Zomina Montgomery v. Zerrick Taylor, Case Manager – Tennessee Department of...

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

ZOMINA MONTGOMERY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 2:26-cv-02412-TLP-atc v. ) ) JURY DEMAND ZERRICK TAYLOR, Case Manager – ) Tennessee Department of Children Services, ) and MICHAEL SAULSBERRY, CPS Team ) Leader – Tennessee Department of Children ) Services, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND MODIFYING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On April 13, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Zomina Montgomery sued Defendants Zerrick Taylor and Michael Saulsberry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2.) She also moved to enjoin Defendants from using certain documents at an upcoming custody hearing. (ECF No. 4.) Under Administrative Order No. 2013-05, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Annie T.

Christoff to manage all pretrial matters. Judge Christoff issued her Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) a week later. (ECF No. 10.) She recommends the Court deny injunctive relief and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 10.) For the reasons below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R on the issue of injunctive relief but MODIFIES the R&R’s disposition by REFERRING the case back to Judge Christoff to screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

BACKGROUND Judge Christoff accurately described the Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 71–72.) The Court briefly recounts Plaintiff’s filings and the R&R here.

This case arises out of an ongoing child custody proceeding in the Shelby County Juvenile Court (“Custody Proceeding”). (ECF No. 2.) According to the Complaint and attached exhibits filed under seal,1 Plaintiff called the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) to report concerns she had about her minor child’s safety. (Id. at PageID 6–9; ECF No. 2-1.) The ensuing DCS investigation led to the Custody Proceeding. Defendant Taylor is the DCS case manager who investigated Plaintiff’s report, (see ECF No. 2 at PageID 6; ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 13), and Defendant Saulsberry is Taylor’s supervisor. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 10.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated her constitutional rights during the DCS investigation and related Custody Proceeding. (See id. at PageID 9–10.) Plaintiff contends that Taylor (1) “violated [her] procedural due process rights by intentionally silencing her testimony and suppressing exculpatory evidence,” and (2) “committed judicial deception . . . by intentionally withholding the existence” of certain evidence. (Id. at PageID 9–10.) And that Saulsberry “had a legal duty to ensure that investigations involving Plaintiff’s parental rights were conducted truthfully and that evidence was not suppressed.” (Id. at PageID 10.) The Complaint seeks declaratory relief that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights, injunctive relief, and $50,000,000.00 in damages under § 1983. (Id. at PageID 10–11.)

Plaintiff also moved to enjoin a Juvenile Court custody hearing that was set for April 27, 2026. (ECF No. 4 at PageID 1.) She asks the Court to enjoin Defendants “and any state actors

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND OBJECTIONS A magistrate judge may submit to a district court judge proposed findings of fact and a recommended ruling on certain dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to dismiss. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). The parties may object to those proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge] and “may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). If neither party objects, then the district court reviews the R&R for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s note. But if there is an objection, the district court reviews the “properly” objected-to portions of the R&R de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Objections come with limits. A party generally cannot raise new arguments or issues in objections that it did not first present to the magistrate court. Dabrowski v. Tubular Metal Systems, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (quoting Murr v. United States, 200 4 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)). And parties must object “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Further, objections must be “specific.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Solomon v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 478 F. App’x 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2012). So when a plaintiff submits only vague, general, or conclusory objections, the district court may review the R&R for clear error, rather than de novo. See Slater v. Potter, 28 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002).

I. Plaintiff’s Objections Plaintiff timely filed two separate documents objecting to the R&R. (ECF Nos. 11, 17 (replacing ECF No. 13).) And between those two documents she makes three objections.

Plaintiff argues Judge Christoff erred by (1) recommending that the Court dismiss instead of stay her claims for monetary damages (ECF No. 11 at PageID 81); (2) labeling her allegations as “conclusory” (ECF No. 11 at PageID 82–83; ECF No. 17 at PageID 119–20); and (3) finding that the state court could provide Plaintiff an adequate remedy under Younger (ECF No. 17 at PageID 121).

These objections merit de novo review because Plaintiff supports each with facts, case law, and citations to the record. Further, these objections center around Plaintiff’s disagreement with a core issue in the R&R: whether Younger abstention applies; and if it does, whether a stay or dismissal is the appropriate recourse. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to review the entire R&R de novo rather than using a piecemeal approach. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). But first, the Court addresses an apparent renewed request for injunctive relief that Plaintiff raised in her objections.

A. Injunctive Relief In the first set of objections, Plaintiff stated that she “formally withdraws her Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.” (ECF No. 11 at PageID 81.) It follows that the Motion is now MOOT.

But Plaintiff added a curious wrinkle to her second set of objections. She states “newly discovered evidence” supports her claims. (ECF No. 17 at PageID 120.) And based on this new evidence, she now seeks to “enjoin the state from further interference with Plaintiff’s custodial rights until the pending exculpatory evidence . . . ha[s] been fully returned, entered into the record, and reviewed by this Court.” (Id. at PageID 121.) Because Plaintiff now seeks a new injunction, the Court considers it here.

