Ferguson v. State
Ferguson v. State
Opinion of the Court
The defendant was indicted for, and convicted of, an assault with intent to murder, and the case is now before this court on appeal.
It is contended by the defendant that the indictment “ is not sufficient, in that it purports to have been presented by a grand jury whose oath is different from that prescribed by law,” and that “ it does not purport to be the presentment of a legally composed grand jury.” This point is presented for the first time in defendant’s assignments of error.
The indictment commences as follows: “In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas : The grand jurors of the county of Erath, in the State of Texas, good and lawful men, duly tried, empanelled, sworn, and, charged by the district judge, at the June term, A. D. 1878, of the District Court of said county, to inquire into, and true presentment make of all offences therein committed against the penal laws of the State of Texas, upon their oaths present,” etc. We believe that it sufficiently appears from the recitals in the indictment that it was presented by a legal grand jury, who took the oath prescribed by law. West v. The State, decided at present term of this court, ante, p. 485.
A careful review of the evidence in this case satisfies us that all the necessary ingredients of an assault with intent to murder were proved. The facts show, substantially, that J. B. Mayfield (the party on whom the assault is alleged to have been made by defendant) and others were at work on a school-house in Erath County, on the fifteenth . day of April, 1878. Late in the evening of that day, when they were about to quit work, Mayfield was going around the house picking up the nails that had fallen during the day, when the defendant, who was standing a few feet from
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We find no error in the charge. It correctly presents the law of the case, and is not liable to the objections urged against it. It correctly defined murder, and gave the jury the meaning of the terms “malice” and “malice aforethought” as ingredients in murder. The jury were instructed that “ whenever it appears, upon a trial for assault with intent to murder, that the offence would have been murder had death resulted therefrom, the person committing such assault is deemed to have done the same with that intent.” The court gave the defendant the benefit of a charge both on aggravated and simple assault; though, in our judgment, there is no evidence in the statement of facts which required it.
The court properly refused to give the special instructions
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.