Liberty Legal Foundation v. National Democratic Party of USA, Inc.
Liberty Legal Foundation v. National Democratic Party of USA, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Liberty Legal Foundation, John Dummett, Leonard Volodarsky, and Creg Maroney’s Motion to Remand (D.E. # 12, 13) filed on March 14, 2012. Defendants Democratic National Committee, Tennessee Democratic Party, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, and Chip Forrester have filed a response in opposition.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Chancery Court for Shelby County, Tennessee, on October 26, 2011.
On February 23, 2012, Defendants removed Plaintiffs’ suit to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. According to the Notice of Removal, “[t]he critical question that must be decided in this case is whether President Obama can constitutionally hold the Office of the President of the United States,” an issue which Defendants contend arises under federal law. (Notice of Removal ¶ 6.) Therefore, Defendants argue that federal question jurisdiction exists in this case and removal to federal court is proper.
In their Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged alternate theories based on state law, and not federal law. Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud are not preempted by federal law and do not depend on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Plaintiffs concede that one of the alleged misrepresentations, that President Obama is a “natural born citizen,” will require this Court to consider United States Supreme Court precedent. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend that their alternate theories about President Obama’s qualifications for office, namely, that he surrendered his American citizenship and that he does not possess a valid social security number, do not implicate substantial questions of federal law. For these reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court remand the ease to state court.
In their response in opposition, Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs’ fraud and misrepresentation claims do not turn on a question of federal law. According to Defendants, this Court must determine whether President Obama meets the qualifications of office set forth in Article II of the Constitution in order to determine whether Defendants have perpetrated a fraud or misrepresented Mr. Obama’s qualifications to the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendants argue that the well-pleaded complaint rule applies in this case. Despite the fact that the First Amended Complaint alleges state-law claims (fraud and negligent misrepresentation), Plaintiffs have omitted from their pleadings a necessary federal question, which is the
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”
ANALYSIS
The Court holds that the allegations in this case arise under federal law because Plaintiffs well-pleaded state law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation have as a necessary element a substantial, disputed question of federal law. As such, Defendants’ removal of this case to federal court was proper, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand must be denied.
The Supreme Court has explained that one variety of cases with “arising under” jurisdiction are those cases in which state-law claims “implicate significant federal issues.”
In this case Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants are liable for fraud and negligent misrepresentation under Tennessee common law. The basis for these claims is Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants have falsely represented to the Tennessee Secretary of State that President Obama meets the qualifications to be President of the United States. More specifically, Defendants have taken steps to have President Obama’s name appear as the Democratic Party’s nominee for President on the Tennessee ballot in November 2012. According to the First Amended Complaint, President Obama’s disqualifying characteristic is that he is a not a natural born citizen of the United States. The pleadings then cite Article II, section 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides, “No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the office of President.”
Based on the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are exactly of the kind which “turn on substantial questions of federal law.” As one of the elements of their claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants somehow misrepresented a material fact.
Furthermore, it is clear that the stated federal issue of President Obama’s qualifications for the office are “actually disputed and substantial.” There is a sharp dispute in this case over Plaintiffs main contention that President Obama is not a natural born citizen and is otherwise disqualified from the office under the United States Constitution. It is also clear that there will be a legal dispute over the Constitution’s definition of “natural born citizen” and the Supreme Court’s decision in Minor. The federal issue presented is obviously contested in this case.
Likewise, the Court holds that the federal issue is substantial. With respect to the substantiality of the federal interest, the Supreme Court has considered four factors: “(1) whether the case includes a federal agency, and particularly, whether that agency’s compliance with the federal statute is in dispute; (2) whether the federal question is important (i.e., not trivial); (3) whether a decision on the federal question will resolve the case (i.e., the federal question is not merely incidental to the outcome); and (4) whether a decision as to the federal question will control numerous other cases (i.e., the issue is not anomalous or isolated).”
