IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE FILED FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1999 April 21, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9804-CR-00133 ) Appellee, ) ) ) HAMILTON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. DOUGLAS A. MEYER MITC HEL L EDW ARD M INGIE ,) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Direct Appeal - DUI - Revoked ) License)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: CONRAD FINNE LL JOHN KNOX WALKUP P. O. Box 1476 Attorney General and Reporter Cleveland, TN 37364-1476 ELLEN H. POLLACK Assistant Attorney General Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243 BILL COX District Attorney General PARKE MASTERSON Assistant District Attorney City and County Courts Building Chattanooga, TN 37402

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE OPINION

The appellant, Mitchell Edward Mingie, was convicted by a Hamilton Coun ty jury of one (1) count of driving under the influence of an intoxican t, fifth offense. He also pled guilty to one (1) count of driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of six (6) months for driving on a revoked license and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for driving under the influence.1 On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict for driving u nder the influenc e. After a thorough review of the re cord b efore th is Cou rt, we aff irm the trial c ourt’s judgm ent.

I

Officer Ragan McDevitt with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department testified as follows. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on June 22, 1996, he was dispatched to the sce ne of a single moto r vehicle accident in Ha milton Cou nty, Tennessee. When McDevitt arrived, other eme rgency perso nnel were presen t, and Appellant, his wife, and his fifteen (15) year old niece, Jessic a Long, we re standing outside of the vehicle. When McDevitt inquired as to how the accident occurred, Appellant informed the officer that he had lost control of the vehicle

The trial court also revoked Appellant’s driving privileges for three (3) years and imposed a fine of $1,110 for driving under the influence and $50 for driving on a revoked license.

-2- while maneuvering a curve and traveling down a hill. Appellant advised the officer that he ha d bee n driving the veh icle an d did n ot have his drive r’s license.

The vehicle involved in the accident was a Toyota pickup with a bench seat. When McDevitt questioned the passengers as to their relative positions in the truck when the accident occurred, Cheryl Mingie, Appellant’s wife, advised the officer that she had been sitting in the middle of the seat. Jessica stated that she wa s sitting nex t to the pas senge r door.

W hile investigating the accident, the officer noticed that Appellant was having difficulty keeping his balance. McDevitt observed that Appellant had bloodshot eyes and sm elled o f alcoh ol. Furth er, Mc Devitt n oticed that Ap pellan t’s speech was slow and he was un stable on his feet. Officer McDevitt arrested Appellant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and, while escorting Appellant to the p olice car, had to “ho ld on to him to ke ep him from falling.”

Subseq uently, Appellant signed an implied consent form and acquiesced in a breathalyser test. Appellant’s blood alcohol content was found to be 0.17.

At trial, Jessica Long testified on behalf of the defense. She stated that Cheryl Mingie, not Appellant, had been driving the vehicle at the time of the acciden t. Jessica testified that, when Officer McDevitt inquired as to who was the driver of the ve hicle, A ppella nt resp onde d, “If I tell you I was d riving th is truck , will you let the ladies go?” On cross-examination, however, Long acknowledged that she failed to advise anyon e that C heryl M ingie was the driver of the vehicle until the day of trial, which was approxim ately eighte en (18) m onths a fter the date of the incide nt.

The jury found Appellant guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The parties subm itted the issu e wheth er App ellant was guilty of a fifth -3- offense to the trial court. The trial court found Appellant to be a fifth offender of driving under the influence. Appellant also pled guilty to driving on a revoked license.2 From his conviction of driving under the influence, Appe llant brin gs this appe al.

II

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting eviden ce. Sp ecifica lly, he cla ims th at he c anno t be co nvicted solely on the ba sis of his uncorro borated extra-judicia l confess ion. He further argues that because Jessica Long was present at the time of the accident, her testimony is more reliable than that of Officer McDevitt. Therefore, he contends that the jury should have afforded Long’s testimony greater weight than McDevitt’s.

A.

When an accused challenges the su fficiency of the evidence , this Court must review the record to determine if the evidence adduced during the trial was sufficient “to support the findings by the trier of fact o f guilt beyon d a rea sona ble doubt.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule is app licable to findin gs of g uilt predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or a combination of direct and circums tantial evide nce. State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App . 1996).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evide nce. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. Because the only issue at trial was whether Appellant was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to driving on a revoked license if the jury found him guilty of driving under the influence.

-4- 1978). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circums tantial evide nce. Liakas v. S tate, 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (19 56). To the c ontrary, this C ourt is requ ired to afford the s tate the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reason able an d legitima te inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Tuttle , 914 S.W.2d 926, 932 (T enn. C rim. App . 1995). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 197 3).

Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burd en in this Court of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W. 2d 913 , 914 (T enn. 19 82); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.

B.

Appellant mainta ins that the sta te did not p resent su fficient eviden ce to corrobo rate his confession tha t he wa s the d river of th e vehic le. It is we ll established that the corpus delicti of a crime may not be proven by a defen dant’s extra-judicial confess ion alone . Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872, (1911). To establish the corpus delicti of a crime, the state must prove two elements: (1) “[t]hat a certain result has been produced,” and (2) “[t]hat the res ult was created throug h criminal age ncy.” State v. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). The elements of corpus delicti may be proven by circum stantial evid ence. Id. at 72.

-5- In the case sub judice, Appellant informed the officer that he was the driver of the vehicle when the accident occurred. This inculpatory statement was corroborated when the oth er pas seng ers of th e vehic le informe d Officer M cDevitt that Appe llant’s w ife was sitting in the m iddle of the seat, and Jessica was by the passenger door. Ne ither Mrs. M ingie nor J essica c ontradicted Appe llant’s statement that he w as the dr iver of the ve hicle. Office r McDe vitt testified at trial that he received “no indication” from the passengers that Appellant was not the driver of the vehicle.

The question whether the state has sufficiently proven the corpus delicti is a question for the jury. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d at 71. Furthermore, “[o]nly slight evidence of the corpus delicti is necessary to corroborate a confession and thus susta in a conviction.” Id. at 72. We conclude that the state presented sufficient corroborative evidence to support Appellant’s conviction.

This issu e is withou t merit.

C.

Appellant further ass erts that because Jessica was an eyewitness to the incident, her testim ony des erves gre ater weig ht than tha t of Officer McD evitt.

However, it is beyond dispute th at ques tions con cerning the cred ibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence as well as all factual issues raised by the evide nce are resolved by the jury as the trie r of fact. State v. Tuttle , 914 S.W.2d at 932. The jury was able to observe the deme anor of b oth witnesses and assess their credibility accordingly. Clearly, the jury discredited Long ’s testimon y. This Cou rt is not at liberty to overturn the jury’s determination.

This issu e has n o merit.

-6- -7- III

W e conclude tha t the eviden ce is sufficie nt to supp ort Appe llant’s conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE

___________________________________ L. TERRY LAFFERTY, SPECIAL JUDGE

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