(after stating the facts as above). Appellants requested the court to instruct the jury to find in their favor, and complain of his refusal to do so. The grounds upon which they based their requests were (1) that the testimony was not sufficient to support a finding of negligence as charged in appellee’s petition; and (2), if it was sufficient, appellee was not entitled to recover, because, it appeared that he did not comply with the stipulations in the contracts covering the shipment requiring him as a condition precedent to a recovery to give notice in writing to their respective agents of damages he claimed within 91 days after the injury t'b the mules occurred.

With reference to the first of the two grounds, it seems the contentions were (1) that there was no evidence on which to base a finding of negligent delay in the transportation of the mules, and (2) that appellee by his pleadings sought a recovery of only such damages as he suffered because of such delay.

[1] We do not agree that there was no evidence of negligent delay on the part of appellants. The evidence on behalf of ap-pellee was that the shipment, while being transported by appellant St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railway Company from Brownsville to Houston, was delayed two or three hours by a wreck due to its bad track near San Beneto, and about twelve hours at Kingsville, and was delayed about sixteen hours at Houston; and that same, while being, transported by appellant International & Great Northern Railway Company from Houston to Longview, was delayed about seven hours on a side track between Houston and Palestine, and about twelve hours at Palestine. No reason for any of the delays specified, except the one due to the wreck near San Beneto, appeared in the testimony heard. Assuming that parts of some of them were for the purpose of enabling appellants to comply with the law requiring them to feed and water the mules (article 714, Vernon’s St.), we think it nevertheless cannot be said that there was no evidence I to support a finding of negligent delay.

*53 [2, 3] Nor do we agree that appellee’s suit was only for such damages' as he sustained because of negligent delay in the transportation of the mules. It was also, as we think is shown by the part of his petition set out in the statement above, for damages because ■of injuries to the mules due to negligence of any kind on the part of appellants. The allegation of negligence, it will be noted, is general, and the allegation as to injury'is general, except as to two of the mules. In the absence, as was the case, of special exceptions to the petition, we think the allegations were sufficient as a basis for the proof made and the judgment rendered. 1 Abbott’s Trial Brief, p. 612; Railway Co. v. Anson, 82 S. W. 785. The evidence on the part of appellant was amply sufficient to show that two of the mules were very seriously, and others of them in a less degree, injured as the result of rough handling.

[4-6] As to the other of the two grounds urged as reasons why the jury should have been peremptorily instructed to find for appellants, it was conceded by appellee that notice in writing of his claim for damages was not given as required in the stipulations in the contracts set out in the statement above, before his suit was commenced May 2, 1914, which was four or five days after the expiration of 91 days from the time the mules suffered the injuries complained of. Appellants contend that it therefore appeared, as a matter of law, that appellee was not entitled to recover as sought by him. Appellee, on the other hand, contends that it appeared that each of the stipulations was without consideration, and for that reason was not binding upon him; and, further, that the stipulations were not valid and enforceable against him unless reasonable, and that the question as to whether they were reasonable or not was for the jury, and not for the court to determine. There is no ■doubt that the stipulations were valid and binding on appellee if reasonable, and that a violation of same was available to appellants as a defense, if pleaded as required' •by the statute. Article 5714, Vernon’s St.; Railway Co. v. Mayes, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 97 S. W. 318; Railway Co. v. Hughey, 182 S. W. 361. That there was no consideration therefor, independent of the one on which the contract as a whole was based, would not invalidate the stipulations. Stevens & Russell v. Railway Co., 178 S. W. 810. Whether appellants’ contention as to their •effect should be sustained or not depends, therefore, upon whether it should be said that it appeared as a matter of law that the ■stipulations were reasonable. We think it should not. Railway Co. v. Childers, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 302, 21 S. W. 76; Railway Co. v Adams, 78 Tex. 374, 14 S. W. 666, 22 Am. St. Rep. 56; Railway Co. v. Barber, 30 S. W. 500; Railway Co. v. Curtis, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 477, 99 S. W. 566. The burden was on appellants to allege and prove that the time stipulated for was reasonable. Railway Co. v. Greathouse, 82 Tex. 111, 17 S. W. 834. They did not so allege. If it should be conceded that the allegation by appellee, that the time stipulated for was unreasonable, entitled appellants to contend that it was reasonable, we think the contention was one which the jury, and not the court, should have determined. If, as is true (article 5714, Vernon’s St.), it must be said as a matter of law that a stipulation requiring such notice to be given within a time less than 91 days from the time the cause of action accrues is unreasonable, we do not think it should be said as a matter of law that a stipulation requiring the notice to be given in 91 days is reasonable. Whether the latter stipulation would be reasonable in a given case or not would depend upon the particular circumstances of that case, and would, we think, present a question of fact for the jury, unless it should be said — and we think it should not in this case — that no other inference than that the stipulation was reasonable could be drawn from the testimony.

It is insisted that the verditt and judgment are excessive. But we think it cannot be so held without ignoring the testimony of appellee and the witness Threadgill. As the jury had a right to believe them, the contention cannot be sustained.

Assignments not in effect disposed of by what has been said are overruled because it is believed they do not present error authorizing a reversal of the judgment. .

The judgment is affirmed.