Bolding v. State

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
Bolding v. State, 23 Tex. Ct. App. 172 (1887)
4 S.W. 579; 1887 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 44
Willson

Bolding v. State

Opinion of the Court

Willson, Judge.

An unbroken line of decisions in this State hold that under an indictment charging an assault with intent to murder, a conviction may be had for an aggravated assault, although no circumstance of aggravation is alleged in the indictment. In Davis v. The State, 20 Texas Court of Appeals, •302, we gave our views at length upon this question, citing the authorities in support of the same. We adhere to the opinion there expressed and so often announced in other cases, both by our Supreme Court and this court.

The law confides to teachers a discretionary power in the infliction of punishment upon their pupils, and will not hold them responsible unless the punishment inflicted be excessive, or be inflicted merely to gratify their own evil passions. Moderate restraint and correction by a teacher of a pupil is not an offense, but is authorized by the law. (Penal Code, art. 490; Dowlen v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 61; Stanfield v. The State, 43 Texas, 167; 2 Bish. Crim. Law, secs. 880, 881, 886; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, sec. 632.)

Teachers have the right, the same as parents, to prescribe reasonable rules for the government of children under their charge, and to enforce, by moderate restraint and correction, obedience to such rules. This authority of a teacher over his pupils is not, in our opinion, necessarily limited to the time when the pupils are at the school room, or under the actual control of the teacher. Such authority extends, we think, to the prescribing .and enforcement of reasonable rules and requirements even *176while the pupils are at their homes. We find no material error in the charge of the court. We think it correctly and fully explains the law of the case, and there was no error in refusing the special instructions requested by the defendant.

Opinion delivered March 9, 1887.

As to the objection to the proposed juror, Burns, we are of the opinion that the court did not err in holding him to be competent. The character of the opinion which said Burns entertertained of the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not such as disqualifies. (Rothchilds v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 519). Moreover it is not shown that any juror' objectionable to the defendant was forced upon him. (Loggins v. The State, 12 Texas, Ct. App., 65.)

As to the teacher’s testimony with reference to the custom of requiring pupils to study at other times than during school hours, we are of the opinion that it was immaterial, and, even if inadmissible, which we do not concede, it could not have affected the result, and was harmless to the defendant.

We find no error in this conviction, and the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Hurt, Judge, dissents from that portion of this opinion which holds that under an indictment for an assault to murder, in the usual form, a conviction may be had for an aggravated assault. He is of the opinion that the authorities in support of this doctrine are incorrect and should be overruled.

Reference

Full Case Name
Hugh Bolding v. State
Cited By
8 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
1. Aggravated Assault—Indictment.—By an unbroken line of decisions in the Supreme as well as this court it has been as it is now held, that a conviction for aggravated assault may be had under an indictment for assault with intent to murder, notwithstanding no circumstance of aggravation be alleged in the indictment. (Hurt, J., dissents.) 2. Assault—Authority of School Teachers.—The law confides to teachers a discretionary power to punish their pupils, and exonerates them from responsibility unless the punishment be excessive or malicious. Moderate restraint and correction of a pupil by his teacher is not an offense, but is authorized by law; and it seems that the authority of a teacher is not limited to the time the pupil is at the school room or under the actual control of the teacher. 3. Jury Law.—On the voir dire of a juror he said he had heard a person in whom he had confidence make a statement of the case, based not upon his own knowledge but on hearsay, and thereupon he, the juror, had formed a conclusion provided the statement was true, but had formed no conclusion as to whether or not it was true. Held, not a disqualifying conclusion. 4. Same.—The mere fact that the trial court erroneously overruled a good challenge for cause to an unqualified juror, and thereby necessitated the defense to expend a peremptory challenge on him, is not reversible error where it does not appear that any objectionable juror was forced upon the defendant.