Patterson v. Workingmen's Building & Loan Ass'n
Patterson v. Workingmen's Building & Loan Ass'n
Dissenting Opinion
delivered the following dissenting opinion:
The defendant, the -Workingmen’s Building and Loan Association, was incorporated June 10, 1875, under the-provisions of the act of the Genera] Assembly, passed March 19, 1875, ch. 142, secs. 5 and 14, entitled “An act to provide for the organization of corporations.” Said fourteenth section providing for the incorporation of building associations, among other things, provides “that the funds of said corporation may be loaned out to the stockholders, in such manner, on such terms- and conditions, aud under such regulations as the said corporation by its constitution and by-laws may prescribe ; provided, the same be secured by real estate, and any funds of the said corporation which may' remain after the stockholders have borrowed all they desire, may be loaned out to other persons, the same-being secured by a lien on real estate. , * * The board of directors shall hold stated meetings, at which-the money in the treasury, if over two hundred dollars, shall be offered for loan in open meeting at a
The charter defines the object and purpose of said Association to be “to raise funds to be used by the members thereof only for the purpose of building houses and securing homesteads for themselves in said (Shelby) county.”
By the constitution adopted by the respondent corporation it is provided, among other things, “ that the stock of this Association may be issued in successive series of two hundred dollars .per share, the number of' shares in each new series to be determined by the board* of directors.” “ On each share of stock there shall be paid an instalment of one dollar per month in advance, and any person wishing to subscribe for stock subsequent to the issue of a series shall pay up all instalments which may have become due in the series in which said stock may be taken or issued,
Mrs. Julia S. Chester, the ancestor of complainant, -became a member of the defendant corporation and the owner of eight shares of the sixth series of the stock prior to the 5th of February,’ 1878, when the money on hand was offered for loan by the said Association, among its members, at a regular meeting, to determine which of them should have the preference to borrow the sum of $1,200 then on hand, and there were a number of members present who desired simultaneously to borrow the same. Said Julia S. Chester bid for ■such preference or priority the sum of $66 premium on each one of six of the said eight shares so held by her, aggregating $396 for such preference, and her’s being the highest bid, the same was struck off and sold to her at said' sum of $396 pre'mium. Said,premium was •not then paid, but she, having filed her application for said loan of the $1,200, to pay off taxes, incum-brances, etc., such loan was, in pursuance of said bid and application, made to her, and said premium •of $396, bid by her .for such preference, was then
On the 2d of April, 1878,. the said Julia S. Chester made another transaction with said Association precisely similar in all respects to the one above stated, in which she purchased the privilege of a loan of $400
Said Julia S. Chester paid on said six shares on which she made the $1,200 loan one dollar per share per month until the same amounted to $366 dues paid en said stock, and on the two shares she also paid one dollar per share per nionth until $122 of dues on said stock was paid. She paid on said $1,200 loan, at the rate of $6 per month interest until the sum of $354 was paid thereon, and on the $400 note she paid interest at the rate of' $2 per month until the same amounted to the sum of $116, when she ceased to make further payment.
Mrs. Chester having died, the complainant, Margaret Patterson, who is her only child and heir-at-law, filed this bill, alleging that said transactions, as above stated, were usurious, and seeking to have an account of said usury, and the mortgaged premises relieved from the same, etc.
The respondent, by its- answer’, denies that said transactions were usurious, and files its answer as a cross-bill, by which it avers that said property is justly chargeable with said amounts of $1,200 and $400, with interest at the rate of six per cent, from the dates of said notes respectively, less the proper •credits for the amounts so paid, as in said answer -set forth, and seeks to enforce the same.
The chancellor held that said transactions were
It seems to be clear that it was the purpose ‘ of the Legislature, by the provisions of the 14th section of the act above recited, to authorize such transactions as are here complained of, and the principal, if not the only, question to be determined is, had the Legislature such power? and this depends entirely upon the question whether or not these transactions were usurious.
Article XI., section 7, of the Constitution of this State provides that the Legislature shall fix the rate of interest; and the rate so established shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. And section 8 of the article provides that the Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual; nor to pass any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with, the general
A transaction identical in its methods with those now under consideration, came before this court in the case of Martin v. The Nashville Building Association, 2 Cold., 419, and was held to be a device to loah money at usurious rates, and declared illegal and void.
