Tally v. Butterworth
Tally v. Butterworth
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal question arising upon the record before the court is, whether the factum or making of a nun-cupative will can be well proved under the provisions of the 15th section of the act, April, 1784, c 22, by two witnesses, neither of whom at one and the same time heard the same declaration, but each of whom heard a different declaration made at a different time, but both in substance of similar import. The section is, that “no'nun-cupative will in any wise shall be good where the estate exceeds $250, unless proved by two wiu nesses present at the making thereof, and unless they or some of them were specially required to bear witness thereto by the testator himself and unless it was made in his last sickness.” This language is perhaps so plain, that any effort to illustrate may serve only to obscure it. The act of valid nun-cupation under the statute, must be proved by two witnesses present when such act of nun-cupation takes place. A nun-cupative will under the statute may be defined to be,’ a verbal
This section more amplified indeed than the corresponding section of our statute of similar import, cannot be read and leave any doubt upon the mind, it seems to me, with regard to the question before the court. That question, it may be remarked, so plain and unambiguous, perhaps, has never been decided — it seems never to have been even raised or discussed in England, nor indeed in this country, till the present time;
The 5th section of the same act of Ch. II. which requites that a “devise of land shall be in writing, signed by the de-visor,” “and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of said devisor, by three or four credible witnesses,” presented very early to the English courts, the question whether the attesting witnesses should subscribe in [he presence of each other. Neither the words of the section nor the nature of the transaction seemed to require that they should so have been present; for the will in writing would identify itself, and their attestation at different times would comply with the words of the statute, if done in the presence of the devisor; yet the contrary was sometimes held, although finally settled in favor of separate attestations. But these decisions have no bearing on the question before us, because in the words of the statute and in the nature of the transactions, the cases are wholly different. The writing unchangingly evidences the intentions of the devisor — the attestations of witnesses verify the writing. But in the other case, the will is but the breath of the testator, niade articulate and preserved in the memory of the witneses. The fact of speaking and the things spoken, are alike to be proved by the witnesses. And the statute has seen proper to require, that to evidence, identify and perpetuate a will of a character so fleeting and so liable to mistake, it should at the moment of making, be executed, if I may so speak, in duplicate, that is, the same identical declaration should be heard and proved by two witnesses. Such, I think, is the very letter of the statute, and if so, it is not a case for giving a construction according to any supposed equity of the statute. For in the case of Liman vs. Bonsal, 1 Addam’s Eq. Rep.
Judgment affirmed.
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