White v. Blakemore
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
Bill fled April 15, 1879, to enforce a lien for unpaid purchase money on land sold, by bond for title, on November 19, 1836, to Haniel L. Barringer, the grandfather of the defendants. The chancellor dismissed the bill, and complainants appealed.
Many years ago, in the year 1811, Wm. White, spoken of in some of the papers as late secretary of State of North Carolina, died leaving a widow Anna
In November, 1836, several instruments of conveyance or sale were executed' between these parties. One of them seems to have been dated on the 18th, and the residue on the 19th of that month, but they are manifestly all parts of one transaction. The instrument of the 18th of November, is a formal deed by which Daniel L. Barringer and his wife Ann convey to Anna White, the widow, and to Elizabeth Eelton, Susan White, Emma White, Sophronia White, and David L. Swain and wife Eleanor, the interest of Bar-ringer and wife, described as one undivided seventh, in the land in controversy in fee. The consideration expressed is $400 paid. The land is set out by metes and bounds, lying on Sugar creek in Bedford county, Tennessee, and described as containing seven hundred
On November 19, 1836, Anna White, ■ Elizabeth Eelton, Susan White, Emma White, Sophronia White and David L. SWain join in a bond for title to Daniel L. Barringer, in the penalty of $5,600, conditioned that each of the obligors in their own right, and Swain in the right- of his wife also, would, upon the payment by the said Barringer of his bonds given as consideration for the land, execute, or cause to be executed to him a good and sufficient deed in fee simple, with covenants of warranty, to the same tract of land of seven hundred acres, describing . it by 'metes and bounds. The title bond, as it is copied into the record, -is defective in the recital of the consideration, probably by a clerical error of the copier of the transcript, as the written arguments of both parties agree in relation to its purport. Supplying the missing words in brackets, the clause will read thus: “ And for consideration for the same, [the said Daniel L. Barringer has executed to] the said Anna White, Eliz-beth Eelton, Susan White, Emma White, Sophronia White and David L. Swain his several bonds under seal; and bearing date herewith, in the sum of $2,800, said bonds falling due at different times as specified upon their face.”
On the same day, Anna White, Elizabeth Eelton, Susan White, Emma White and Sophronia White join in a conveyance of their interest in the same lands, “as heirs and devisees of Wm. White,” to Daniel L. Barringer in fee, reciting a consideration of $2,750 paid.
The sum of these several instruments ' is that Bar-ringer and wife convey their one-seventh of the land in controversy to the widow and other children of Wm. White for $400, and these latter immediately covenant, • by title bond, to convey the whole tract to Barringer upon the payment of his bonds for the purchase money, recited as $2,800. At the same time, the same parties sell to Barringer their interest in the other lands of Wm. White’s estate in Tennessee, at the price of $3,300.
The bill is filed to subject the land mentioned in the title bond to the satisfaction of the bonds of Bar-ringer executed to the complainants and their sister Sophronia for the purchase money of their shares. The complainants did not have the title bond before them, which at the time was supposed to have been lost, but they allege that their covenant to convey was by bond for title or agreement in writing. They say that Barringer executed to each of the five bargainors
The defendants, in their answer, admit the sale of' the land to Barringer, but deny the tei’ms of sale as alleged, saying:- “While it is probably true that complainants hold the several notes described in their bill,
It will be noticed that the bonds as mentioned in the title bond are “in the sum of $2,800.” Three bonds of $300 each to each of the six bargainors would be $5,400. And no addition of the bonds would correspond with the sum recited.
Daniel L. Barringer died in 1852, leaving a widow and one daughter surviving. The daughter had married J. A. Blakemore. Blakemore qualified as the administrator of Barringer’s estate. Barringer’s widow died about 1859, his daughter in 1873. Barringer lived on the land in controversy until his death. Blakemore and wife continued in possession of the land until her death, and Blakemore retained possession until his death in. February, 1878. The defendants are the children of Blakemore and wife.
Anna White, the widow of Wm. White, died February 20, 1850, and, on November 4, 1851, a general settlement was had between Barringer and wife on the one part, and her sisters on the other part. The result, as embodied in a written agreement signed by the parties, was that the other parties purchased the interest of Barringer and wife in certain property specifically set out, presumably in North Carolina, at the price of $3,922.25, of which the greater part was paid in a mode designated, leaving a balance due to Barringer of $966.75. As to this balance, the agreement recites that Susan White, Emma White, and Sophronia White have each given the said D. L.
The ' complainants produce and file letters to show a knowledge of their claims, and continuous recognition. The first letter is from Barringer’s daughter under date of January 29, 1850. She wrote to one of the complainants that she was sorry her father had ever bought the lands in Tennessee as they had been a source of trouble to him, and added that he had sold all the lands except the place he lived on, concluding thus: “ I learned from aunt Betsy that you all had a lien on that, so I hope there will be nothing lost.” On April 14, 1852, Barringer himself wrote to Swain, in reference to the hope expressed by Swain to him in a recent letter “ of receiving a considerable sum' of money on the girls’ notes,” that his only source for raising the money was by a sale of the land on which he lived, and which he had been trying to sell without success. He seems after-wards to have sold two hundred acres to one Barrett for $3,600, as will presently more fully appear. On December 6, 1853, after Barringer’s death, Blakemore wrote to Swain, concluding with the following post
Barringer in his lifetime sold two hundecl acres of the land to one Barrett. On May 26, 1856, the lawyer of Barrett, at the request of Blakemore, wrote to Swain that no deed could be found for the land, and requesting a deed. Swain réplied, June 11, 1856, that he was not surprised that no deed was found, as he was very certain none was ever executed. Gen. Barringer, he says, gave his bonds for the purchase money, and the vendors covenanted to convey the title upon the payment of his bonds. He expresses a willingness, however, to make a title to the land sold, adding that a conveyance of the residue will be made when the- purchase money is fully paid. In another letter of the 30th of the same month, in which.
