Robertson v. Simmons
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Henderson E. Robertson died intestate in • Erank-lin county in 1859. He left surviving him his widow, C. E. Robertson and five children, viz.: Victoria E., H. J., Lizzie M., Wm. M., and Belle
During the years 1861 and 1862, a large quantity of cotton was raised, by the slaves on the plantation, which was on -hand, in the seed, in April, 1863, when the last guardian resigned.
This cotton was undisposed of, in the summer of 1863, when the widow removed to Georgia with all of the children, except H. J. Robertson, who was in the Confederate army. She carried with her all the slaves except five or six, leaving the plantation and property,, including the cotton to be managed, controlled, and disposed of by her agent, J. M. Bratton. After reaching Georgia, in November, 1863, her daughter Victoria was married to J. J. 'Williams. On the 19th of March, 1864, George Simmons, who lived in Eránklin county,
Reeusee’s Home, near Columbus, Ga.,
March 19, 1864.
I have sold to George Simmons thirteen thousand seven hundred and eleven dollars’ worth of cotton at fifty cents per pound, Confederate Treasury notes if there he enough cotton to that amount, if not, the amount of deficit to be returned in Confederate currency, or bonds. Mr. Bratton will please deliver said cotton to Mr. Simmons at the place where it is stored at present.
C. R. RobeRtsoít,
By J. J. Williams, Agent.
With this order Simmons returned to Tennessee, and received from Bratton one hundred and nine thousand pounds of seed" cotton, of which he sold about seventy thousand pounds at from twelve and a half to fifteen cents per pound, receiving payment in greenback currency — the residue was carried to a gin to be picked and baled, but all of it except about three bales, was destroyed by the burning of the gin-house.
On the 24th of July, 1866, complainants filed the bill in this case, in u&ich they allege,' that as the heirs at law of H. 3T. Robertson, deceased,
The bill prays for an attachment against the property of Simmons, ’ sufficient to satisfy the amount due complainants; that an account be taken showing the amount of cotton converted and the respective shares of conrplainants; that said sale of the cotton be set aside, and that Simmons be required to pay therefor, and for general relief.
To this bill defendant Simmons demurred upon the general grounds that the complainants have an unembarrassed remedy at law, and that there is no equity in the bill. The Chancellor overruled the demurrer, and it is • now insisted that this action of the Court below was erroneous. We think not, for the reason that the bill alleges that defendant made the sale without any legal authority;, that defendant had knowledge of her want of authority, and of the ownership of complainants, who are alleged to have been minors,, and that he entered upon the estate of their ancestor, and took possession of and converted the cotton. These allegations being admitted by the demurrer, complainants have a right to treat defendant as a trustee, and to hold him accountable as such for the mesne profits of the estate: 1 Sto. Eq., § 511; 2 Sto. Eq., § 1856; Meigs’ Dig., §§ 1111 and 1112; Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yer., 374.
Defendants C. E. Robertson and J. J. Williams answer, and admit all the allegations in the bill. Defendant Simmons, then answers and. admits the
Defendant states, that owing to the condition of the country at the time, the cotton was only of a nominal value, and that under the circumstances, he paid a full price, and that in fact, most of -the cotton was burned and destroyed before he got it to market.
He insists that defendant Williams and wife were present and assented to the trade, and received the money. He insists further, that the interest of his wife passed to Williams by his marital right, and that he had the authority to sell. He charges, that the bill is really the bill of defendants C. E. "Robertson and J. J. Williams. He says that the widow
In the answer of defendants to the cross-bill, the amount of the interest of the widow, C. F. Robertson, is submitted . to the Court, upon the statement that dower had not b^en allotted; that fifty-one of the slaves -belonged to the intestate, and thirty-seven to his children by gift from their grandfather, and that the cotton was the joint product of all the slaves.
Defendants admit’ the sale of the cotton by 0. F. Robertson, by her agent, J. J. Williams, and say the condition of the country where the cotton was situated, may have been such as stated by complainant in the 'cross-bill; and that the sale was made on account of his representations as to danger of loss and destruction to which the cotton was exposed, and after consulting with J. J. Williams, they concluded that it was better to sell than suffer a total loss; but that complainant did not disclose the fact that he had partners in the transaction.
They state that after returning to Tennessee after the ’four, they ascertained and believe that their agent, Bratton, was a partner in the purchase. Dp-on learning this, respondent J. J. Williams advised the filing of the bill by all the defendants, except C. F. Robertson. They-say that they have $210 of the Confederate money, which was thrown out as counterfeit.
Defendants C. E. Robertson and J. J. Williams insist that the contract was executory, and therefore void for illegality. Defendant II. E. Robertson answers, that he was a minor when his mother moved south; he supposes she acted for his best interest as she then thought, but that she acted on her own responsibility, nor did he at any time constitute' her his agent.
Defendants C. E. Robertson and J. J. Williams claim their rights under the bill, as if they were complainants. They deny that there was any implied warranty of the title of the cotton to the purchaser.
