Little Creek CRE, LLC v. Stonebriar Commercial Finance, LLC, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION LITTLE CREEK CRE, LLC, ) ) Appellant, ) NO. 3:26-cv-00784 ) v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON ) STONEBRIAR COMMERCIAL ) FINANCE, LLC, et al, ) ) Appellees. ) ORDER Pending before the Court in this appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (“Bankruptcy Court”) is an “Emergency Motion For Stay Pending Appeal And Memorandum Of Law” (Doc. No. 3, “Motion”), filed by Appellant, Little Creek CRE, LLC (“Appellant” or “Little Creek”). Via the Motion, Appellant seeks a stay of the “Bankruptcy Court’s Order dismissing the underlying Chapter 11 case, pending resolution of this appeal.” (Doc.

No. 3 at 1).

For the reasons described below, the Motion (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND This appeal and the instant Motion arise out of the Bankruptcy Court’s order (Bankr. Doc.

No. 30, “Order”) granting the motion to dismiss (Bankr. Doc. No. 16) in the Bankruptcy Court case numbered 3:26-bk-02072 (hereinafter “Bankruptcy Case”).1 On June 1, 2026, Appellant initiated an appeal of the Order (“Appeal”) to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“6th Circuit BAP”).

Doc. No. 43). On June 8, 2026, Appellees Eldridge Capital Management, LLC, Blaine Hirsch, Stonebriar Commercial Finance, LLC (“Stonebriar”), and Jeffrey Wilkinson filed with the 6th Circuit BAP an “Optional Appellee Statement of Election to Proceed in District Court.” (BAP Doc. No. 5, “Election”).3 On June 9, 2026, Appellant filed the Motion with the 6th Circuit BAP. (BAP. Doc. No. 8). On June 10, 2026, the 6th Circuit BAP found the Election timely made and ordered the Appeal, including the Motion, transferred to this Court, (BAP Doc. No. 10-2), where the Appeal was assigned to Judge Crenshaw, with the case number 3:26-cv-00784. On June 11, 2026, Stonebriar filed an “Unopposed Motion for Reassignment of Case & Memorandum in Support,” (Doc. No. 6, “MTR”), wherein Stonebriar sought to transfer the Appeal to the undersigned as related to an earlier filed case (Case No. 3:26-cv-00202). On June 15, 2026, the Appeal (along with the Motion) was transferred to the undersigned. (Doc. No. 12).4 Via the Motion, Appellant seeks a stay of the “Bankruptcy Court’s Order [Bankr. Doc. No. 30] dismissing the underlying Chapter 11 case, pending resolution of this appeal.” (Doc. No. 3 at 1). Appellant’s basis for bringing the Motion seems to be that absent a stay of the Order dismissing

LEGAL STANDARD As other district courts have recognized, the granting of a stay pending appeal of a bankruptcy court order is within the sound discretion of the district court. Tagnetics, Inc. v. Kayser, No. 3:19-CV-00363, 2020 WL 815668, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2020) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009)). And the “propriety” of a stay’s issuance “is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Tagnetics, 2020 WL 815668, at *2 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 427). Moreover, as one district court recently put it, “a stay pending appeal is considered an ‘extraordinary remedy,’” Saldana v. Saldana, No. 3:15-CV-1918-L, 2015 WL 5021415, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) (quoting Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 395 F.2d 685, 686 (5th Cir. 1968)), and even if an appellant may suffer irreparable harm absent the requested stay, a stay “‘is not a matter of right.’” Saldana, 2025 WL 5021415, at *2 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 426- 27).

Courts consider four factors when considering whether to issue a stay. These are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Tagnetics, 2020 WL 815668, at *3 (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that these “factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are interrelated considerations The tract comprising the Property is located at “7412, 7450, and 7452 Old Hickory Boulevard, Whites Creek, Tennessee 37189.” (Doc. No. 3 at 2). that must be balanced together.” Michigan Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985)).

Importantly, “[t]he Supreme Court [has reasoned] that the first two factors—likelihood of success and irreparable harm—weigh the most,” and a party “must show greater than a ‘possibility’ of both” in order for a stay to issue. See In re Baker, No. 17-12870, 2017 WL 6015380, at *2 (E.D.

Mich. Dec. 5, 2017) (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35). See also Cosby v. KPMG, LLP, No. 3:16- CV-121-TAV-DCP, 2021 WL 2668803, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. June 29, 2021) (noting, when considering a motion for stay pending appeal in a non-bankruptcy context, that “even if irreparable harm is clear, the movant must still prove more than a mere possibility of success.”).

“If, after weighing the first two factors”—which are perhaps better referred to as requirements given that, consistent with the just discussed case law, some showing on both seems to be required for a stay to issue—“the scales tip decisively in one direction or the other, the Court need not consider the remaining factors.” In re Baker, 2017 WL 6015380, at *2 (citing Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003)). However, a “movant must address each factor, regardless of its relative strength, providing specific facts and affidavits supporting assertions that these factors exist.” Gripentrog, 945 F.2d at 164 (emphasis added) (citing Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1987)).

DISCUSSION Here, the Court will deny the Motion because Appellant has not made a sufficient showing so as to be entitled to the relief sought via the Motion.

