Maines v. State
Maines v. State
Opinion of the Court
In this case the assistant attorney-general confesses errors, and the errors are manifest upon the record, and of a character which necessitates a reversal of the judgment.
Appellant has been convicted of perjury committed by him as a witness upon the trial of one Joe Wyers, who was on trial for theft of a steer. Several of the errors complained of relate to the admission of evidence over the defendant’s objection. Several witnesses were permitted to testify to conversations among themselves, and with one Morris, with regard to Morris’s suspicions as to Wyers; and further as to an agreement entered into between said witnesses and Morris as to what should be done by the latter in order to detect Wyers in the theft of cattle, in which business the latter was supposed, by said parties, to be engaged. At "these conversations, neither Wyers nor this appellant were present.
Such testimony was clearly hearsay, and the conversations and agreements were res inter alios acta, and in no manner binding either upon Wyers or this defendant. (Cohea v. The State, 11 Texas, Ct. App., 153; Tyler v. State, Id., 388; Chumley v. State, 20 Id., 547; Kennedy v. State, 19 Id., 618; Hart v. State, 15 Id., 202; Burke v. State, Id., 156.)
Again, the witness Morris was permitted to testify that after he, witness, had testified on the examining trial of Wyers, “I went away to Tyler county because I had been threatened. I had, at the time I was threatened, testified fully on the examining trial of Joe Wyers, and serious threats had been made against me before I went off.” Defendant’s objections were that the evidence as to the threats was hearsay, and that the defendant was in no way connected with the threats, nor with witness’s fleeing the country, if he did so, on account of them. These objections should have been sustained, because it was not shown or attempted to be shown, that the defendant made the threats or had any connection with them, and the testimony was of a most prejudicial character to his interests. (20 Texas Ct. App., 157.)
Again, on this trial the entire record of the proceedings on the trial of Joe Wyers for theft was read in evidence by the prosecution. It was not error to admit this evidence, such testimony being admissible in perjury as inducement, though not to prove perjury. The general rule is “that whenever extraneous matter is admitted in evidence for a specific purpose, incidental to, but
Other errors are elaborately and ably discussed in the brief of counsel for appellant, but the above are the most material, and. on their account the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- John Maines v. State
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- Syllabus
- 1. Perjury—Evidence.—The perjury assigned in this case was the false testimony of the accused upon the trial of one W., for cattle theft. Upon the trial of the accused for the perjury the trial court permitted certain State’s witnesses to testify to conversations among themselves and one M., concerning the suspicion of H. that W. was a cattle thief; and further, to an agreement entered into between the said witnesses and M. developing a plan whereby M. was to detect W. in the theft of cattle; neither the defendant nor W. being present when the said conversations were had and the agreement entered into. Held, that the testimony, being hearsay, was clearly inadmissible; and the conversations and agreement, being res inter alios acta, were not binding upon either W. or this defendant. 2. Same.—The State’s witness M. was permitted to testify, on this trial, that after he had testified fully on the examining trial of W., for cattle theft, he fled the country because of serious threats uttered against him. Held that, in the absence of evidence showing that the threats were uttered by the defendant, or that he had some connection with them, the evidence was incompetent, and its admission was erroneous. 3. Same—Charge op the Court.—The record of proceedings on the trial of W. for theft was admissible against the defendant on his trial for perjury committed on the trial of W., but only as matter of inducement in committing the perjury, and not to prove the perjury; and, being admitted for that specific purpose, the charge of the trial court, omitting to restrict and 'irnit it accordingly, though not excepted to, was erroneous. See the opinion for the rule stated in extenso.