Defendant J. J. Williams says he does not know exactly what was done with all of said Confederate money — most of it, however, was placed in bank, to be funded in four per cent. Confederate bonds. The amount funded was never drawn from bank.
Defendant TI. J. Robertson says he did not hear of the trade of the cotton until some months after it •was made, and that he never repudiated it but once, and that was when he filed his bill; but he has never recognized the sale as binding on him. He nowhere states when he became of age.
An amended bill was filed by the original complainants, alleging that J. T. Morris was a partner with Simmons in the purchase of the cotton, and making his administrator, W. D. Williams, a party,
■It is apparent from the allegations in the original bill, that it was filed under - the assumption that the contract for the sale of ' the cotton was void, because it was paid for in'. Confederate money, and because it was not an executed, but an executory contract. As the law is now ruled, this ground of objection to the contract ceases to be available.'
This question being out of the way, the first inquiry that arises, is, whether the contract was void on account of fraud on the part of Simmons, the purchaser. The proof shows that Simmons had knowledge that complainants were the owners of the cotton, and that C. IP. Bobertson, the widow, had taken charge and control of the estate, not as guardian or administratrix, but as the widow, and natural guardian. He was acquainted with the condition of the country, and of the dangers to which the cotton was exposed from the prevalence of marauding and plundering bands, which infested the country, and were engaged in an indiscriminate destruction and appropriation of all kinds of personal property. He knew the location of the cotton, and the special danger to which it was liable. He knew the uncertain value of this, as of all other kinds of personal property. With this knowledge he entered into an arrangement with J. IP. Morris to buy the cotton on speculation, and risk the dangers of putting it into market.
Although the widow is not entitled to sue for, and recover the third of the rents and profits, until dower is assigned, yet when dower is assigned, her claim relates back to the death of her husband, and, in a case like this, a court of equity would recognize her claim to the third upon the principle of regarding that as done which ought to have been clone.
Simmons, therefore, became the owner of the one-third of the cotton raised by the fifty-one slaves of the intestate on the land. If J. J. "Williams, by his marriage, became the absolute owner of the share of his wife in the cotton, then Simmons, by his purchase from the widow under the advice and consent of Williams, became the owner of Williams’ share. As soon as the contract was concluded, and the money paid, Simmons became the assignee and owner of Williams’ share.
This was one-fifth of thd cotton after deducting the one-third set apart for the widow. But it is insisted that Williams had never reduced his wife’s share to possession — in fact, that he had never seen it, and, therefore, that the title was not in him, but
The widow assumed tbe right to sell tbe share of H. J. Robertson. It does not appear whether be was of age or not at tbe date of tbe sale. He says in his answer to the cross-bill, that be was a minor when his mother removed South. He says be beard of tbe sale a few months, be thinks, after it was made; but be does not say whether be was then of age. He says bis mother supposed she was doing tbe best for his interest when she made tbe sale, but that he bad never authorized her to act as bis agent. He states that he never repudiated the sale until be filed this bill, but that be never recognized it. One witness proves that after his return to Tennessee he spoke frequently of tbe sale of tbe cotton, and never expressed dissatisfaction with it, but said they had lost nothing by the transaction, as they had vested tbe. Confederate money in lands.
It follows that Simmons became, by his purchase, the owner of the shares of C. F. Robertson, the widow, and J. J. Williaíns and II. F. Robertson, and upon presenting the order to Bratton, the agent on the plantation, he was entitled to the amount of their three shares out of the one hundred and nine thousand pounds embraced in the purchase. As to their three shares he became a tenant in common with the three minor heirs. Although he believed he was purchasing the share of the minors, and although the widow thought she was selling, and as widow, mother, and natural guardian supposed she had the right to sell, and although under the circumstances she was justified, in view of the interest of the children, in making the sale, yet as Simmons knew that he was purchasing the shares of minors,, and that their mother had no legal right to sell, he must be regarded as taking possession of their shares of the cotton as a trustee for their benefit. As the proof shows no
He will, therefore, be held to account only for the amount received for the three bales shown to have been saved out of that lot and sold. After deducting from the whole amount received the one-third for the share of C. E. Robertson, as already explained, and the two-fifths of the residue for the shares of J. J. Williams and H. E. Robertson, he and Watterson, administrator of Morris, will be held to -account for the balance at its value in Hnited States currency at the time, with interest.
As it appears from the answers of the widow, C. E. Robertson, and J. J. Williams, that they received the Confederate money from Simmons, which in the contract was paid for the shares of the three minors in the cotton, and as Simmons and Morris are held accountable for the value in Hnited States currency of three shares in the proceeds of the sales of the cotton, it is deemed by the Court to be equitable that C. E. Robertson and J. J. Williams be held accountable for the value in Hnited States currency of that portion of the Confederate notes which were genuine, which they received for the shares of the three minors, and that
The clerk will make his report on the proof in the record.
One half of the costs of this Court, and of the Court below, will be paid by Simmons and Watter-son, administrator of Morris, and the other half by 0. IP. Robertson and J. J. "Williams.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.