Clark v. Jones
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Memphis Sheraton Corporation, Cross-Appellant v. Billy J. Kirkley and Robert McCullough Cross-Appellees (6th Cir. 1981)
- George Jones v. Select Portfolio Servicing (6th Cir. 2016)
- Dolores-Rose Dauenhauer v. The Bank of New York Mellon (6th Cir. 2014)
- Lorrie Thompson v. Bank of America, N.A. (6th Cir. 2014)
- King v. Emery (6th Cir. 1988)
- McAllester v. Jackson (In re Jackson) (United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee 1980)
- Cleveland Trust Co. v. Capitol Theater Co. (W. Va. 1936)
- Citizens Nat. Bank of Orange, Va. v. Waugh (4th Cir. 1935)
- Neely v. Clarence Saunders Co. (Tenn. 1935)
- Foster v. Harle (Tenn. 1933)
- Franklin v. Duncan (Tenn. 1915)
- Richmond Type & Electrotype Foundry v. Carter (Tenn. 1915)
- Hamilton v. Fowler (6th Cir. 1899)
- W. C. Early Co. v. Williams (Tenn. 1916)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is a foreclosure hill. On July 27, 1891, A. G-. Hickman sold and conveyed to R. L. Jones a tract of land in Hamilton County, taking his six-months’ promissory note for $250 as part of the consideration. The note recited on its face that it was given for a part of the purchase-price, and that its payment was secured by a deed of trust on the land. In pursuance of their agreement, Jones, on the same day, recouveyed the laud to Hickman, as trustee, with full power of sale in case the note should not be paid at maturity. Thereafter Hickman sold and indorsed the note to W. I. . Clark. Default having been made, Clark, as holder and owner of the note, filed this bill against Joues, as maker of the note and deed of trust, and against Hickman,
Jones demurred to the bill, (1) because it did not allege a transfer of the deed of trust by Hickman to Clark, and (2) because it did not allege that the trustee had refused to execute the trust, ■or that Jones had done any thing to prevent him from doing so. ;
The demurrer was overruled, and Jones filed an answer, denying, in many different forms, the right of complainant to have the deed of trust foreclosed by decree of Court, when the way for a sale by the trustee was entirely free and unobstructed.
Hickman, the trustee, answered, stating that he had ever been ready and willing to execute his power of sale, if the complainant should request him so to do.
Hearing the cause upon the whole record, the Chancellor granted the relief sought in the bill. The land was sold, and the sale confirmed. Defendant, Jones, has appealed.
First. — The first ground of demurrer was properly overruled. It was not necessary to Clark’s enjoyment of the security provided for' his note that it should have been, formally transferred to him. The transfer of the note, without more, carried with it the lien created by the deed of trust. Graham v. McCampbell, Meigs, 52; Cleveland v. Martin, 2 Head, 129; Roberts v. Francis, 2 Heis., 133; McCallum v. Jobe, 1 Leg. R., 244; Anthony v. Smith, 9 Hum., 511; Thompson v. Pyland, 3 Head, 539.
The jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to foreclose mortgages is almost as old as the Courts themselves; formerly it was exclusive, because such instruments, then, conferred no power of sale upon any individual. Now, however, mortgages with power of sale, or deeds of trust, are very generally adopted as security for debt. These may be foreclosed by the person designated for that purpose; or, at the election of the mortgagee or beneficiary, by a Court of Equity. The introduction of the later mode of foreclosure does not supersede the former one, but is in addition to it; it is merely cumulative. Bennett v. Union Bank, 5 Hum., 615; McDonald v. Vinson, 56 Miss., 497; 2 Perry on Trusts, Sec. 602gg; 1 Jones on Mortgages, Sec. 1443; 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 277, 278, and cases cited.
Third. — But, since mortgages with power of sale or deeds of trust are resorted to because affording a less expensive as well as a more convenient and more expeditions mode of foreclosure than that
Fourth. — It was also error to charge Jones with complainant’s attorney’s fee in this case. It is true that Jones agreed, in the face of his note, that he would pay a reasonable attorney’s fee, “ if necessary to resort” to suit for the collection of the note; but no such resort is shown to have been necessary. On the contrary, it appears that the note could have been collected without litigation. The mode of payment provided in the deed of trust was ample. The trustee had full power of sale, was ready and willing to sell, and could have sold easily, and without interruption, at any time.
Fifth. — The deed of trust provided for a sale for cash, with right of redemption in the maker. The Court, upon the application of complainant, ordered a sale on a credit of six and twelve months, barring the right of redemption. This was error. The terms of sale prescribed in the instrument creating the lien were controlling. See Knox v. McCain, 13 Lea, 199, overruling Frierson v. Blanton, 1 Bax., 272.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.