Elizabeth Felton proves, upon her examination as a witness in this case, that she was to get $900 for her interest in the land, the same as each of her sisters, and that ’ Barringer paid her at the time in cash $600, and gave her his note for $300. This note, with the payments endorsed, she sent as a gift to Blakemore’s daughters, after his death. D. L. Swain died in 1868. The deposition of his widow is taken in this cause to prove his handwriting. She makes no claim for unpaid purchase money.
It is clear, from the foregoing statement, that Bar-ringer did, on November 19, 1836, purchase the land in controversy, and execute the three sets of notes
The notes were under seal, and therefore not within the general statutes of limitations. These statutes did not apply to sealed obligations previous to the adoption of the Code in 1858, and the limitations of that compilation were restricted to causes of action accruing after the first of October of that year: Code, sec. 47. And the proof effectually disposes of any presumption of payment arising from lapse of time. The personal representative of Barringer would, it' is true, be protected by the statutes of three and seven years in favor of the estates of decedents. But
The defendants in their answer, while conceding that the complainants hold the notes as claimed by them, deny that the notes are a lien on the land. And it is certain, as argued by their counsel, that the title bond of November 19, 1836, recites the consideration of the sale of the land as only $2,800, which would make the consideration of each share corresjjond with the valuation of the share of Barringer and wife in the same land as set out in their conveyance ofthe previous day. It is also true that the consid
Can we look outside of the terms of the title bond to ascertain whether the entire «amount called for by the notes was in fact purchase money of the land, or, even if not purchase money, was nevertheless, charged upon the land so as to constitute a lien upon it? The consideration for the sale of land, it has been held by this court, is not required to be in writing by our statute of frauds: Whitby v. Whitby, 4 Sneed, 473; Gass v. Hawkins, Thomp. Cas., 243. "When the consideration is expressed in the writing, the recital is only prima fado evidence, and the true consideration may be averred in pleading, and shown by parol proof: Perry v. Southern R. Co., 5 Cold., 138; Mowry v. Davenport, 6 Lea, 80, 93. An absolute deed may be shown by parol to be a mortgage to secure a specific debt: Ruggles v. Williams, 1 Head, 141. So, in the case of a title bond, a paról contract that the title retained should stand" as security for a new
Under these authorities, there can be little doubt that the complainants might show by pa,rol testimony either that the notes in controversy were given for the purchase money of the land covenanted to be conveyed, or that the legal title was retained to secure the payment of the notes by special contract between them and the vendee, and either contemporaneously or subsequently. The burden of proof would be on the complainants, and, after the lapse of over forty years, the proof ought to be very clear and satisfactory.
The complainants and their sister Elizabeth Fenton do say that the notes produced were given for the purchase money of the land, and the title retained to secure their payment. Swain seems to have entertained the same view, at any rate to the extent that the title to the land was reserved to secure the notes.
The depositions of the complainants and their sister were taken without having the title bond before them, which was then supposed to be lost. It was after-wards found and filed, but neither party retook their depositions to explain the discrepancy between their recollection as deposed to and the recitals of the instrument. And the question is what effect shall the evidence have against the writing. Treating the recital of the latter as true, it is almost certain that the notes were given not only in consideration of the
In this view, the recovery of the complainants must be limited to so much of the debt evidenced •by the notes as constituted the consideration money of the land in controversy. That would be the sum of $466.66 oí each set of notes with interest payable annually. The general rule in this State, in respect to the appropriation of payments is, that a debtor owing different debts to the same person has a right to apply the payment at the time when made to either debt, and if he fails to do so, and the payment be
It remains to be considered whether the lien for the balance of debt due to complainants, under the foregoing rulings, can be enforced . against the whole land, or against only a part of it, and what part. The contract between the parties, as shown by both the title bond and the other evidence, was that each owner of the land sold an undivided sixth interest, and received the purchaser’s notes for an equal part of the purchase money. It was not a joint sale of the whole land for a single price to be paid to all of the bargainors, either at once or in instalments, but a separate sale of each share for a separate consideration. The obligation of the contractors is tl¿e same as if they had entered into separate covenants, except in so far as they may have made themselves sureties for each other for the performance of the obligation. There is nothing in the written .instrument nor in the proof to change the. legal effect of the contract. In this view, as the share of any owner was paid for, the purchaser acquired the right to de
Judge Turney thinks that the complainants are entitled to enforce their whole debt against the entire unconveyed tract of land.
Something is said in the answers of the defendants, and the argument submitted for them, as to a defi
The decree of the chancellor will be reversed, and -a decree entered in accordance with this opinion.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.