Burford v. Memphis Bulletin Co.
Burford v. Memphis Bulletin Co.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Several executions were issued upon the judgment, but what was done under them does not appear, except that the alias fi. fa. was issued November the 19th, 1860, and was levied upon certain real estate, as the property of the defendant Cross, which was sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of costs.
On the 7th of March, 1862, the defendant, Joseph R. Mosby, paid to the Clerk'of the Court two thousand three hundred and sixty-jhe dollars, ($2,365), in satisfaction of the judgment and interest thereon; whereupon the Clerk made the following entry on the execution docket:
“This judgment is satisfied to me by J. B. Mosby, March 7th, 1862, and money paid J. H. Unthank at the Fair Grounds.
(Signed) M. D. L. Stewart."
The defendant, Stewart, was the Clerk of the Court; Unthank, who was dead at the time the bill was filed in this cause, was the Attorney of record for the plaintiff, in procuring the judgment in the Circuit Court.
Complainant' filed the bill in this cause on the 18th of September, 1866, against the defendants in the Circuit ' Court judgment, except Bond, who was dead,
The principal, ground for relief alleged in the bill is, that the payment by Mosby to the Clerk and by 'him paid over to the Attorney of plaintiff, was made in, “Confederate, money," which was not only worthless, but was issued and circulated for an unlawful purpose.
The pleadings, and proof in the, c.ause render it at ¡least doubtful, whether the payment was made in Confederate money, or made in Southern Bank notes, or partly in both. The proof also shows that both kinds of currency were then current, but at considerable discount, compared with gold and silver.
It is insisted for the complainant, that when it is "made to appear that the Clerk received anything but gold and silver or currency convertible into coin at par, it was no satisfaction of the judgment, unless the plaintiff authorized payment in depreciated currency, or 'ratified it afterwards. That proof of payment to his Attorney, and the Attorney’s acceptance, is not suffi-cient proof of ratification. In other words, that in such cases the principal is not bound by the act, of the agent, unless the latter had special authority to receive depreciated currency, or ratified the act afterwards — either by receiving it from his agent, or ‘by some other positive act on his part.
Payment to him operates to discharge the judgment. But the payment must be in money, — a payment in-salt, wheat, choses in action, or anything but money, is no satisfaction. Nor can the agent or Attorney of the plaintiff receive anything but money, without authority from him to do so.
The question then arises, What is money? This Court, in the case of Crutchfield v. Robbins, 5 Hum., 15, said, that “money is a generic term, and covers everything which by consent is made to represent property, and passes as such currently from hand to hand, whether it be the iron of the Spdrtans, the cowry of the African,, the gold and silver of the World, or the paper of modern Ewope and America.” So far then as the payment was made in current Southern Bank notes, there can be no question at this day in our own State, as to the authority of the Clerk to receive it. It is. true he might have refused to receive anything but gold and silver at the time; but having received the Bank notes, it was, in the absence of instructions from the -plaintiff to the contrary, a satisfaction of the-judgment.
The proof shows, that at the time this payment-was made, Confederate money had a very general circulation as currency. At Memphis, when this transaction occurred, it was the chief currency. The Banks, received it, and paid it out to their customers; com--
But it is insisted that though a payment of such money to a Sheriff with an execution in his hands may be good, because he is the agent of the plaintiff; yet it is different in the case of a payment to a Clerk, because he is the agent of the judgment debtor until the money is received by the plaintiff. To this position we can not assent. They are both Officers of the Court. Their duties are prescribed by law; arid in the exercise of the ordinary functions of their offices, they are no more the agents of one party than they are of the other.
See: Morris v. Morris, post, 814.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.