Courts may on their own raise the need to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. See Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 n.3 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976)); see also id. at 204 (explaining that the Younger doctrine “permits federal courts to withhold authorized jurisdiction in certain circumstances to avoid undue interference with state court proceedings”). Relevant here is Younger abstention.2 It “requires a federal court to abstain from granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971); see Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (“The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to

Younger abstention is fitting where (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiff to raise constitutional challenges. Hill, 878 F.3d at 206 (citation omitted). Each factor fully supports abstention here. As to the first and second factors, the Custody Proceeding is ongoing, and Tennessee has an important interest in custody matters.

Furr-Barry v. Underwood, 59 F. App’x 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2003). As to the third factor, not only is Tennessee entitled to a presumption that its courts will provide an adequate forum to address Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431, but Plaintiff may appeal the juvenile court’s decision to Tennessee’s higher courts.3 Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c).

Because abstention is justified,4 the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s new request for injunctive relief. See Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Indeed, cases out of the Supreme Court and this Court make it clear that abstention is generally appropriate in matters of family relations such as child custody.” (citations omitted)).

DISPOSITION The Court now reviews the R&R de novo. The R&R recommends abstaining under Younger and dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 78.) For reasons already discussed, the Court agrees that Younger requires abstaining from the Custody Proceeding.

But does this finding require the Court to dismiss the case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction? On this point, the Court disagrees with the R&R—Younger abstention is a federal court’s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction when “allowing a federal suit to proceed threatens ‘undue interference with state proceedings.’” Aaron v. O’Connor, 914 F.3d 1010, 1015 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing Younger and stating that “[t]he abstention doctrines . . . assume jurisdiction but decline to exercise it in limited circumstances” (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013)). The doctrine does not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See O’Neill, 511 F.3d at 641 (“Younger abstention is not a question of jurisdiction, but is rather based on ‘strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.’” (quoting Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986)). But see Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Because the district court must abstain under Younger and therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear Judge Squire’s claim, her argument under Parratt is foreclosed.”).

With that in mind, Plaintiff objects to dismissal. She contends that because she no longer seeks an injunction, under Carroll v. City of Mount Clemons, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998), the Court should stay her remaining claims for monetary damages rather than dismiss them. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 81.) Plaintiff raises a valid point.

On the one hand, it is proper for a district court abstaining under Younger to dismiss claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Meyers, 23 F. App’x at 206. But on the other hand, “[i]n the context of a complaint seeking ‘both equitable [relief] and money damages,’ as in this case, ‘a federal court’s discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction does not extend so far as to permit a court to dismiss or remand, as opposed to stay, an action at law.’” James v. Hampton, 513 F. App’x 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gray v. Bush, 628 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2010)). The reason for this distinction is “to protect against the possibility that [the plaintiff] could be deprived of the opportunity to present the merits of her damages claims in state court.”

Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1075–76.

As the Carroll court explained: The District Court’s decision to abstain avoided duplication of legal proceedings, deferred to the state's sovereignty over its law, and respected the principles of comity inherent to our federalism. Given these considerations, the District Court’s application of Younger abstention to the present case was proper.

In the present case, however, the District Court should have stayed, not dismissed, Carroll's complaint. Requiring the District Court to stay rather than dismiss damages claims may be an empty formality under the facts of this case. The District Court may have nothing left to do but clear the case number off of its docket once the state proceedings conclude. If Carroll prevails on the merits of her case in the state proceeding, her federal damages claims will be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata . . . because Carroll’s pending state counterclaim is essentially identical to her federal lawsuit. If Carroll loses on the merits of her case in the state proceeding, res judicata will also preclude her federal claims due to the state court's concurrent jurisdiction over those claims. Carroll’s only relief from an adverse state judgment will be from Michigan’s appellate courts. The only federal review available to her will then be from the United States Supreme Court on certiorari. Staying her damages claims on the federal docket thus will likely be “of little moment.” 139 F.3d at 1075 (citations omitted); see also Doe v. University of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The purpose of Younger abstention is to promote equity and comity and allow state officials to proceed with cases uninterrupted by the federal courts. As such, albeit not in the context of qualified immunity, we have consistently held that if a court abstains under Younger, it should stay any claim for damages rather than evaluate the merits and dismiss the case.” (citations omitted)).

This word of caution rings true here. See Meyers, 23 F. App’x at 206 (concluding same).

The R&R focuses almost exclusively on injunctive relief even though Plaintiff also seeks $50,000,000.00 in damages from Defendants for alleged constitutional violations.5 So with the claims for injunctive relief no longer on the table, the Court finds that screening the claim for damages in the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is more appropriate than outright dismissal.6 To be sure, a screening may be “an empty formality under the facts of this case”— Plaintiff’s claims face an uphill battle and may not survive § 1915(e)(2) for several reasons. And the Court hesitates before creating more work for our already busy Magistrate Judges. But given Plaintiff’s objection, the caselaw, and the remaining need to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint on the merits, the Court MODIFIES the R&R and REFERS this action back to Judge Christoff for screening. See Kalniz v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 699 F. Supp 2d 966, 975 (S.D. Ohio) (entering a

CONCLUSION Having reviewed Plaintiff’s objections and the R&R, the Court MODIFIES the R&R, DENIES as MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 4), DENIES Plaintiff’s second request for injunctive relief (ECF No. 17), and REFERS Plaintiff’s remaining claims (ECF No. 2 at PageID 9–10, Counts I–III) back to Judge Christoff for screening under § 1915(e)(2).

SO ORDERED, this 13th day of May, 2026. s/Thomas L. Parker THOMAS L. PARKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE