In re McCracken & McLeod

District Court, W.D. Tennessee
In re McCracken & McLeod, 129 F. 621 (1904)
1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 305

In re McCracken & McLeod

Opinion of the Court

HAMMOND, J.

The one attorney’s fee allowed the petitioning •creditors by section 64b (3) of the bankruptcy statute of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 563 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3448]), should be equitably divided between the attorneys representing two .petitions filed and consolidated by order of the court under general ■order 7 of the Supreme Court Orders in bankruptcy (89 Fed. v, 32 C. C. A. xi). The referee decided that the attorneys filing the second .petition were not entitled to share in the fee, because that petition was unnecessary — giving the whole of it to the attorneys filing the first .petition in point of time — and this petition was filed to review that finding. The consolidation by order of the court before the adjudication and before the reference to him precluded that question before the referee, and he was not authorized, after such an order of consolidation, to determine that the petition was unnecessary. It was already res judicata, and he should have confined his action to determining the amount of the fee, and, if the attorneys could not agree -about its division, to allow to each a share according to the relative *622value of the services and amount of work done by each in behalf of the creditors, having care to adhere to the statute by not allowing more than one fee, however numerous the attorneys.

The finding will be vacated, and the case returned to the referee, with directions to proceed according to law. Ordered accordingly.

Reference

Full Case Name
In re McCRACKEN & McLEOD
Cited By
2 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
1. Bankruptcy — Petitions—Necessity—Consolidation—Res Judicata. The consolidation of bankruptcy petitions filed by different creditors under order of court before the adjudication of bankruptcy, and before reference to the referee, was res judicata of the question of the necessity for the filing of the second petition, and precluded the referee from thereafter reviewing the question and holding that such second petition was unnecessary. '2. Same — Attorney’s Fees — Division. Where two bankruptcy proceedings were filed by attorneys representing different creditors, and were consolidated by order of court, as authorized by general bankruptcy order No. 7 (89 Fed. v, 32 C. C. A. xi), a single attorney’s fee should be divided between such attorneys according to the relative v¿lue of the services and amount of work done by each.