The only difference between that case and the one here presented is that the authority to sell the privilege of loans to the highest ■ bidder among the members of the Association in that case was conferred by the constitution and' by-laws of • the corporation, but was not contained in the charter; and in this it is contained in the act of the Legislature which authorizes the incorporation of the defendant, as well as in its constitution. And it has been virtually conceded in' argument that if that case is to stand as authority this must be decided in favor of the complainant. But, it is very earnestly insisted, that case was not well decided and should be overruled; and we have been referred to a great number of cases in which
A collection of these cases has been compiled and printed in the form of a brief, constituting a book of over two hundred pages, and furnished us. We have examined them, as well as various other cases and authorities, to which we have been referred, with as much care as we have been able. It does appear that such transactions, or transactions apparently similar in most respects, and including this feature of bidding a bonus or premium for the privilege of the loan of money, in addition to paying the lawful rate of interest, have been uniformly upheld in England and in a majority of the United States. Some of these cases have involved transactions of voluntary associations, and others of incorporated companies, and have been sustained upon the idea or assumption that they were partnership transactions, and as dealings between the partners with the partnership funds. The English cases, notably, as well as some of the earlier American cases, seem to have proceeded upon this idea. Others have been based upon the assumption that the transaction was a sale by the member and stockholder of his shares of stock to the company (the actual value of which was uncertain) for the present advance of a sum of money less than their nominal or prospective value; while others have been placed upon the authority of legislative enactments, without regard to the question as to whether they may or may not, without such sanction, have been usurious. All these cases except, perhaps, the class last men
The transactions involved in this casé cannot be considered in the light of partnership transactions, for the simple reason that stockholders in a corporation are not partners, nor is the stock of a corporation partnership property. It does not appear in the cases that have been sustained, upon the authority of legislative enactments, that the State Constitutions under which they were decided contained any such restrictions as those contained in our Constitution of 1870, which we have cited above. Nor do we think the transactions in question can be legitimately treated as a sale of her shares of stock by Mrs. Chester to the corporation. The language of the ■ statute, as well as of the constitution of the Association, which we have quoted, evidently contemplated the transactions which they undertook to authorize as loans, and so designated them. The transaction itself is, that Mrs. Chester, being desirous, to procure a loan of the aggregate sum of these notes _of, say $1,600, gave the Association $532 for the privilege of borrowing that sum, and which was deducted from it, leaving the actual amount received by her in both transactions $1,068, and for which she executed her promissory notes for $1,600, payable one day after date with in
The vice of this argument, we think, is, that if it is perfectly apparent, as it must be, that the transaction considered by itself is usurious, it cannot be rendered lawful by the fact that the complainant, as a stockholder in the same corporation, may in the meantime derive a benefit from other transactions equally usurious, that will compensate her for the amount of .usury which she has paid upon her individual transactions with the Association. The legality or illegality of a usurious transaction cannot be made to depend upon the success of the party who pays the, usury in other transactions, whether they be usurious or not.
Mrs. Chester received $1,068, for which she executed her note for $1,600. The substance of the transaction was that she was to pay not only six per cent, interest upon this note, monthly in advance, but the principal was also to be paid by her, and with means to which she would otherwise have been en
If a stockholder in a bank were to make a negotiation with it, by which he agrees to receive $1,000 in cash, and execute, his note for $1,600, bearing six per cent, interest from its date, and to pay the interest monthly in advance until the dividends to be declared upon his stock should amount to a sum sufficient to pay the principal of the note, and that in the meantime said dividends, as they were declared, should remain in the bank to be loaned by it for its own benefit, no one, it seems to me, would contend that such a transaction would not be usurious, although the bank might, by other and greater usurious transactions with other customei’s, by its gains swell his dividends until such a borrower might, in fact, have to pay less interest than six per cent, upon the amount actually borrowed, nor would the transaction be relieved of its usurious character by an arrangement that stockholders of the bank should be entitled to the privilege of. It is difficult to distinguish such a transaction in principle from those now under consideration., If it were not designed to authorize these Associations ' to receive more than legal interest for the use of money under the guise of selling the privilege of the loan „ of it, it would seem that some other mode of determining the right of priority among the members desiring to borrow, free from suspicion of illegality, had not suggested itself. And it cannot matter that the Legislature expressly enacted that this so-called pre
It is said, however, that these Building Associations are benevolent in their design, and the chief object of their formation is to aid the heads of families of small means to purchase or build their own homes. Such objects are eminently worthy of all the aid and encouragement that can lawfully be bestowed upon them. They have sometimes, however, been assailed from a different standpoint. Mr. Justice Lumpkin, in the case of the Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards, 21 Ga., 592, has epitomized what is generally said for and against them as follows: “Their friends and advocates who claim for them an antiquity older than the Christian era, insist that they are peculiarly propitious to the poor, by stimulating them to save small sums from the grog-shop and the gambling house, and to purchase with their hoards and earnings happy homes for themselves and families; and that the terms upon which they procure help for this purpose are such as they could get no where else, and not so hard as those exacted by monied men, who will not give long indulgence to any, especially those in straightened circumstances; that another object which they subserve is to
“On the other hand it is asked, why so much complication and mystery about a system designed for the benefit of the masses, especially the poor and humble? That it is all for the purpose of concealing the repulsive interest they charge; that nothing can be understood of its workings, except that it produces the most gratifying gains to the capitalist who invests his money in it to accumulate; that the borrowers, once in the web, may, like the little fly, struggle in vain to escape the entanglement; that the roof that he hoped would have sheltered him crumbles beneath the mortgage that overspreads it; that the sooner these institutions are abolised the better.”
But granting for them all the benefits which are claimed in their behalf, we are compelled to administer the law, under the Constitution, as we find it, not as we might wish it to- be; and transactions which are usurious, and therefore illegal, cannot be consecrated by beneficent results, or rendered lawful by advantages, real or imaginary, which may flow from them; and which, if conceded, can only prove that, although generally disastrous, it may, under some circumstances, prove beneficial to people to be enabled to borrow money upon long credits, even • at usurious rates of interest, and might furnish perhaps an argument more or less persuasive in favor of the establishment of a conventional rate of interest in accordance
The chancellor’s decree should, therefore, be affirmed with costs.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
Bill to be relieved from alleged usury in a transaction between the Workingmen’s Building and Loan Association and one of its corporators. The chancellor granted the relief sought, and the Association appealed.
The following provisions of the constitution of the Association are quoted as bearing upon the matters of controversy. The object of the incorporation is stated to be “the accumulation of a fund which may be loaned on good security to the members thereof to aid them in procuring homes, and such other investments as are provided in the constitution. The stock of the Association is to be issued in successive series of two hundred dollars per share. The members shall be white r^idents of the United States, who' shall have subscribed for one or more shares of stock and signed the constitution. No one person shall-'hold more than fifty shares of stock. * * Any member wishing to withdraw one or more shares of his or her stock, which is not pledged to the Association, shall give thirty days’ notice in writing, at the expiration of which time the withdrawing stockholder shall be entitled to receive the amount actually paid in on such stock and such proportion of profits that may have
The note given on the first loan is in these words: “ One day after date, I promise to pay to the 'Workingmen’s Building and Loan Association of Memphis, Tennessee, twelve hundred dollars for value received, with interest from date at the rate of six per cent, per annum, payable monthly in advance. This noté • is secured by a trust deed on house and lot particularly described in said trust deed, which is of record in the register’s office of Shelby county, Tennessee. Memphis, February 5, 1878.” The condition of the deed of trust is as follows: “ Whereas, the said Julia S. Chester has become indebted to the Workingmen’s Building and Loan Association in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, as is evidenced by my promissory note, signed by me, for said sum, and due one day after date, with interest from date at the
The points made and argued on behalf of the complainant are:
First. That the loan of money to Julia S. Chester, the highest bidder, in pursuance of the charter and by-laws of the defendant company, was violative ■of the interest laws of the State, and the premium so' charged and received therefor, was invalid and unlawful, and as such cannot be collected from' the complainant or her property.
Second. The charter of the defendant Association requiring that “the premium paid by borrowing stockholders for the preference or priority of loan shall be paid before the loan is consummated,” makes the loan to Julia S. Chester, as a building association con
Third. In no event can the Association claim interest on the premium charged, because, by the charter, the premium is not embraced in the loan, but paid before the loan is consummated.
All of these propositions turn upon the letter of the general act of incorporation, and depend for their cogency upon the conclusions we may come to upon the substance' of the legislation. The first and third may be considered together, for they both present the-issue of usury. The second point is not sustained by the facts, for the premium was paid or deducted before the loan was consummated, ’and, in that view, the proposition is resolved into the first and third, that is to say, did what was done, the retention of the premium, and receiving monthly payments on the whole sum bid off in the form of interest, make the transaction usurious? The sole issue in reality is usury or no usury.
And here it may be conceded at once that if the substance of the transaction be a mere loan of money for a bonus, the contract would 'be usurious. The State Constitution expressly provides: “ The Legislature shall fix the rate of interest, and the rate so established shall be equal and uniform throughout the
The Association, by its contract with its borrowing member, required security by note and trust deed for the payment of monthly dues, equivalent to interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum on the whole amount offered and bid off, until the accumulations of funds would bring all the shares up to par/ and the Association paid over to its member, by satisfying his indebtedness to that extent, the net sum left after deducting the bonus bid from fhe amount offered and bid. This contract is authorized by the act of the Legislature, which, after directing the money in the treasury to be offered for loan to the stockholder who will bid fhe highest premium for the preference or priority, .-proceeds thus: “In case of non-payment of instalments
In a contract of loauing of money between individuals, if the lender ohai’ge and receive a bonus for the loan of money to be repaid with interest, whereby the one would pay and the other receive more than the legal rate of interest for the use of the money, it would be usury. If we treat the advance by a Build
In England the courts have held, both in the case of voluntary associations and of associations organized under act of Parliament, that the transaction of an advance of money to a member upon a premium bid is not a loan of money, but a dealing with the partnership or joint fund, and therefore not usurious: Silver v. Barnes, 8 Scott, 300; Burbridge v. Cotton, 8 Eng. L. & Eq., 57; Seagrave v. Pope, 1 DeG., M. & G., 783; In re Building Society, L. R., 12 Eq., 516. In Seagrave v. Pope, Lord Chancellor Truro, notwithstanding the' language of the Society’s rules, which, like our act of 1875 and the rules of the company before ns, treated the advance as a loan, held, in an elaborate opinion, that the transaction was not a loan,
If, however, the intervention of the corporate entity operates to take the case out of the general rule of the English eases, a large majority of the American courts have held the contract under consideration not usurious, partly upon the ground that it amounted to a purchase or redemption of the stock by the Association, and partly because of the uncertainty in the payments by which the principal of the advance, treated as a loan, is put at hazard: Delano v. Wild, 6 Allen, 1. “ We take it,” says the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a recent case identical
The transaction between the Association and one of its members upou an advance on stock is not in fact a Joan of money, although so-called in the act of the Legislature, and in the constitution of the Association, and even in the instruments executed in completion of the contract. It is in substan'ce a sale by the member to the company of his expected dividend on his subscription at the winding up of the Association-for a money advance, he agreeing to. continue to pay his dues on the stock subscribed, and to pay, in addition, upon the par value of the stock monthly instal-ments, equivalent to six per cent, interest on that value, until the accumulations of the Association shall enable it to pay or settle all the stock of the same series at par. There is no contract to pay the advance at all, which is essential to constitute usury in the loan of money: Delano v. Wild, 6 Allen, 1. If a per centage per annum be adopted as an easy mode of adjusting profits upon a settlement between partners, or persons engaged in a joint venture, it will not be usury: Gilliam v. Moore, 8 Hum., 468. The principal is put at hazard by being made to depend upon a contingent event, as in the case of bottomry and respondentia, or loans on post obit bonds, in which cases the' stipulation for the payment of extra interest is not usury: 2 Pars. on Con., 415; Thorndike v. Stone, 11 Pick., 183; Delano v. Wild, 6 Allen, 1.
The chancellor’s decree must be reversed, and the-Assoeiation may take a decree, under the agreement in the record, for the enforcement of the contracts-with the costs of the cause, upon the principles settled by this decision.
Reference
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- Margaret Patterson v. Workingmen's Building and Loan Association
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