IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED SEPTEMBE R SESSION, 1998 October 19, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk JESSIE LAFRANTZ JACKSON, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9711-CR-00523 ) Appe llant, ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY V. ) ) ) HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (POST-CONVICTION)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: JESSIE LAFRANTZ JACKSON, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP Specia l Needs Facility Attorney General & Reporter 7575 Cockrill Bend Industrial Road LISA A. NAYLOR Nashville, TN 37243-0469 Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243 VICTO R S. JO HNS ON, III District Attorney General NICK BAILEY Assistant District Attorney General Washington Square Second Avenue North, Suite 500 Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION The Petitioner, Jessie LaFrantz Jackson, appeals the order of the Davidson Coun ty Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for pos t-conv iction re lief. In this appe al, Petitioner raises the following three issues: (1) whether the State obtained the first degree murder conviction through the perjured testimony of the key eyewitness; (2) whether the State failed to produce certain exculpatory information; and (3) whether his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to offer impeachment and exc ulpatory e vidence at the first pos t-conviction hearing . We affirm the tria l court’s de nial of pos t-conviction relief.

On March 16, 1987, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonm ent. On August 25, 1987, Petitioner filed a notice of appe al, but the appeal was dismissed in May of 1988 at the request of Petitioner and his cou nsel. O n Mar ch 29 , 1989 , Petitioner filed his first pe tition for post- conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The evidentiary hearing on the petition was held on various dates beginning in July 1990. T he trial court denied relief on July 28, 1994. On December 19, 1995, this Court affirmed the dism issal. On June 10, 1996, our supreme court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. On March 31, 1997, Petitioner filed a second petition seeking post-conviction relief. On May 28, 1997, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition from which P etitioner no w appe als.

-2- W e will not a ddres s Petitio ner’s issues o n the m erits as we conc lude th at his petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations. At the time Petitioner’s convictio ns bec ame fin al, the statu te of limitation s applica ble to post-conviction proceedings was three years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). His con viction becam e final in May 1988 when he w ithdrew his direct appeal for the murder conviction. He the refore need ed to file his petition by May 1991 in orde r to toll the runnin g of the statute . How ever, P etitione r did no t file this petition for post-conviction relief until March 31, 1997, thus barring any claims he mig ht have h ad.

The new 1995 Post-Conviction Act go verns this petition and all petitions filed after May 10, 1995. Petitioner’s petition is not revived by the new Post-Conviction Procedu re Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq. Petitioners “for whom the statute of limitations expired p rior to the effe ctive date of the new Act, i.e., May 10, 1995, do not have an additional year in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief.” Carter v. S tate, 952 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tenn. 1997). Also, Petition er’s claims do not fall into an y of the thre e recog nized ex ceptions to the new Act in which a trial court can have jurisdiction to consider a petition filed outside the statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b). Furthermore, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(c), a Petitioner may only file one post-conviction petition attacking a single jud gmen t. Howev er, a petitioner may file a m otion in the trial court to reopen a p reviously filed post-conviction petition in four limited circumstances.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a). After a careful review of the record, we find

-3- that Petition er’s alle gation s in the case sub judice, even if true, would not support the applicab ility of any of tho se circum stance s. See Tenn. C ode Ann . § 40-30-217 (a).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition was a ppropriate. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-3 0-206(b).

____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________ GARY R. WA DE, Presiding Judge

___________________________________ J. CURWO OD W ITT, JR., Judge

-4-