With respect to the first factor that a district court evaluates when considering whether to grant a stay of a bankruptcy court’s order pending appeal—likelihood of success on the merits— the Court notes that it is somewhat unclear whether Appellant must show a likelihood of success on the merits of the Appeal or whether Appellant must instead show a likelihood of success in ultimately obtaining relief under the Bankruptcy Code so as to maintain ultimate ownership and possession of the Property. Assuming arguendo that (as seems probable) Appellant must show a likelihood merely of success on the merits of the Appeal—which is the particular showing that Appellant attempts to make via the Motion—Appellant has failed to make that showing. This is because Appellant has failed to cite any case law to support its assertion that is has a likelihood of success on the merits of the Appeal; that is, Appellant has failed to cite any case law to support the proposition that the Bankruptcy Court erred in issuing the Order and dismissing the Bankruptcy Case.6 In other words, Appellant would have this Court identify, on its own and without assistance from Appellant, relevant case law and supporting arguments for Appellant’s contention that it has a likelihood of success on the merits of the Appeal.7 This, the Court will not do. See Elias v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 3:23-CV-00348, 2026 WL 886622, at *30 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2026) (“[A]

The problem for Appellant here is that it cites no legal authority, and makes no argument, to support the last of these six points. Instead, it seems merely to assume that the sixth point is valid. But the Court cannot simply assume that this is valid; instead, Appellants must develop a legal argument that the Bankruptcy Court committed reversible error in relying on its intent-based rationale, and they simply have not done so. court does not serve as the parties' research assistant, doing the work they cannot be bothered to do: it is emphatically not [the] court's responsibility to research and construct the parties’ arguments.” (quoting Ruckman v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 5:21-CV-00923, 2022 WL 11218098, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2022))). Given Appellant’s failure to cite any legal authority to support the basis for its assertion that is has a likelihood of success on the merits of the Appeal—i.e., to support the proposition that the Bankruptcy Court erred in issuing the Order and dismissing the Bankruptcy Case for the reasons that it did—the Court cannot conclude that Appellant has shown that it has more than a “possibility” of likelihood of success on the merits of the Appeal as required for a stay to issue. In re Baker, 2017 WL 6015380, at *2 (“[t]he Supreme Court [has reasoned] that the first two factors—likelihood of success and irreparable harm—weigh the most,” and a party “must show greater than a ‘possibility’ of both” for a stay to issue).8 By itself, this failure of Appellant to show that it has more than the mere possibility of likelihood of success on the merits of the Appeal dooms the Motion. Nevertheless, the Court alternatively will also briefly examine the second stay factor—irreparable harm absent the issuance of a stay. With respect to this factor, Appellant asserts that it “faces significant and irreparable harm if the stay is not granted [because] the foreclosure would divest [Appellant] of its only significant asset[: the Property].” (Doc. No. 3 at 8).

The Court notes that generally, a “review [of] the bankruptcy court's conclusions of law [is] de novo, [and a] review [of] its factual findings [is] for clear error,” but certain “[e]quitable determinations” of a bankruptcy court “are within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion.” In re M.J. Waterman & Assocs., Inc., 227 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 2000). Given the nature of the Appeal, the Court discerns that the appropriate standard of review of the Order would be a de novo review of the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions of law and a clear error review of the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings, but Appellant’s failure to even identify the applicable standard of review provides yet another reason to deny the Motion.

As is axiomatic, the possibility that compensatory relief (i.e., monetary damages) will adequately compensate a party for harm that it may suffer “weighs heavily” against a finding of irreparable harm. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at 154 (citing Samson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)).

True, the loss of real property—for instance through foreclosure—has been found to constitute irreparable harm. Wonderland Shopping Ctr. Venture Ltd. P'ship v. CDC Mortg. Capital, Inc., 274 F.3d 1085, 1097 (6th Cir. 2001). However, federal courts are frequently wary of finding irreparable harm from the loss of real property that is commercial real property (like the Property), absent a showing that monetary damages would be unable to remedy any injury from the loss of the commercial property. See In re Richmond, No. 14-41678, 2014 WL 5100705, at *4 (Bankr.

E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014) (“Absent special circumstances, the sale of commercial property does not create an irreparable harm, since any harm due to the sale of the property or interference with the business can be remedied with monetary damages.” (quoting Javino v. Pergament, 2013 WL 1952639 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2013))). In re Baker, 2017 WL 6015380, at *5 (declining to grant stay even in face of threatened foreclosure of commercial property because appellant “does not explain why monetary damages would not remedy any injury from the sale of commercial property.”). Here, the Property is (seemingly) a piece of commercial real estate that is subject to a planned foreclosure sale set for June 18, 2026, which will (evidently) occur absent the Court issuing a stay. (Doc. No. 3 at 4). However, given that Appellant has not shown that monetary damages would be unable to remedy any injury suffered by Appellant from the loss of the Property, the Court finds that Appellant has failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay.9

Nevertheless, the Court does not discern (and Appellant does not argue) that it is bound by this finding.

Given Appellant’s failure to make a satisfactory showing as to either likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the Court denies the Motion and will forgo herein an analysis of the other two stay factors—i.e., whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding and where the public interest lies. Cf In re Baker, 2017 WL 6015380, at *5 (denying motion to stay pending appeal and declining to examine other stay factors when movant made a weak showing on likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm).

See also Tagnetics, 2020 WL 815668, at *3 (“a court is not required to make specific findings concerning each of the factors if fewer factors are dispositive of the issue.” (citing Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003))).'° CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Motion (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED. Additionally, and for the reasons set out in an earlier footnote, the MTR (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE '© The Court notes, however, that Appellant failed to mention the public interest factor even once in the Motion. Given that by clear Sixth Circuit precedent a movant seeking a stay pending appeal must “address each factor, regardless of its relative strength, providing specific facts and affidavits supporting assertions that these factors exist,” Gripentrog, 945 F.2d at 154, this failure further buttresses the Court’s decision to deny the Motion.