However, the other factors suggest that the issue of whether President Obama is constitutionally qualified to run for the Presidency is certainly substantial. First, the Court finds that the federal question presented, the meaning of the phrase “natural born citizen” as a qualification for the Presidency set out in Article II of the Constitution, is important and not trivial. The Court finds it self-evident that an individual’s ability to meet the constitutional qualifications to serve as President of the United States, particularly where
Finally, the Court holds that this is a dispute a “federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Plaintiffs have not drawn the Court’s attention to “any disruptive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction” in this case,
Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not necessarily arise under federal law or turn on substantial questions of federal law because they have pleaded additional facts about President Obama’s qualifications for office. According to the First Amended Complaint, President Obama renounced his American citizenship as young man and does not possess a valid social security number. Plaintiffs describe these fact pleadings as “alternative theories” in support of their fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Plaintiffs specifically rely on Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) for the proposition that “a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for federal jurisdiction unless federal law is essential to each of those theories.”
The Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument on this point to be without merit. Plaintiffs’ assertion that “neither of [their alternative] theories require an interpretation of federal law or the U.S. Constitution” misses the point.
Based on the Court’s holding that Plaintiffs’ claims present substantial, disputed questions of federal law, the Court need not consider Defendants’ arguments that the artful-pleading rule should apply in this case or that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted.
Defendants have filed a number of Rule 12(b) motions in this case, and Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Extension of Time (D.E. # 14, 15) in which to respond. Plaintiffs request that they not be required to respond until such time as the Court has ruled on the Motion to Remand. Because the Motion to Remand is denied, Plaintiffs shall have twenty-one (21) days from the entry of this Order in which to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. Defendants have argued in other filings with the Court that Defendant National Democratic Party of the USA, Inc. is not a proper party to this action and is perhaps a ''sham” organization contrived to obtain venue in
. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint while this matter was pending before the Shelby County Chancery Court. For purposes of analyzing the Motion to Remand, the First Amended Complaint is the operative pleading. Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, Inc., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (“When ruling on a motion to remand, a court generally looks to the plaintiff's complaint, as it is stated at the time of removal, and the defendant’s notice of removal.”).
. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).
. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
. City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted).
. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (quotation marks omitted); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).
. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) (citation omitted).
. Id. at 315, 125 S.Ct. 2363 (citation omitted).
. Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 315, 125 S.Ct. 2363).
. Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363. See also Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 568 (6th Cir. 2007) (summarizing the three parts of the substantial-federal-question doctrine as (1) the state-law claim must necessarily raise a disputed federal issue; (2) the federal interest in the issue must be substantial; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must not disturb any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities).
. First Am. Class Action Compl. ¶ 10.
. Id. ¶ 11.
. Id.n 12-14.
. See Shah v. Racetrac Petroleum, Co., 338 F.3d 557, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2003) (defining elements of fraud under Tennessee law); Davis v. McGuigan, 325 S.W.3d 149 (Tenn. 2010) (defining elements of intentional misrepresentation); Ritter v. Custom Chemicides, Inc., 912 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1995) (defining the elements of negligent misrepresentation).
. Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 569-70 (concluding that the plaintiffs' claim stated a federal issue where the plaintiffs “staked their claim” on the interpretation of a federal statute).
. Id. (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-701, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006)).
. Id.
. Indeed, neither party has shown how any federal agency would ever be involved in a federal dispute of this nature. Plaintiffs have made allegations about President Obama's passport and social security number. These assertions in no way suggest that the Department of State or the Social Security Administration are somehow involved in the federal dispute presented in this case.
. Defendants have cited many of these decisions in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). See Defs.' Mem. in Support Mot. Dismiss 7-8 (D.E. # 5).
. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313-14, 125 S.Ct. 2363 ("But even when the state action discloses a contested and substantial federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to a possible veto. For the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331.”).
. Id. at 315, 125 S.Ct. 2363.
. Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 565.
. Pl.'s Mot. Remand 2.
. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Okuley, 344 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810, 108 S.Ct. 2166).
. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), ‘‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
. Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1996); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1994).
. Pis.’ Mot. Remand 4.
. First Am. Compl. ¶ 2.
. The Sixth Circuit has held that the artful-pleading rule applies only in narrow circumstances because "an expansive application of this doctrine would effectively abrogate the well-pleaded complaint rule.” City of Warren, 495 F.3d at 287 (citing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 340 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- LIBERTY LEGAL FOUNDATION, John Dummett, Leonard Volodarsky, and Creg Maroney v. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF the USA, INC., Democratic National Committee, Tennessee Democratic Party, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Chip Forrester
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published