Opinion. • .

[1] We are of the opinion that the court erred in refusing to grant the appellant a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is insufficient as a basis for a judgment. In order to support a judgment, a verdict, taken as a whole, must be plain in its meaning and not inconsistent in its findings upon material facts. In support of the proposition that the verdict must be plain, intelligible, and unambiguous we cite Moore v. Moore, 67 Tex. 293; Brown v. Harless, 22 Tex. 646; Aultman v. Cappleman, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 523, 81 S. W. 1243; Riske v. Rotan Grocery Co., 37 Tex. Civ. App. 494, 84 S. W. 243; Schwartzman v. Cabell, 49 S. W. 113; Railway Co. v. Hathaway, 75 Tex. 557, 12 S. W. .999. As sustaining the proposition that a verdict must not be contradictory, see Waller v. Liles, 96 Tex. 21, 70 S. W. 17; Yeary v. Smith, 45 Tex. 56; Cushman v. Masterson, 64 S. W. 1031; Taylor v. Flynt, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 664, 77 S. W. 964; Stoker v. Fugitt, 102 S. AY. 743; Goldstein v. Heflin, 174 S. W. 891.

The statute requires'railway companies to designate their depot grounds before constructing their roads. R. S. arts. 6550 and 6551. Had the jury simply answered “Yes” to the first question, it would have been a finding that appellant did designate depot grounds at Hurley. If they meant to find that such designation was in the sense in which that word is used in the statute, there was no necessity for them to say that it was a permanent designation; for in such case the statute makes it permanent by forbidding its change.

[2] What did the jury mean by adding the words “preliminary designation, but not permhnent”? Did they mean that the appellant designated such place as a station on its road, with the intention of putting in side tracks and a depot building, but afterwards changed its mind and moved this station 3% miles to the place where the evidence shows the depot was built, and that therefore such designation was temporary and not permanent? If so, judgment should have been for appellee, for the reason, as above stated, the appellant, under such circumstances, was forbidden by law to make such change.

[3,4] AVe cannot look to the evidence, unless it is uncontradicted, to see what the jury ought to have found in order to determine what they did find. But when a verdict is apparently not clear, we may look to the evidence to determine that it is in fact ambiguous. It was the contention of appellant, supported by its evidence, that it never designated Warren Siding or Hurley as a depot, in the sense in which that word is used in that statute, but that the only sense in which it designated it as a station was that it was suggested as such, and so placed upon its preliminary map, as a place probably suitable for *773 a depot, and so reported to its chief officers,; but that they after investigation decided not to designate that place as a depot or station. If the jury meant to find this contention to be true, then there was never any legal designation of depot grounds at Hurley. Which did they mean? Quien sabe? We cannot tell. '

The answer to the second question, to say the least of it, is not clarifying; and the answer to the fourth question renders obscurity doubly obscure.

[5] The questions propounded were calculated to lead to obscurity and contradictory answers. There were but two issues in this case, and these were whether or not appellant, prior to the construction of its road, designated depot grounds at Hurley, and, if so, was the order of the commission fixing the amount to be expended by appellant in providing a suitable building unreasonable and unjust to the appellant? But one question as to the designation of such depot grounds should have been propounded, together with such explanation as was necessary to enable the jury to intelligently answer the question, and no answer should have been received, except a direct answer, “Yes” or “No.”

[6] There was no error in the explanation given by the court in connection with the first question, as to what was meant by Hurley and as to what was meant by depot grounds. The. undisputed evidence shows that Warren Siding or Muleshu and Hurley are separated only by the railroad track, and that for the purpose of this case they are one and the same place.

[7] Appellant assigns error on the admission of a map issued by the immigration department of the Santa Fé system, and which shows Hurley as a station on appellant’s road. The only objection to this map which we .deem it necessary to notice is that a map issued by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway system is no proof of the location of a station on the road of the Pecos & Northern Texas Railway, the appellant herein. So far as we can gather from the record, the Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Company, while operating under a separate charter, is in fact a part of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway, and was in fact, if not in name, built and is owned by the latter railway company. If such is the fact, we think the map in question was admissible in evidence.

L8] There was no error in that portion of the court’s charge which, in effect, instructed the jury that the burden was on appellant to show by “clear and satisfactory evidence” that the order of the Railroad Commission as to the cost of the depot ordered to be erected at Hurley was unreasonable and unjust to appellant. This is the language of the stab-ute. R. S. art. 6658; R. R. Commission v. Galveston, 105 Tex. 101, 145 S. W. 573.

[9] “Depot grounds,” as that expression is used in the statute, is synonymous with “station.” Hill v. Railway Co., 75 S. W. 876; Railway Co. v. Thornsberry, 17 S. W. 523; 13 Cyc. 1041; Words and Phrases, vol. 7, p. 6644.

We do not deem it necessary to speeifical•ly discuss the remaining assignments of error. They have been considered and are overruled.

For the reason that the verdict is ambiguous and contradictory, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.