UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENVILLE

DUSTIN RAY CADE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No.: 2:23-CV-88-KAC-CRW v. ) ) SERGEANT MOORE, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION

Before the Court is Plaintiff Dustin Ray Cade’s “Motion Objecting to Report and Recommendation,” [Doc. 17], which raises an objection to Magistrate Judge Cynthia R. Wyrick’s “Report and Recommendation” (the “Report”) [Doc. 14]. On September 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting “restraining orders” against Defendants “mentioned in [his] case” for his “protection against retaliation” [Doc. 6 at 1]. On September 21, Judge Wyrick denied Plaintiff’s request for restraining orders in part, giving Plaintiff thirty (30) days “to file an amended motion requesting a restraining order” that is “properly supported” [Doc. 7 at 15]. On October 4, Plaintiff sent a letter responding to the September 21 Order, noting difficulties accessing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and stating that he “shall await [Judge Wyrick’s] reply” [Doc. 10]. Considering Plaintiff’s letter [Doc. 10] and September 20 Motion for restraining orders [Doc. 6] together, the Report concluded that “Plaintiff has not provided grounds for granting an injunction” [Doc. 14 at 2]. As such, the Report recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff’s request for restraining orders without prejudice [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff objected to the Order but provided no specific grounds for his objection, and he did not identify any specific portion of the Order to which he objected [See Doc. 17]. In reviewing Plaintiffs objection, the Court must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 US.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). But a “[flailure to identify specific concerns with a magistrate judge’s report results in treatment of a party’s objections as a general objection to the entire magistrate judge’s report.” See McCready v. Kamminga, 113 F. App’x. 47, 49 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Howard v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs.,

(6th Cir. 1991)); see also Mira v. Marshall,

(6th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he district court need not provide de novo review where the objections are frivolous, conclusive[,] or general”) (citation and internal quotation omitted). At bottom, “[a] general objection is considered the equivalent of failing to object entirely.” McCready, 113 F. App’x. at 49. Here, Plaintiff's objection to the Report only states that “Plaintiff humbly objects to [the] recommendation to deny [his] request” for restraining orders [Doc. 17 at 1]. Plaintiff raises no “specific concerns” with the Report. See McCready, 113 F. App’x. at 49. Because Plaintiff's objection amounts to a general objection to the Report, the Court treats it as “the equivalent of failing to object entirely.” /d. And the Court sees no other basis to set aside or modify the Report. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objection [Doc. 17] and ADOPTS the Report in its entirety. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's Motion requesting restraining orders [Doc. 6] without prejudice. The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed another “Motion For Temporary Restraining Order” [Doc. 16] that is pending. SO ORDERED.

KATHERINE A. tha United States DistrictJudge