IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON APRIL SESSION, 1999

FILED RONALD WARD, ) April 15, 1999 ) No. 02C01-9806-CC-00173 Appellant ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. ) HENRY COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk vs. ) ) Hon. Julian P. Guinn, Judge STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) (Post-Conviction) Appellee )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee: Teresa McCaig Marshall Paul G. Summers Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter W. Washington Street Paris, TN 38242 Georgia Blythe Felner Assistant Attorney General Criminal Justice Division Fifth Avenue North 2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Robert "Gus" Radford District Attorney General Post Office Box 686 Huntingdon, TN 38344

OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

David G. Hayes Judge OPINION

The appellant, Ronald Ward, appeals from an order entered in the Henry County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the appellant contends, first, that his counsel was ineffective for his failure to investigate and pursue a defense, specifically the defense of entrapment, and second, that his guilty pleas were involuntary because trial counsel misled him as to the meaning of the thirty percent (30%) release eligibility date.

After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. R. App.

On January 15, 1997, the appellant entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine over one-half gram, class B felonies, and one count of sale of cocaine under one-half gram, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a range I standard offender to eight years for each class B felony and three years on the class C felony. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. No direct appeal was taken from the sentence.

In February of 1998, the appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The pro se petition was subsequently amended after appointment of counsel.

A hearing on the merits was held during which evidence was presented revealing that the drug transactions leading to the charges against the appellant were videotaped. In response to this evidence, the appellant admitted, “there was no need in it [going to trial], that he was busted, that they had him.” Moreover, defense counsel testified that he thoroughly explained the meaning of the thirty percent (30%) release eligibility date to the appellant. In dismissing the petition on its merits, the post-conviction court found:

. . .There is no evidence that would even remotely suggest that a defense of entrapment or any other defense was available in the petitioner’s case or, for that matter, that the petitioner’s pleas of guilty were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. The petitioner fully understood the sentences he was to and did receive.

In a post-conviction proceeding, the appellant has the burden of establishing his claims by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f) (1997). Moreover, the findings of fact of the post-conviction court have the weight of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against its judgment. Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 697 (Tenn. 1995). We conclude that the appellant has failed to carry his burden of establishing his claims.

Moreover, we cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact. As a result, we find no error of law mandating reversal of the court’s judgment. The post-conviction court’s denial of the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed in accordance with Tenn. Ct. Crim. R. App. 20.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

CONCUR:

________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge

________________________________ L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge