Tennessee Supreme Court, 1891

Jones v. Insurance Co.

Tennessee Supreme Court · Decided October 17, 1891 · Lurton

90 Tenn. 604

Cases that cite this one

17 later published cases cite this decision.

Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield (6th Cir. 1899)
Washington v. Atlanta L. Ins. Co. (Tenn. 1940)
Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Cook (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935)
BFM Leasing Co., LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance (6th Cir. 2005)
Kansas City College of Osteopathic Medicine v. Employers' Surplus Lines Insurance Company (1st Cir. 1978)
Vinson v. Mills (Tenn. 1975)
Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. (5th Cir. 1941)
Smithart v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. (Tenn. 1934)
Life & Casualty Insurance v. Mitchell (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932)
Lattarulo v. National Surety Co. (City of New York Municipal Court 1922)
Hellman v. National Council of the Knights & Ladies of Security (Mo. Ct. App. 1918)
Kirk v. Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World (Mo. Ct. App. 1913)
Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane (Minn. 1906)
Kentucky Vermillion Mining & Concentrating Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. (9th Cir. 1906)
Taylor v. Grand Lodge (Minn. 1905)
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. McCormick (Ind. Ct. App. 1898)
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Bowser (Ind. Ct. App. 1898)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Lurton, J.

The fire policy issued by the defendant company on lumber owned by the complainants, contained in its written part a warranty that a' continuous clear space of 150 feet should be maintained between the lumber insured and the saw-mill, dry-kiln, or any wood-working or manufacturing establishment, and that said space should not be used for the handling or piling of lumber *605thereon. This warranty was untrue when made and untrue when the insured property was burned by fire communicated from a saw-mill within the space provided for. The contract of insurance is a conditional one. If no risk attaches, no premium, in the absence of fraud, is earned. "Where the risk never attached, and no risk was ever run, the premium is to be returned, in case it has been paid, and the assured was guilty of no fraud. May on Ins., Sec. 4.

The language of Lord Mansfield, in Tyree v. Fletcher, Cowp., 668, was that “where the risk had not been run, whether its not having "been run was owfing to the fault, pleasure, or will of the insured, or to any other cause, the premium shall be returned.”

The facts of this- case show no intentional fraud on part of assured, and, his premium never having-been earned, must be returned.

Other points in the case were disposed of orally.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.