for that construction. But, although the estate would be absolute if there were no children, yet the power of disposi
It is suggested, but not urged, that the will vests the power of sale in the executors named in the will, and that, as only one qualified, he cannot act. But it is clear, that this is not a discretionary power. It is a positive direction, •and, as the learned counsel has himself urged ha another comaection, an absolute conversion. It is a power, therefore, coupled with an interest, which survives, and which any legatee can enforce.
It is also said that the will directs that a part of testator’s property, sufficient to raise the widow’s annuity, shall be reserved, and that the executor ought not to have sold the only productive real estate, the store house.' But the will gives to the executor a discretion here as to what portion of the estate, real, personal or mixed, he will retain, and it appears that he has retained a portion of the realty, a part of which the parties have joined in conveying to the widow, but whether in part of her annuity or not, does not appear. It nowhere appears that the property reserved is not sufficient, nor that there has been an improper exercise of dis-ci’etion by the executor.
Construe the will accordingly, and order an account of the administration in the usual form.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.